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WHAT WERE THEY THINKING? FOURTH
AMENDMENT UNREASONABLENESS IN
ATWATER V. CITY OF LAGO VISTA
Richard S. Frase*
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Supreme Court upheld the
arrest and jailing of a woman for a seat belt violation even though
her offense was punishable with a small fine and the police officer
could have simply issued a citation. Atwater thus permits, and
indeed encourages, unnecessary and disproportionate arrests along
with the various searches and other hardships that routinely
accompany an arrest. The extremely broad arrest power recognized
by the Court also creates a grave potential for abuse in light of the
breadth of modern traffic laws (almost every driver violates some
minor traffic rule), the broad search powers that accompany an
arrest, the documented tendency for some officers to engage in
pretextual investigations and/or racial profiling, and the absence of
effective legal limits on pretexts and profiling.
The Atwater decision is puzzling as well as troubling. The majority
opinion admits that Ms. Atwater's arrest was "pointless" and, as
explained in this article, the Court's reasons for upholding her arrest
are not persuasive. This decision can best be explained in the
context of other recent Fourth Amendment cases that, like Atwater,
reveal the Court's attempts to limit further applications of case-
specific "reasonableness balancing." Even if the concerns
underlying this latent trend are valid, however, they did not justify
the decision in Atwater.
The proper resolution of a case like Atwater can benefit from, and
contribute to, current theories of constitutional interpretation.
Atwater shows the severe limitations of originalism and textualism,
but it adds considerable support to, and helps to further refine,
Professor Cass Sunstein's theory of "minimalism"-that the Court
should generally decide cases narrowly both in terms of the scope of
Benjamin N. Berger Professor of Criminal Law, University of Minnesota. The
author was counsel of record on an amicus brief filed in support of the Petitioners in
Atwater by the Institute on Criminal Justice at the University of Minnesota Law
School and eleven individual criminal justice experts. See infra note 95. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Institute or of the individual amici. Helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this article were received from Craig Bradley, Thomas Y. Davies, Joshua Dressier,
Donald Dripps, Barry Feld, Wayne LaFave, Tracey Maclin, Myron Moskovitz,
Christopher Slobogin, and Ronald F. Wright.
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the ruling and its reasoning. The facts and case-specific policy
arguments in Ms. Atwater's case were compelling, and the Court's
broad grant of arrest power risks many adverse unintended
consequences. The Court easily could and should have ruled
narrowly, deciding only that the police must show a legitimate need
to arrest rather than issue a citation for non-jailable traffic
violations. These legitimate needs are well defined in statutes and
rules found in a number of states. Given the broad scope of traffic
laws, and the infrequent circumstances that justify arrest for these
minor violations, strict limitations on arrest powers are both
essential and administratively feasible. All states should enact
similar limitations by statute or criminal rule; if such limitations are
not forthcoming, courts should not hesitate to recognize them under
state constitutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,1 a five-to-four majority of the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment places no
limitations other than probable cause on police discretion to make a
custodial arrest rather than issuing a citation for a minor traffic
offense. Ms. Atwater was handcuffed and taken to jail even though
she was charged with a seat belt violation punishable only with a small
fine, and there was no legitimate law enforcement need to take her
into custody (e.g., to confirm identification or prevent further
dangerous driving). Seat belt violators are normally issued citations,2
and it appears that the officer in this case made the arrest because he
was angry at Ms. Atwater and wanted to teach her a lesson.3
The decision in Atwater has been widely criticized, even by
conservatives,4 and with good reason. Indeed, the closer one looks at
1. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
2. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(Garza, J., dissenting) ("[l]n a regular traffic stop ... the usual procedure.., is to give
the accused a citation .... ); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 388 (5th
Cir. 1999) ("Our research reveals that every case in Texas wherein an individual was
custodially arrested after violating the seat belt law, the arrest ensued only after some
additional conduct occurred or some additional factor justifying arrest was
revealed.").
3. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
4. Petitioner's Request for Rehearing at 8 n.8, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408) (citing the following criticisms of the decision in the
media: A Decision Lacking Reason, Investor's Bus. Daily, Apr. 26, 2001, at 22; Sandy
Banks, Why A Mom's Fate Should Worry Us All, L.A. Times, Apr. 27, 2001, at 1E;
Mark Cloud, Extreme Searches, Chi. Trib., May 4, 2001, at 25N; Steve Forbes, Junk
Judgment, Forbes, May 28, 2001, at 40; James 0. Goldsborough, Belting Justice for a
Seat-Belt Violation, San Diego Union-Trib., Apr. 30, 2001, at B7; James J. Kilpatrick,
Punishing Logic in Soccer Mom's Case, News and Observer (Raleigh, NC), May 7,
2001, at All; Peter Moskos, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Sowed Confusion, Injustice,
Bait. Sun, May 3, 2001, at 13A; Ed Quillen, Tell Us Again, Which Side Won The Cold
War?, Denver Post, Apr. 29, 2001, at E6; Theotis Robinson, Jr., Supreme Court
Eroding Our Freedom, Knoxville News-Sentinel (Knoxville, TN), Apr. 30, 2001, at
A12; Bob Ray Sanders, High Court Ruling Gives Bad Cops a New Weapon, Fort
Worth Star-Telegram, Apr. 27, 2001, at Metro 1; Rob Zaleski, Supreme Court Ruling
is Boggling, Capital Times (Madison, WI), May 14, 2001, at 1B); The Honorable Dick
Armey, Disappointing Supreme Court Opinion, Apr. 24, 2001,
http://www.freedom.gov/news/statements/seatbelt.asp; A Bad Decision By Supreme
Court, State Journal-Register (Springfield, 11.), May 10, 2001, at 10. Academics have
2002]
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Justice Souter's majority opinion and the issues involved, the less
sense it makes. The decision is "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside
an enigma."5  The enigma is apparent from even a superficial
recitation of the facts:6 jailing a driver for a fine-only seat belt
violation, with no need for custody whatsoever, and apparently in bad
faith, is clearly unreasonable. The mystery deepens when one
examines Justice Souter's reasons for rejecting Ms. Atwater's claim.
Justice Souter seems to admit that, on the facts alleged by the
Petitioner (and which the Court assumed to be true), her arrest was
unreasonable.7
Moreover, the Atwater decision carries with it substantial potential
for abuse. The Court's ruling means that, as a practical matter, the
police may arrest and search the person and the car of anyone who
drives on public streets and highways. These broad powers flow from
the combination of the Court's prior rulings and the nature of modern
traffic laws. In earlier cases, the Court gave the police authority to
conduct routine, suspicionless searches of drivers and their cars,
incident to custodial arrests.' Additional suspicionless search powers
apply to several police procedures that frequently accompany an
arrest, such as the impounding of the arrestee's automobile9 and the
taking of his clothing and other effects when he is booked into jail or
another detention facility."' Given these broad search powers, officers
are tempted to arrest persons for very minor offenses in order to
investigate more serious crimes for which they lack legal grounds to
also been highly critical. See, e.g., 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise
on the Fourth Amendment 19-36 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) [hereinafter LaFave, Search &
Seizure Supplement]; Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest
Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 239 (2002); Irene Merker
Rosenberg, Buckle Up or Else. Or Else What? You're Under Arrest -Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 38 Crim. L. Bull. 160, 160-75 (2002); Akhil Reed Amar, An Unreasonable View
of the 4th Amendment, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 2001, at MI; Craig M. Bradley, Minor-
Offense Arrests Get Green Light in Seat Belt Case, Trial, Aug. 2001, at 66.
5. Bartlett's Familiar Quotations 620 (1992) (quoting an October 1939 speech by
Winston Churchill, who was referring to the Soviet Union).
6. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 248 (Wiener, J., dissenting) ("[H]ere, the facts virtually
speak for themselves .... "). Similarly, Justice Stevens suggested at oral argument
that any arrest for which no plausible reason can be given is arbitrary, and that
anything that is arbitrary cannot be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Supreme Court Oral Argument at 37-38, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001) (No. 99-1408). In contrast, Justice Kennedy opined that 'i]t's not a
constitutional violation for a police officer to be a jerk." Id. at 21. Another
unidentified Justice remarked, "[tihere are a lot of really stupid things that aren't
unconstitutional." Id. at 32.
7. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
8. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973).
9. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976).
10. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
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arrest and search. The Court has refused, however, to permit lower
courts to examine such pretextual motives, in cases where the police
have probable cause to believe that some minor violation has
occurred. 1 But almost every driver violates some minor traffic law
every time he drives. Some examples of common violations include
failing to come to a complete stop at intersections, inadequate
signaling of turns and lane changes, and modestly exceeding the
posted speed limit. If the police do not immediately observe a
violation, they need only follow the driver for a few blocks until they
do.
12
Of course, the police will not follow, arrest, and search every driver
they see, given the potentially staggering costs that such a program of
"full enforcement" would involve. Instead, the extremely broad arrest
and search powers now enjoyed by the police will be applied in a
highly selective manner, thus virtually ensuring even more frequent
complaints of racial profiling and other forms of disparity. 3 But the
Court has made it very difficult for citizens to successfully raise claims
of unconstitutional discriminatory enforcement in the exercise of law
enforcement discretion. 4
The Atwater decision also substantially undercuts the Court's
11. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806 (1996). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 192-94, 250-53 and
accompanying text.
12. Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized
Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 152 [hereinafter
LaFave, Robinson Dilemma] ("[V]ery few drivers can traverse any appreciable
distance without violating some traffic regulation." (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at
248 (Marshall, J., dissenting))); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 544, 582 (1997) ("Any time we use our cars, we can be stopped by the
police virtually at their whim because full compliance with traffic laws is
impossible.").
Modern public-order statutes prohibiting littering, loitering with intent to
commit any crime, general disorderly conduct, etc., also make criminals of a large
number of persons who are not driving. The remainder of this article will focus,
however, on the traffic law context because prohibitions and police powers are
greater in that area. Atwater was a traffic case, and there were good reasons for the
Court to limit its decision to such cases. See infra Part IV.
13. Harris, supra note 12; David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:
Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999); Tracey Maclin,
"Black and Blue Encounters"- Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 243, 250-57 (1991);
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 377-78 (1998).
14. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (discovery); Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (selective enforcement); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976) (absolute immunity); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting claim of racial bias in airport stops because defendant's statistics showing
unequal treatment did not establish intent to discriminate or that police actions were
based solely on race); United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 1996)
(affirming trial court's refusal of defense efforts to show racially biased traffic stops);
United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that defendant failed to
show that whites also violated the bicycle headlamp law and were not arrested).
2002]
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unanimous decision in Knowles v. Iowa,5 decided only a little more
than two years earlier. Knowles held that the suspicionless search-
incident-to-arrest power only applies if the officer makes a custodial
arrest. That search power is not available if the officer releases the
offender on citation or summons to appear, even if a custodial arrest
would have been permitted.16 The Court declined to extend the
search-incident doctrine to citation and summons cases because these
brief citizen-police encounters do not pose the substantial (but
unknowable) risks to the officer which arise when an officer
transports an arrested suspect to jail or the police station. 17 Of course,
the problem with Knowles is that it encourages officers to make
custodial arrests for the sole purpose of conducting a suspicionless
search of the offender, his carried belongings, and his car. But until
Atwater, such arrests were discouraged by the possibility that a court
might invalidate the arrest-particularly an arrest for a very minor
violation, with no demonstrated need for custody. Atwater removes
this uncertainty and explicitly holds that all such arrests are valid,
provided the officer has probable cause that the suspect has
committed some violation."
Naturally, many officers will still be reluctant to make a time-
consuming custodial arrest just to be able to search the suspect, in
cases where citation release would adequately serve to charge the
suspect and bring him to court. But Knowles does not actually require
an arrest. All the officer has to do is announce his intention to arrest
and proceed to conduct a full search of the person and his belongings
and vehicle; if no evidence, contraband, or other seizable items are
found, the officer can then "change his mind" and issue a citation. 9
Thus, the expanded arrest power granted in Atwater greatly increases
the likelihood that officers will conduct searches "incident to
citation," which is precisely what the Court sought to prohibit in
Knowles.
15. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 117. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of the rationale of the search-incident doctrine and the majority's use of
cases within this doctrine to support its decision in Atwater.
18. The probable cause standard is not a particularly high standard. See Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 246 (1983) (defining probable cause as a "fair probability"
under the totality of the circumstances); see also Davies, supra note 4, at 381-85
(remarking that Gates "drastically weakened" the probable cause standard).
19. James B. White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A
Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 165, 208; see also LaFave, Search
& Seizure Supplement, supra note 4, at 28 (noting that police can validly search just
before formally arresting). In other words, the officer in Knowles made the "mistake"
of writing out the citation before he conducted the search. Another search-without-
arrest option for the police, after Atwater, is to "encourage" the suspect to give
consent to the search of his person, belongings, car, or other property or area over
which he has control, by advising him that he will be arrested if he refuses. Id. at 26.
[Vol. 71
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So we are left with a riddle: how can a clearly unreasonable arrest
and an unfettered arrest power with grave potential for abuse be
considered "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment? And why
did Justice Souter, who in recent years voted to uphold Fourth
Amendment rights,2 side with the police in Atwater? This article
explains how the majority in Atwater reached its unfortunate decision
and argues that the Court's reasons-both those stated in the majority
opinion, and those that can be inferred from trends in the Court's
recent Fourth Amendment decisions-did not justify or require the
holding in Atwater. On the contrary, the constitutional arguments for
invalidating Ms. Atwater's arrest were compelling. Those arguments,
and the potential for abuse from unlimited arrest power in minor
cases, should lead state courts to limit such arrests under state
constitutional provisions corresponding to the Fourth Amendment.21
Part I of this article presents a short summary of the facts and
procedural history of the Atwater case and the major arguments
advanced in the majority and dissenting opinions. Part II critiques the
majority's reasoning, while also pointing out the limitations of the
arguments presented to the Court on the Petitioner's behalf. This
case turned out to be deceptively complex, and the Petitioner and her
supporting amici failed to anticipate and address some of the issues
that were of greatest concern to the justices in the majority. Part III.A
examines a latent trend in Fourth Amendment cases that helps to
explain Justice Souter's opinion. Beginning in the late 1970s, and with
increasing frequency in recent years, the Court has sought to limit
further expansion of the application of "reasonableness balancing"
analysis, so as to maintain traditional citizens' rights and police
powers. Part III.B. argues that, even if the concerns underlying this
trend are legitimate, the Court should still have invalidated the arrest
in Atwater. Part IV considers how the proper resolution of a case like
Atwater can both benefit from, and contribute to, theories of
constitutional interpretation-in particular, Professor Cass Sunstein's
theory favoring "minimalist" decisions (narrow in scope, shallow in
reasoning). Part V proposes a workable (and narrow) arrest
limitation rule that could easily have been adopted by the Court in
Atwater, and that should now be adopted by state courts interpreting
their own constitutions: arrest for a fine-only traffic violation should
20. Justice Kennedy, another centrist who joined the majority in Atwater, has also
often voted against the police in recent Fourth Amendment cases. See infra Part
lI.A.
21. Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 1.5(d) (3d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter LaFave]; Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure § 1.02[A]
(3d ed. 2002); Charles H. Whitebread & Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure:
An Analysis of Cases and Concepts § 34.02(c) (4th ed. 2000). At least two courts
have already reached different results under state law. See infra note 402 and
accompanying text. But post-Atwater legislative attempts in Texas to enact stricter
arrest standards for minor cases failed. See infra note 414 and accompanying text.
2002]
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only be permitted if the officer has a reasonable, articulable basis to
believe that custodial arrest is needed to verify identity, ensure
payment of the fine, prevent imminent bodily harm, or prevent
immediate repetition of the violation. State legislators and criminal
rule drafters have a broader range of options, and these are also
briefly considered. The article's concluding section considers the
likely course of future constitutional developments in this area, and
the lessons that civil rights litigators and constitutional scholars should
draw from the surprising and disappointing outcome in Atwater.
I. THE A TWA TER DECISION
A. The Facts and Procedural History
The Atwater case was a federal civil rights suit for damages that the
trial court dismissed on summary judgment, so the legally relevant
facts are those alleged in Ms. Atwater's complaint and supporting
documents.22 As summarized in Justice Souter's majority opinion, the
essential facts and procedural history of the case were as follows:
In March 1997, Petitioner Gail Atwater was driving her pickup truck
in Lago Vista, Texas, with her 3-year-old son and 5-year-old
daughter in the front seat. None of them was wearing a seatbelt.
2 3
Respondent Bart Turek, a Lago Vista police officer at the time,
observed the seatbelt violations and pulled Atwater over.... Turek
approached the truck and "yell[ed]" something to the effect of
"[w]e've met before" and "[y]ou're going to jail." [Turek had
previously stopped Atwater for what he had thought was a seatbelt
violation, but had realized that Atwater's son, although seated on
the vehicle's armrest, was in fact belted in. Atwater [had]
acknowledged that her son's seating position was unsafe, and Turek
issued a verbal warning.] 24 He then called for backup and asked to
see Atwater's driver's license and insurance documentation, which
state law required her to carry. When Atwater told Turek that she
did not have the papers because her purse had been stolen the day
before, Turek said that he had "heard that story two-hundred
times."
Atwater asked to take her "frightened, upset, and crying" children
to a friend's house nearby, but Turek told her, "[y]ou're not going
22. See infra notes 425-29 and accompanying text for a further discussion as to
whether the procedural context, although seemingly advantageous to Ms. Atwater,
actually hurt her case.
23. Ms. Atwater claimed that she was driving slowly (15 m.p.h.) on a residential
street near their home, with the children unbelted so they could look out the windows
for a favorite toy that had been lost while driving. Brief of Petitioners at 2-3, Atwater
v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408).
24. The bracketed material is from a footnote to the opinion. Atwater, 532 U.S. at
324 n.1. The prior encounter between Officer Turek and Ms. Atwater had occurred
approximately three months earlier. Id. at 369-70. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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anywhere." As it turned out, Atwater's friend learned what was
going on and soon arrived to take charge of the children. Turek then
handcuffed Atwater, placed her in his squad car, and drove her to
the local police station, where booking officers had her remove her
shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses, and empty her pockets. Officers took
Atwater's "mug shot" and placed her, alone, in a jail cell for about
one hour, after which she was taken before a magistrate and
released on $310 bond.25
Ms. Atwater was charged with driving without her seatbelt fastened,
failing to secure her children in seatbelts, driving without a license,
and failing to provide proof of insurance. She ultimately pleaded no
contest to the misdemeanor seatbelt offenses and paid a $50 fine; the
other charges were dismissed.26
Ms. Atwater and her husband, representing the children, filed suit
in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Turek, the City of
Lago Vista, and the city police chief Frank Miller, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. The case was removed to a
federal court, which found the Fourth Amendment claim meritless
and granted the city's motion for summary judgment. A panel of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,27 holding that Ms. Atwater's
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, and that Officer Turek was
not entitled to qualified immunity. 2 The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc,
by an eleven-to-six vote, vacated the panel's decision and affirmed the
District Court's grant of summary judgment. 29 The en banc court held
that, although determinations of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
25. Id. at 323-24 (citations omitted). Ms. Atwater further alleged that her hands
were cuffed behind her back, and that she was not secured by a seat belt during the
drive to the police station. Id. at 369 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In addition, her truck
was towed. Id. She had to pay $110 to get it back. Brief of Petitioners at 29, Atwater
(No. 99-1408). Thus, her total out-of-pocket cost for bail and towing, $420, was far
higher than the maximum $50 fine authorized for her offense. Cf Malcolm M. Feeley,
The Process Is the Punishment (Russell Sage Found. 1979) (discussing the dominance
of informal penalties for minor crimes).
26. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323-24. The dismissed driver's license and insurance
charges were not mentioned further in Justice Souter's opinion. Presumably this was
because these charges were likewise punishable only by a fine. Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Dennis, J., dissenting);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4 n.1, Atwater, 523 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408).
Moreover, it appears that the arrest was motivated by the seat belt violations, not the
other charges. Petitioner alleged that Officer Turek stated his intention to take Ms.
Atwater to jail before he asked to see her license and proof of insurance, and that he
had seen both her license and insurance documents during the previous encounter.
Brief of Petitioners at 4 n.1, Atwater, 523 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408). Moreover, prior to
her arrest Ms. Atwater gave the officer her driver's license number, which allowed
him to verify that she still had a valid license. Reply Brief of Petitioners at 14,
Atwater, 523 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408).
27. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1999).
28. For further discussion of the validity and latent importance of the qualified
immunity ruling, see infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
29. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242.
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generally require a balancing of individual and governmental
interests, where "an arrest is based on probable cause then 'with rare
exceptions.., the result of that balancing is not in doubt.""'3 Case-
specific balancing would only be required if an arrest were "conducted
in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's
privacy or even physical interests."3 Because the Petitioner conceded
that Officer Turek had probable cause to arrest her, and the en banc
court found nothing in the record to suggest that Turek conducted the
arrest in an "extraordinary" or "unusually harmful" manner, the court
concluded that her arrest was constitutional.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari32 to consider "whether the
Fourth Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions
on misdemeanor arrests or otherwise, limits police officers' authority
to arrest without warrant for minor criminal offenses. 33
B. Justice Souter's Majority Opinion
Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, began by examining arguments based
on historical sources. Justice Souter did not discuss, or even mention,
the Petitioner's first history-based argument-that the lower court's
ruling, combined with the breadth of modern traffic laws, gives the
police virtually unlimited arrest power, equivalent to common-law
general warrants and writs of assistance-the very abuses that the
Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.34  Instead, Justice
Souter focused on Ms. Atwater's claim that her arrest violated a
common-law rule prohibiting warrantless arrests for misdemeanors
not involving any breach of the peace. Based on an examination of
pre-Founding era English legal materials, Justice Souter concluded
that the commentators and "sparse" case law reached "divergent
conclusions" as to the validity of such arrests, while Parliament
continued to expand warrantless misdemeanor arrest powers for
various non-breach-of-the-peace-crimes. An examination of
American sources, including the probable intent of the Framers, post-
framing era developments, and late-twentieth-century statutes and
model codes, similarly led Justice Souter to conclude that "[t]his ...
30. Id. at 244 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996)).
31. Id. at 244-45 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 818).
32. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000).
33. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001).
34. Brief of Petitioners at 8-12, 20-23, Atwater (No. 99-1408). For further
discussion of these broad powers, see supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text. The
argument based on analogy to general warrants and writs of assistance is more fully
examined in Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A
Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses,
62 Temp. L. Rev. 221 (1989). See also Davies, supra note 4, at 401 (noting that the
framers intended the Fourth Amendment to reinforce common-law principle that
peace officers should not be given discretionary power to arrest or search).
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simply is not a case in which the claimant can point to 'a clear answer
[that] existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the
traditions of our society ever since."'35 Instead, he wrote, "history, if
not unequivocal, has expressed a decided, majority view that the
police need not obtain an arrest warrant merely because a
misdemeanor stopped short of violence or a threat of it."36
Justice Souter next turned to modern Fourth Amendment doctrine,
noting that the Petitioner:
[D]oes not wager all on history. Instead, she asks us to mint a new
rule of constitutional law on the understanding that when historical
practice fails to speak conclusively to a claim grounded on the
Fourth Amendment, courts are left to strike a current balance
between individual and societal interests by subjecting particular
contemporary circumstances to traditional standards of
reasonableness. Atwater accordingly argues for a modern arrest
rule, one not necessarily requiring violent breach of the peace, but
nonetheless forbidding custodial arrest, even upon probable cause,
when conviction could not ultimately carry any jail time and when
the government shows no compelling need for immediate
detention.3
7
Justice Souter then made a startling concession:
If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested
facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail. She was a known and
established resident of Lago Vista with no place to hide and no
incentive to flee, and common sense says she would almost certainly
have buckled up as a condition of driving off with a citation. In her
case, the physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous
humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising
extremely poor judgment. Atwater's claim to live free of pointless
indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can
• 31
raise against it specific to her case.
Justice Souter, however, advanced a number of reasons why Ms.
Atwater's arrest should not be declared unreasonable, despite the
case-specific balance strongly in her favor.
First, Justice Souter cited several search-incident-to-arrest cases
adopting "bright-line" rules granting overbroad police search powers.
35. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 345 (quoting Justice Scalia's dissent in County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991)).
36. Id. at 345.
37. Id. at 345-46 (citations omitted). Actually, Petitioner and her supporting amici
did not call for a standard of "compelling need." For discussion of the standards that
were proposed, see infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
38. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346-47. A similar concession was made in one of the
amicus briefs opposing Ms. Atwater's claim. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (arguing that if the
allegations in complaint were true, "there would be little question that respondent
Turek behaved in an inappropriate and unprofessional manner").
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In Justice Souter's view, these cases stand for the proposition that "a
responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by
standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of
government need, lest every discretionary judgment in the field be
converted into an occasion for constitutional review."3 Justice Souter
then examined whether it might be feasible to devise a clear and
simple constitutional rule limiting warrantless arrests in minor cases,
but he concluded that any such rule would be unworkable. He also
feared that constitutional limits on custodial arrest would lead to
problems of excluded evidence, personal liability of officers, increased
litigation, and "a systematic disincentive" to make custodial arrests
even when they were needed, thus resulting in underenforcement of
the law. "
Next. Justice Souter questioned, as he had at oral argument, "how
bad the problem [of unnecessary, minor crime arrests] is out there."4
He noted that statutes in some jurisdictions already limit such arrests,
that political accountability and good sense can prevent abuses, and
that, as a result, there is "a dearth of horribles demanding redress."42
Finally, Justice Souter announced the Court's new bright line arrest
powers rule, similar to the rule adopted in the en banc Fifth Circuit
opinion, and derived from language in Whren v. United States-that
probable cause is generally a sufficient basis for custodial arrest and
that case-specific balancing of government and private interests will
not be conducted unless the arrest is made in an "extraordinary
manner, unusually harmful to [the citizen's] privacy or even physical
interests."43 Justice Souter concluded that Ms. Atwater's arrest was
not sufficiently "extraordinary" to fit within this exception.
C. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer began by stressing the majority's concession
that Ms. Atwater's arrest was a "'pointless indignity' that served no
discernible state interest."44 She then cited several prior cases for the
proposition that "[i]t is beyond cavil that '[t]he touchstone of our
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always "the reasonableness
in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a
citizen's personal security."' ' ' '  She briefly referred to the majority's
reliance on common-law rules, but argued that "history is just one of
39. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347.
40. Id. at 351.
41. Supreme Court Oral Argument at 20, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
42. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353.
43. Id. (referring to Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)). For a
further discussion of Whren, see infra notes 192-94, 250-53 and accompanying text.
44. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the tools we use in conducting the reasonableness inquiry."46  She
concluded that "when history is inconclusive, as the majority amply
demonstrates it is in this case," courts must balance the intrusion
against the governmental interest in that intrusion based on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case.47  She again
emphasized the majority's admission that such a case-specific
balancing would lead to a ruling in Ms. Atwater's favor. Justice
O'Connor underscored this point by noting the serious invasion of
liberty and privacy involved, particularly in light of the searches and
jailing permitted incident to arrest, but also including the trauma that
Ms. Atwater's children experienced, the creation of an arrest record,
the minimal state interest in prosecuting a fine-only offense and the
absence of any case-specific need for custody to abate criminal
conduct, verify identity, or assure appearance at trial.48 She also
pointed out that, while the Court had never precisely considered the
validity of warrantless misdemeanor arrests,49 several justices had
seriously questioned the constitutionality of custodial arrests in minor
cases.
50
Justice O'Connor then addressed several of Justice Souter's reasons
for refusing to apply case-specific balancing to invalidate Ms.
Atwater's arrest. She argued that the Court's language in Whren,
refusing to engage in case-specific balancing when police act with
probable cause, should not be taken beyond the context there: a brief
traffic stop. She recognized the need for clear and simple rules, but
saw no problem in devising a workable rule limiting arrests for fine-
only offenses. In her view, a citation should always be used "unless
the officer is 'able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant [the additional] intrusion' of a full custodial arrest."51 Justice
O'Connor further argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity will
take care of problems of personal liability and disincentives to arrest.52
Finally, she noted that the majority's per se rule granting broad
discretion to police has "grave potential for abuse" given the many
minor offenses punishable only with a fine, the variety of search
powers that come into play once a valid arrest is made, the risk of
46. Id. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 368, 370-71 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49. Justice O'Connor also noted that the Court's decision in United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), upholding warrantless felony arrests, was based on a
"clear and consistently applied common law rule." Atwater, 532 U.S at 362
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1.973) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 238 n.2 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
51. Atwater, 532 U.S at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
52. Id. at 366-67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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racial profiling and harassment, and the absence of limits on pretext
arrests.53
A further significant feature of Justice O'Connor's opinion is her
explicit adoption of the concept of proportionality. At three different
points in her opinion, Justice O'Connor complained that Ms.
Atwater's arrest was disproportionate relative to the nature and
seriousness of her offense54 and to any legitimate case-specific need to
take her into custody." As discussed more fully in Part III.B, the first
of these proportionality concepts suggests a limiting principle that is
distinct from, and easier to apply than, the general Fourth
Amendment reasonableness balancing test.
Although Justice O'Connor wrote a powerful and persuasive
dissent, she did not fully respond to all of the arguments in Justice
Souter's majority opinion. The following section provides such a
critique.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE MAJORITY OPINION'S STATED RATIONALES
One of the most striking things about Justice Souter's opinion is the
relative emphasis given to the various arguments bearing on the
validity of Ms. Atwater's arrest. Justice Souter began by addressing
historical arguments and devoted two-thirds of his opinion to them
before turning to a consideration of modern Fourth Amendment law.
His limited discussion of contemporary issues paid very little attention
to the Court's prior decisions defining police powers associated with
arrests, and he almost completely disregarded the practical
consequences of the Court's ruling in light of the nature of modern
policing and traffic laws."
A. Common Law and Other Historical Sources
Justice Souter began his opinion by noting that the understanding
of arrest powers under common law during the Founding-era "sheds
light on the obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive,
consideration of what the Framers of the [Fourth] Amendment might
have thought to be reasonable."57 Justice Souter then addressed, and
rejected, the Petitioner's specific contention that the common law
prohibited warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of breach
of the peace. However, as noted previously, Justice Souter did not
mention or address the Petitioner's other historical argument: that
the lower court's ruling effectively gives the police discretion
53. Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 364, 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 371 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.




equivalent to that exercised under common-law general warrants and
writs of assistance. 8 Perhaps Justice Souter felt that such broad
arguments by analogy are too imprecise to serve the purposes of
"originalism" in constitutional adjudication-limiting judicial
discretion and making the law more predictable. 9  But Justice
Souter's preferred historical argument, based on specific features of
common-law and early American misdemeanor arrest rules, does not
avoid all problems of judicial discretion and unpredictability.
Moreover, for the reasons suggested below, eighteenth-century rules
provide an unsatisfactory basis for determining, in a case like Atwater,
what constitutes an unreasonable search or seizure at the start of the
twenty-first century. Although the Court has relied on common-law
rules in a number of its prior Fourth Amendment decisions," Atwater
represents one of the most extreme examples of the use, and misuse,
of original-meaning arguments.61
Justice Souter and the other justices in the majority are not entirely
to blame for their focus on historical sources, since the Petitioner
strongly emphasized such sources. Petitioner's brief on the merits
began with the two common-law arguments noted above, which took
up over one-third of the argument section.62 Moreover, the petition
58. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Petitioner had conceded that a
somewhat similar argument-that everybody violates traffic laws, so probable cause
cannot be the only limitation-had already been rejected by the court in Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). But Petitioner sought to distinguish custodial
arrests from the traffic stop at issue in Whren. Brief of Petitioners at 22, Atwater (No.
99-1408).
59. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court 210-11 (1999); Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The Second
Amendment and the Failure of Originalism, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 167, 180 (2000);
David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev.
1739, 1793 (2000).
60. See, e.g., Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295 (1999); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621 (1991); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). On the other hand, the Court has sometimes declined to
incorporate common-law rules. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S.
44 (1991); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). See infra notes 315-16 and
accompanying text for a further discussion of Garner.
61. For a thorough and very critical review of the accuracy and value of Justice
Souter's historical analysis in Atwater, see Davies, supra note 4. The Court's recent
emphasis on originalism in Fourth Amendment cases is reviewed and critiqued in
Sklansky, supra note 59. See also Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why The
Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged (2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review). For a succinct
critique of the feasibility and desirability of constitutional originalism in general, see
Farber, supra note 59.
62. Brief of Petitioners at 7-19, Atwater (No. 99-1408). Petitioner's counsel also
strongly emphasized the common law at oral argument, even though the Court's first
question asked why the common law was relevant at all. Supreme Court Oral
Argument at 3, Atwater (No. 99-1408). Later in the argument, counsel suggested that




for certiorari had strongly emphasized the similarity between the
issues in Atwater and those in a case heard by the Court two years
earlier, Ricci v. Village of Arlington Heights.63 In both cases, the
Petitioners argued that the Fourth Amendment incorporates a
common-law, breach-of-the-peace requirement for misdemeanor
arrests, even when the offense is committed in the presence of the
arresting officer or citizen. After reading the briefs and listening to
the oral arguments in Ricci, the Court dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted,'M apparently because the actual case facts did
not fit within the supposed common-law rule. Linking these two cases
in the Atwater certiorari petition was presumably done in order to
persuade the Court that the issue of constitutional limitations on
misdemeanor arrest powers was important enough to grant review
again. But this linkage, along with the order of arguments in
Petitioner's brief on the merits, may have led some members of the
Court to think that the common-law misdemeanor arrest rule was the
primary issue in Atwater.
In retrospect, it may have been a mistake for Petitioner to give so
much emphasis to the common-law breach-of-the-peace-argument.
Justice Souter may have been right to conclude that this common-law
rule was not so well established that one could find that it must have
been intended to be carried over in the Fourth Amendment.65
Moreover, the supposed common-law rule bore little relationship to
the facts in Atwater. That rule limited arrests for jailable as well as
non-jailable offenses and did not recognize any legitimate grounds for
warrantless misdemeanor arrest other than immediate public safety
(breach of the peace). The common-law rule thus swept much more
broadly than would any rule based on the actual facts of Atwater and
bore no relationship to the two most compelling facts in Ms. Atwater's
case: that her offense was punishable only with a fine, and that there
63. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 6-9, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (citing Ricci v.
City of Arlington Heights, 116 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 522 U.S. 1038
(1998), writ dismissed as improvidently granted, 523 U.S. 613 (1998)).
64. Ricci, 523 U.S. at 613; see Wayne Logan, Policing in an Intolerant Society, 35
Crim. L. Bull. 334, 353 n.92 (1999) (discussing the concern raised by several Justices
during oral argument in Ricci that the violation in question was considered a "civil"
rather than a "criminal" provision).
65. See LaFave, Search & Seizure Supplement, supra note 4, at 19 (remarking that
Justice Souter's conclusions about the common-law breach-of-peace requirement are
"well documented," and that all of the justices agreed there was no "clear and
consistently applied" common-law rule); see also William A. Schroeder, Warrantless
Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mo. L. Rev. 771, 848 (1993)
(stating that the common-law breach-of-the-peace rule has been abandoned in almost
all American jurisdictions, and should not be deemed constitutionally required, but
the common-law "in-the-presence" rule should be). But see Davies, supra note 4
(arguing that Founding-era exceptions to the breach-of-the-peace requirement were
narrowly tailored, and that the Framers would not have approved of the broad
misdemeanor arrest power endorsed by the Atwater majority).
[Vol. 71
2002] ATWATER AND UNREASONABLENESS 345
was absolutely no need to take her into custody.66 Indeed, the
overbreadth of the common-law misdemeanor arrest limitation was
implicitly conceded by the much narrower terms of Petitioner's
proposed "modern" rule based on reasonableness balancing analysis.
Petitioner's rule would have only applied to non-jailable traffic
offenses; moreover, even in those cases her rule would allow arrest
not just for reasons of public safety, but also when "necessary for
enforcement of the traffic laws."67
It is possible that Justice Souter would have emphasized historical
sources even if Petitioner had not. But such sources also provide
weak support for Justice Souter's own (pro-police) arrest rule. His
review concluded that "history, if not unequivocal, has expressed a
decided, majority view" that a warrant is not needed to arrest for a
non-violent misdemeanor.68 The four dissenters viewed the same
history as "inconclusive. '"69
Even if the common-law and early American rules had been much
more clear, and had unambiguously permitted warrantless arrest for
non-violent misdemeanors, it would have been (and was) a mistake to
give these ancient rules controlling weight in a case like Atwater. As
the Court recognized in Tennessee v. Garner," much has changed in
American society, law, and criminal justice since the Founding era. In
Garner, the changes had to do with the common-law's authorization
of the death penalty for almost all felonies, the dramatically different
mix of offenses defined as a felony under modern criminal laws, and
major changes in police weaponry that made it much easier for
modern police to kill fleeing suspects who pose no imminent danger to
the officer. The Court therefore concluded that incorporating the
common-law deadly force rule "would be a mistaken literalism that
ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry."7
66. Furthermore, if the Court had held that the Fourth Amendment incorporates
the common-law breach-of-the-peace requirement, the result would have been to
constitutionalize the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. But as
Petitioner conceded, such offense classifications vary considerably from state to state,
and have also changed dramatically since the Founding era. Brief of Petitioners at 46,
Atwater (No. 99-1408) (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 440 n.9 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that many modern felonies were misdemeanors at
common law)).
67. Brief of Petitioners at 46, Atwater (No. 99-1408). For a further discussion of
Petitioner's proposed rule and its exceptions, see infra notes 137, 386-87 and
accompanying text.
68. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 345 (2001).
69. Id. at 361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see generally, Davies, supra note 4.
70. 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not incorporate
the common-law rule permitting use of deadly force to effect a felony arrest).
71. Id. at 13; see also Davies, supra note 4, at 422-37 (opining that framing-era
criminal procedure was so different from our own that it cannot provide answers for
contemporary issues); Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal
Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 47-48 (2001) [hereinafter, Dripps, Constitutional Theory]
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In Ms. Atwater's case, the relevant changes since 1791 are different,
but equally compelling: in the Founding era there were no cars and
traffic regulations, no driver and vehicle licensing laws, and no
instantly-accessible computerized driver, vehicle and outstanding-
warrant records. Nor were there large professional police
departments with officers constantly on patrol looking for minor
violations and rounding up absconders. 2  Moreover, some of the
broad police powers that now apply whenever a valid arrest is made
may not have existed in the late eighteenth century. Could the few
police officers back then routinely conduct suspicionless searches of
the "passenger compartment" of the horse-drawn carriage in which
the suspect was riding when arrested, or impound the carriage and
conduct a detailed inventory search of its contents? 73  Could such
officers stop and frisk suspects on standards less demanding than
probable cause?74  The Court did not even bother to look for
common-law roots when it gave approval to many of these expanded,
modern-day police powers, so it should not insist on finding a
common-law basis for any rule which limits police powers. Clearly, the
Court has not consistently imposed any such requirement in the past.75
("The institutional framework of modern criminal justice differs so greatly from that
known to the authors of the Bill of Rights that, as Lawrence Lessig has argued,
something akin to translation is required before the constitutional text is even
relevant to modern practice." (citing Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex.
L. Rev. 1165 (1993))); Susan R. Klein, Enduring Principles and Current Crises in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 533, 541 (1999) (stating
that in matters of criminal justice, "the present legal and social landscape is...
completely foreign to that of the Framers' time"); see generally, Sklansky, supra note
59.
72. The first modern police force was created in London, in 1829. Robin Shepard
Engel, Police: History, in 3 Encyclopedia of Crime & Justice 1051-60 (2d ed. 2002).
Full time public prosecutors were also rare in common-law England, and a mix of
public and private prosecution was used in colonial America. Abraham S. Goldstein,
Prosecution: History of the Public Prosecutor, in 3 Encyclopedia of Crime & Justice
1242-46 (2d ed. 2002). In part due to the greater reliance on private policing and
prosecution, custodial arrest for minor crimes was relatively rare in the Founding era:
"Prior to the mid 1800s... the summons was the rule." Salken, supra note 34, at 258.
It can also be argued that the original meaning of the Bill of Rights provisions was
fundamentally changed by the post-Civil War amendments, with their strong
emphasis on equal protection values. For further discussion of the problems of
discriminatory enforcement created by the Atwater decision, see infra notes 123-29,
183, 325-27, 360-62 and accompanying text.
73. Cf Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (holding that inventory search of
impounded vehicles includes any closed containers therein); New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454 (1981) (ruling that scope of search incident to arrest includes passenger
compartment).
74. Cf. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich.
L. Rev. 547, 629 n.216 (1999) (finding no framing-era equivalent of broadly-applicable
detention power approved in Terry v. Ohio).
75. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reaffirmed in Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); see also Davies, supra note 4, at 260-64 (noting
that the Court's use of framing-era doctrine is very selective, and was not even
mentioned in Dickerson and in most recent Fourth Amendment decisions).
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Finally, even if one believes that adherence to the original meaning
of the Fourth Amendment serves the important goals of limiting
judicial discretion and making the law more predictable,76 can these
benefits be achieved with any regularity, given the difficulty of
accurately determining common-law rules and applying them in a
modern context? The results of Justice Souter's extensive historical
survey-deemed "inconclusive" by four members of the Court-
suggest that originalism often will not provide the benefits its
proponents seek.77
In fairness, it should be noted that Justice Souter's historical
analysis was not limited to the Founding era. He also examined cases,
statutes, and commentary from that era up to the present and
concluded that these materials also failed to support Petitioner's
proposed breach-of-the-peace limitation. This broader historical
approach, which involves a search for what might be called the
Constitution's "traditional meaning," also had been used by the Court
in earlier arrest cases.7" "Traditionalism" is less problematic than
"originalism" because the former relies upon more recent legal theory
and practice, which are more relevant to our era, and easier for us to
discover and interpret. Like originalism, the traditional meaning
approach also tends to discourage novel interpretations, making the
law more predictable and stable. As discussed more fully in Part III,
the Court's recent Fourth Amendment decisions reveal a strong
preference for maintaining traditional rules governing both police
powers and citizens' rights.
However, the value of the traditional meaning approach depends
on how it is used and what questions are asked. Justice Souter only
used it to look for evidence supporting the common-law breach-of-
the-peace requirement. If he had applied this approach to Petitioner's
alternative arrest-limitation rule (applicable to non-jailable traffic
offenses), he would have found considerable and growing support in
modern laws and model codes." Moreover, adoption of a traditional
meaning approach does not free the Court from the obligation to
seriously consider whether a long-standing constitutional rule has
become undesirable in light of current social and legal conditions. As
noted at the outset of this article, these conditions strongly suggest the
need for additional constitutional limitations on minor-crime arrests,
yet these current conditions were almost completely ignored by the
majority in Atwater. As discussed more fully below, the Court's stated
reasons for rejecting the Petitioner's strong "modern law" argument,
based on reasonableness balancing, were shallow and unpersuasive.
76. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
77. See Farber, supra note 59, at 170-83.
78. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416-21 (1976).
79. See infra Part V.
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B. Reasonableness Balancing- Why Ms. Atwater Wins on the Facts,
but Still Loses
Justice Souter devoted approximately the last third of his opinion to
the Petitioner's alternative argument-that her arrest was
unreasonable because the degree of intrusion into her personal
liberty, privacy, and dignity outweighed the minimal or non-existent
law enforcement interest served by taking her into custody. The
Court first formally recognized this balancing approach in Camara v.
Municipal Court of San Francisco,"' where it upheld housing and other
regulatory inspections pursuant to warrants based on administrative
criteria"l rather than an individualized suspicion of violation. The
Court stated that "there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails." 2 In the Court's view, three factors
supported the reasonableness of these inspections, despite the absence
of traditional probable cause to search:
First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous
conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other
[inspection] technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such
conditions-faulty wiring is an obvious example-are not
observable from outside the building and indeed may not be
apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery
of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the
urban citizen's privacy. 3
One year later, the Court again used a reasonableness balancing
approach in Terry v. Ohio84 to uphold warrantless investigatory stops
and frisks based on a degree of suspicion less than probable cause (a
standard usually referred to as "reasonable" and/or "articulable"
suspicion)." Citing Camara and its balancing test, the Court
concluded that important government interests are served by such
stops and frisks, and that such interests, supported by reasonable
suspicion, justify the relatively minor intrusions authorized by the
Court, because a stop is less intrusive than an arrest, and a frisk is less
thorough than a search incident to arrest. s6
In recent years, the Court often has used this balancing approach to
80. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
81. Such criteria might include "the passage of time, the nature of the building(e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area." Id. at 538.
82. Id. at 536-37.
83. Id. at 537 (citation omitted).
84. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
85. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1997) (noting that a Terry pat-
down requires reasonable and articulable suspicion of danger); Dressier, supra note
21, § 18.03[A].
86. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22, 26-27.
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uphold warrantless (and usually suspicionless) searches and seizures:
searches of regulated industries;87 automobile and jail inventories;8
immigration and drunk driving roadblocks; 9 drug testing9" and other
searches91 of high school students, public employees, and convicts; and
miscellaneous other limited intrusions. Over the years, some
observers have expressed concerns that such balancing would only be
used to water down Fourth Amendment rights;93 reasonableness
balancing has, however, occasionally been used to grant additional
protections to citizens.94
Application of the balancing approach strongly favored Ms.
Atwater's claim that her arrest was unreasonable. Her custodial
arrest and its various incidents, which included handcuffing and
removal to the police station, separation from and trauma to her
children, the searches of her person and vehicle, and her confinement
in a cell, were significant intrusions on her liberty and privacy, and
were not justified by either the seriousness of her offense or any case-
specific need to take her into custody. Indeed, as noted above, Justice
Souter agreed with this assessment, characterizing her arrest as a
"gratuitous humiliation[]" that imposed "pointless indignity and
confinement." 9' Nevertheless, Justice Souter concluded that, when
87. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
88. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976).
89. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
90. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
91. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985).
92. See infra notes 280, 294 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 465 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that balancing should not be viewed "as a one-way street, to be
used only to water down" citizens' rights); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 393-94 (1974); Scott E. Sundby, A
Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry. 72
Minn. L. Rev. 383, 384-85 (1988); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a
General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 119, 130 (1989) (claiming that balancing has led to "a steady weakening of fourth
amendment protections").
94. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985);
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
95. Brief of Petitioners at 23-36, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001) (No. 99-1408); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, et
al., in Support of Petitioners ("ACLU Amicus Brief") at 11-18, Atwater (No. 99-
1408); Brief of the Institute on Criminal Justice at the University of Minnesota Law
School and Eleven Leading Experts on Law Enforcement and Corrections
Administration and Policy as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners ("Institute
Amicus Brief") at 3-17, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
96. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346-47.
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viewed in a perspective broader than the facts of Ms. Atwater's case,
her arrest should not be deemed unreasonable.
Justice Souter's specific reasons for this conclusion are examined
below. On closer inspection, each of these reasons is unpersuasive.97
But once again, the fault is not entirely Justice Souter's. None of the
broader policy considerations cited by Justice Souter was fully
addressed in the briefs of Petitioner and her supporting amici.
Indeed, several were not addressed at all, nor have most of these
points been adequately discussed in scholarly literature.
1. Balancing Must Reflect the Value of Readily-Administrable
(Bright-Line) Rules
Justice Souter began his attack on Ms. Atwater's case-specific
balancing argument by citing United States v. Robinson" and New
York v. Belton,99 search-incident-to-arrest cases that rejected case-
specific evaluation in favor of simple, "bright-line" rules granting
overbroad police powers. As Justice Souter explained,
Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur
(and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its
command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear
and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial
second-guessing months and years after an arrest or search is made.
Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment
balance thus credit the government's side with an essential interest
in readily administrable rules ... [which] "'ought to be expressed in
terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the
97. An alternative argument, which was not mentioned by Justice Souter or in any
of the briefs opposing Ms. Atwater, is that a strategy of "zero tolerance policing"
requires and justifies arrests for minor crimes (or at least, that the Court should not
adopt federal constitutional rules which would "tie the hands" of police
administrators who believe in this approach). See Logan, supra note 64, at 353 n.92
(citing brief of respondent in Ricci v. City of Arlington Heights, 522 U.S. 1038
(1998)). This police strategy is based on the theory of "broken windows"-that a
failure to vigorously suppress minor forms of deviance and disorder encourages more
serious crimes and general neighborhood decay. James Q. Wilson & George Kelling,
Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic Monthly, March
1982, at 29-38. Some observers have questioned the validity of this theory, as well as
the effectiveness of zero tolerance policing. See, e.g., Bernard Harcourt, Illusion of
Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing (Harvard Univ. Press 2001).
In any case, it appears that such policing strategies have more often focused on
"nuisance" or "quality of life" crimes (graffiti, public drinking or urination, low-level
drug sales and use, prostitution, subway fare-beating, and panhandling), rather than
on minor traffic offenders like Ms. Atwater. See Logan, supra note 64, at 335, 337,
339. And when the latter are targeted, they are usually subjected only to brief
detention (questioning and observing the vehicle's occupants, inspecting the vehicle
itself, and checking for outstanding warrants), not routine custodial arrest. See id. at
341 n.29, 342 n.33, 343 n.39.
98. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
99. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged"'
and not "'qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts.'
100
There is certainly much truth in what Justice Souter says about the
value of simple, readily-administered rules."' But Justice Souter's
arguments ultimately fail, and the fault lies partly with counsel and
Fourth Amendment scholars. Although the pro-police bright-line rule
cases cited by Justice Souter are well known, and provided a
predictable counter to Ms. Atwater's strong case-specific balancing
arguments, these cases were almost completely ignored in the briefs of
Petitioner and her supporting amici,()2 and were not addressed in
Justice O'Connor's dissent. Scholars, too, are well aware of these
cases, but do not seem to have explored their application to a case like
Atwater.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the Court has not
been very clear about its criteria for deciding when to adopt a bright-
line rule. Such rules have been rejected (in favor of case-specific
standards or factors evaluated under "the totality of the
circumstances") in numerous Fourth Amendment cases.'( 3 Wayne
100. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347. This theory is taken from New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 458 (1981), which in turn was quoting from LaFave, Robinson Dilemma,
supra note 12, at 141. However, in the same article, Professor LaFave went on to
argue that the police should not have unregulated discretion to make custodial arrests;
instead, he proposed that regulations should specify the general situations in which
arrest is either required or prohibited. Id. at 158-61. In later writings, Professor
LaFave proposed strict criteria for adopting bright-line police-powers rules, and
concluded that some of the Court's decisions-including Atwater-have not met these
criteria. See infra notes 104, 114, 130 and accompanying text.
101. See generally LaFave, Robinson Dilemma, supra note 12; Dripps,
Constitutional Theory, supra note 71; see also infra Part V. But see Albert W.
Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 227, 231
(1984) ("[bright-line rules] often lead to substantial injustice [and] their artificiality
commonly makes them difficult, not easy, to apply."). See also Craig Bradley, Two
Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468, 1471 (1985) (suggesting that
in lieu of unworkable bright-lines, courts should adopt either a general
reasonableness standard, or strictly enforce the warrant requirement).
102. Only one brief supporting Petitioner even mentioned these cases. See Institute
Amicus Brief at 9 n.7.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105 (2002) (discussing consent
by and seizure of bus passengers); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126-27 (2000)
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting with approval the majority's rejection
of bright-line rules proposed by each side in that case, as to whether the suspect's
flight was a sufficient basis for a Terry stop); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385
(1997) (requiring case-specific justification for no-knock entry); Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (citing earlier cases rejecting bright-line rules); United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 684-87 (1985) (discussing duration of allowable stop under
Terry v. Ohio); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (determining "standing" to
suppress illegally-seized evidence); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(requiring that voluntariness of consent be assessed under the totality of the
circumstances).
Numerous cases outside of the Fourth Amendment context have also rejected
proposed bright-line rules. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)(involving ineffective assistance of counsel); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357
352 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
LaFave has suggested the following criteria for evaluating whether a
proposed bright-line rule should be adopted in a particular context:
1) Does [the proposed rule] have clear and certain boundaries, so
that it in fact makes unnecessary case-by-case evaluation and
adjudication?
2) Does it produce results approximating those which would be
obtained if accurate case-by-case application of the underlying
principle were possible?
3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to forego case-by-case
application of a principle because that approach has proved
unworkable?
4) Is it not readily subject to manipulation and abuse?1 114
It is far from clear that the Court's adoptions and rejections of
bright-line rules have been consistent with LaFave's criteria, or with
any other set of neutral principles.
Cynics might argue that one of the principles guiding the Court, or
at least some of the justices, is that bright-line rules will ordinarily
only be adopted when they favor the police, granting them overbroad
powers that would often not be justified by application of any
underlying principle to the particular case facts. Unfortunately, the
language of the majority opinion in Atwater lends some support to this
theory.
Justice Souter began his analysis of reasonableness balancing by
asserting that such balancing must "credit the government's side with
an essential interest in readily administrable rules.""' 5  Thus, even
before stating exactly what "readily-administrable rule" he was
proposing, Justice Souter implied that such rules always help "the
government's side" of the balance. But overbroad pro-defendant (or
pro-civil-rights) bright-line rules, although less common (especially in
recent years), do exist."°6 An example of an overbroad pro-defendant
(1978) (filing of mandatory life-sentence charge after defendant refused to plead to
much lower initial charge); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (allowing
death-motivated guilty plea).
104. Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment § 7.1(c) at 446 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter LaFave, Search & Seizure].
105. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001). At this point in his
opinion, Justice Souter cited New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981). That
portion of the Belton opinion deals with the value of clear rules for police decisions,
but it did not suggest that such rules must or should be overbroad in favor of the
police.
106. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reaffirmed in Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Miranda is (or at least, once was) an overbroad,
pro-defendant bright-line rule because it renders inadmissible some statements that
would be admissible by application of underlying principles of voluntariness or
compelled self-incrimination. See infra note 348. Cases granting automatic rights to
appointed counsel also announced overbroad, pro-defendant rules. See Alabama v.
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rule in the Fourth Amendment context might be found in the Court's
recent decision in Kyllo v. United States,"7 invalidating the use of a
heat-detecting "thermal imaging" device to obtain any information-
even non-intimate information-regarding the interior of a home that
police could not otherwise obtain without entering the home. And
although most bright-line rules seem to be overbroad in favor of
either the police or the citizen, some rules are relatively neutral.
Perhaps Chimel v. California"°s was such a rule. Chimel favored the
police by permitting suspicionless searches of an arrestee's person and
the area of his immediate control, however, it favored the citizen by
ruling that such routine searches could not extend to a wider area.'019
Putting aside the Court's lack of clarity in adopting bright-line rules,
and its possible tendency to favor pro-police rules, what can be said
about the "readily-administrable" rule Justice Souter actually adopted
in Atwater? What exactly is this rule, and how did Justice Souter
justify its "polarity" (pro-police) and its precise language? A
statement of the majority's rule can be pieced together from several
paragraphs near the end of Justice Souter's opinion: except for arrests
made in an "extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to [the
citizen's] privacy ... or physical interests," probable cause suffices to
justify any arrest, regardless of the seriousness of the offense or the
actual need to take the suspect into custody.'
In support of adopting this overbroad pro-police rule governing
arrest powers in minor cases, Justice Souter cited two of the Court's
most famous decisions of this type: Robinson v. United States"' and
New York v. Belton."' However, a pro-police, bright-line rule is much
more appropriate in the search-incident context at issue in Robinson
Shelton, 122 S. Ct. 1764 (2002); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on
the Freeway, 3 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 117, 155-57 (2001) (citing other examples of
pro-citizen bright-line rules, but concluding that the Court has not articulated neutral
principles for deciding when to adopt such a rule).
107. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Other recent examples of pro-defendant bright-line rules
can be found in a series of cases rejecting prosecution arguments based on case-
specific "reasonableness balancing" arguments. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). These cases, as well as Kyllo, are further discussed in
Part III.A.
108. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
109. See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical
Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 Wisc. L. Rev. 657, 659 (characterizing
these two aspects of Chimel as its "positive" and "negative" rules).
110. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818
(1996)). Although not mentioned in Justice Souter's opinion, the police presumably
still need at least an arrest warrant to make a non-consensual, non-exigent entry of
the suspect's home for the purpose of effecting an arrest. See Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980). They may also need a search warrant to enter the home of a
non-suspect third party. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
111. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
112. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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and Belton, and poses far fewer risks of manipulation and abuse.
Moreover, Justice Souter's failure to seriously consider these risks
renders his broader conception of reasonableness balancing, which
factors in the value of readily-administrable rules, very unsatisfactory
and, in effect, very pro-police.
The Robinson and Belton rules permit suspicionless searches of the
suspect, his "area of immediate control," and the passenger
compartment of any car he was riding in when arrested, as a routine
"incident" to (and "contemporaneous" with) custodial arrest for any
offense, even a traffic offense." 3 These rules are not free from
controversy; they have been questioned by many scholars,114 and
several states have rejected or limited them as a matter of state
constitutional law.1 5 But whatever their faults, such bright-line,
strongly pro-police rules make much more sense in the
Robinson/Belton context"6 than in a case like Atwater.
First, it should be noted that Robinson and Belton only assumed,
but did not decide, that the custodial arrests in those cases were valid.
Indeed, Justices Stewart and Powell, two relatively conservative
members of the Robinson Court, each questioned the constitutional
validity of arrests in minor traffic cases." 7 When this issue was finally
squarely presented in Atwater, the Court should have given serious
consideration to the concerns raised by these two justices-concerns
which have only grown more serious in light of numerous subsequent
decisions expanding police powers. In particular, the Court should
have been very hesitant to adopt another bright-line, overbroad
police-powers rule, given the cumulative effect-and potential for
abuse-of these rules. But instead, the Court proceeded to pile yet
another overbroad, pro-police rule on top of the old ones-that is, on
top of the Robinson and Belton search-incident rules; the automobile
113. See Belton, 453 U.S. 454; Robinson, 414 U.S. 218.
114. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 21, §§ 13.04-.05; LaFave, Search & Seizure,
supra note 104, §§ 5.2(e), 7.1(c); Moskovitz, supra note 109; Whitebread & Slobogin,
supra note 21, at 82, 191.
115. See, e.g., Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977); State v. Perham, 814
P.2d 914 (Haw. 1991); State v. Hardaway, 36 P.3d 900 (Mont. 2001); State v.
Chrisman, 676 P.2d 419 (Wash. 1984).
116. Automobile impound and jail-booking inventory searches are another context
in which the Court has permitted routine, suspicionless searches. Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). For many of
the reasons suggested in the text, such overbroad but highly "standardized" search
powers pose fewer problems than the overbroad and highly discretionary arrest
power recognized in Atwater.
117. In Robinson, Justice Powell, concurring, stated that the validity of a custodial
arrest for a minor traffic offense was "not ... self-evident." 414 U.S. at 238 n.2. In the
companion case of Gustafson v. Florida, Justice Stewart, concurring, stated that "a
persuasive claim might have been made ... that the custodial arrest of the Petitioner
for a minor traffic offense violated [the Fourth Amendment]. But no such claim has
been made." 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973).
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and jail inventory rules;' and the cases refusing to allow courts to
examine pretextual motives for the arrest.119
Another reason why the Robinson and Belton decisions provide
weak support for the Court's pro-police ruling in Atwater has to do
with differences in the nature of arrest and search-incident decisions.
Searches incident to custodial arrest, even for minor crimes, are
justified primarily by the need to ensure the officer's safety during the
drive from the arrest scene to the police station. 2  A routine,
suspicionless search power is needed because anyone may be carrying
a weapon, and because there is no reliable way to identify which
arrested persons are armed. The consequences of failing to disarm the
suspect can be fatal to the officer or to the suspect. 2' For these
reasons, even the dissenters in Robinson agreed that at least a
suspicionless weapons frisk would be permissible. 22 Moreover, given
the unpredictable nature of weapons-carrying, and the potentially
fatal consequences of placing an armed suspect in the back seat of the
police car, police officers are likely to invoke their search-incident
powers in most custodial arrest cases, even if departmental regulations
do not mandate the search. Thus, the search-incident power gives rise
to a more or less "standardized" procedure'23 that the police can easily
apply and which produces limited potential for disparate treatment of
suspects.
The Atwater context is much different in terms of police needs, the
potential for disparity, and the suitability of an overbroad, pro-police
rule.'24 The overwhelming majority of suspects in minor traffic-stops
do not need to be taken into custody, and the few who do can be
118. See supra notes 9, 116; cf. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining about the piling of overbroad (pro-defendant)
bright-line rules on top of each other- "prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis"-in the
Miranda context).
119. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam); Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text (citing cases
that render it practically impossible for suspects or defendants to raise a successful
claim of racially discriminatory enforcement).
120. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113,116-18 (1998).
121. Some years ago a case was reported in the Minneapolis paper of a suspect who
was shot dead by the police (before they had a chance to frisk him) because they
thought his cigarette lighter was a pistol.
122. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 250-51 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
123. See generally, LaFave, Robinson Dilemma, supra note 12. The similarly
overbroad automobile and jail-inventory search powers are even more standardized.
Supra notes 9-10. The Court has invalidated inventory searches that were not
sufficiently controlled by police department regulations. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S.
1 (1990).
124. Another distinction is that custodial arrest represents a substantial additional
intrusion, beyond that already imposed on the offender; in Robinson, the Court may
have viewed the search-incident of the arrestee as a relatively minor addition to the




identified by simple, objective criteria that can already be found in the
existing laws of several states.125 The identity of the offender can
almost always be established from driver and vehicle licensing
records. Minor traffic suspects are unlikely to flee to avoid paying a
modest fine. And if a suspect fails to appear in court, or even flees the
jurisdiction, he may be subject to driver's license suspension.'26 Nor
do most minor traffic offenders pose any imminent risk of harm to
themselves or others. Finally, as Justice Rehnquist (speaking for a
unanimous court) noted in Knowles v. Iowa,127 there is rarely any need
to search the person or vehicle of a traffic offender for evidence of
their current offense-the officer already has all the evidence needed
to prove the violation.
For all of these reasons, and because the sheer volume of traffic
cases precludes arresting more than a small fraction of them, the great
majority of traffic offenders will, even after the Atwater ruling,
continue to be issued citations and then released at the scene,
although more of them will probably be searched first, and arrested
only if evidence or contraband are found. 2 But it is likely that more
suspects will now be arrested. Because the Court has declined to
require any scrutiny of these decisions, there is no reason to assume
that the police will only make arrests when there is a valid need for
this measure, and every reason to assume that many offenders will be
arrested for invalid reasons, such as to harass a particular individual or
group, to impose informal "punishment" (as seems to have been the
motive in Atwater), or to use the traffic violation as a pretext to
investigate other suspected violations. Because virtually anyone who
drives can be charged with a traffic violation, the potential for abuse is
great. 129
Nor does Justice Souter's rule that probable cause is sufficient
grounds for any in-public arrest, except in "extraordinary" cases, hold
up well when judged according to Professor LaFave's criteria for
assessing bright-line rules, summarized above:"1
1) the boundaries of this rule are not necessarily "clear and
certain"--what is an "extraordinary" arrest? Moreover, Ms.
Atwater's arrest was "extraordinary" in a number of respects.13 1
2) as noted above, the rule authorizes arrest in far more cases than
125. For further discussion, see infra section Il.B.2 and Part V.
126. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 171.01(13) (2000) (discussed further infra note
386).
127. 525 U.S. 113,118 (1998).
128. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text; see also infra section II.B.4
(discussing the past and likely future frequency of arrests for minor violations).
130. See LaFave, Search & Seizure Supplement, supra note 4 at 21-24 (applying his
four criteria to the Atwater majority's bright-line arrest rule, and concluding that the
rule fails to meet most of these criteria).
131. See infra section II.B.5.
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would be justified based on the actual need for custody;
3) requiring individualized assessments of the need for custody is a
workable option (for the reasons suggested above, and in the
following section); 132 and
4) Justice Souter's rule is, indeed, "readily subject to manipulation
and abuse." Pretextual arrests and searches are almost certain to
become more common, and police will be tempted to invoke the
arrest power in bad faith-that is, solely to justify the search, with a
view toward issuing a citation if nothing is found in the search.133
These problems of manipulation and abuse point to another
problem with Justice Souter's approach. Once the Court decided to
look beyond the facts of Ms. Atwater's case, assessing
"reasonableness" in a broader context that considers the systemic
need for "readily-administrable" decision rules, then the Court should
also have carefully considered and "balanced" the broader public and
private interests that weigh against unfettered arrest powers-in
particular, the serious potential for abuse that this ruling creates. Yet
Justice Souter never seriously considers these problems; he simply
asserts that reported cases like Ms. Atwater's seem to have been fairly
rare in the past.'34 As for the future, Justice Souter dismissed as
"speculative" the "grave potential for abuse" noted by the dissent.'35
Nor did Justice Souter seriously consider the ways in which
unnecessary minor-crime arrests negatively affect several important
governmental interests to which the police themselves may not pay
sufficient attention.'36 Such casual concern for the "downside" of the
Court's decision, while giving strong weight to the need for bright-line
rules and seeming to assume that consideration of this practical need
will naturally support the government's side, produces a truncated and
unduly pro-police balance.
In addition to citing Robinson and Belton, Justice Souter presented
several other arguments for rejecting Petitioner's proposed arrest-
limitation rule and adopting an overbroad, pro-police rule. These
arguments are examined in sections B.2 through B.5 below.
132. See infra Part V.
133. See infra section II.B.4.
134. See infra section II.B.4.
135. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 n.25 (2001).
136. See Institute Amicus Brief at 11-17, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (arguing that
unnecessary minor-crime arrests present serious management problems for jail
officials that are costly and dangerous, burden courts, and pretrial release programs,
remove officers from duty while they transport the arrestee, and negatively affect the
public's perception of the police). Justice Souter's only reference to these problems
was his argument that cases like Ms. Atwater's will be rare, because "it is in the
interest of the police to limit petty-offense arrests, which carry costs that are simply
too great to incur without good reason." Atwater, 532 U.S. at 352. However, only
some of these problems directly affect the police, and cases like Ms. Atwater's do not




2. Petitioner's Proposed Arrest Limits Are Unworkable
Justice Souter next examined the rules proposed by Petitioner and
her supporting amici, and concluded that none of these rules provided
a "readily administrable" constitutional limitation on the warrantless
arrest power in minor cases. The Petitioner herself proposed the
following rule: "The Fourth Amendment prohibits custodial arrests
for fine-only traffic offenses except when the arrest is necessary for
enforcement of the traffic laws or when the offense would otherwise
continue and pose a danger to others on the road." '137 Most of
Petitioner's supporting amici proposed rules applicable (with various
exceptions) to at least some non-traffic offenses.'38
Justice Souter rejected a rule limiting arrests for offenses not
punishable with incarceration, arguing that arresting officers may not
be able to tell how serious the crime is. He maintained that "we
cannot expect every police officer to know the details of frequently
complex penalty schemes,"' 39 and he further argued that unknown
facts, such as the offender's prior record or the precise amount of
drugs involved, may make an offense more serious than it appears to
the arresting officer. Justice Souter also objected to the exceptions
that the Petitioner and her amici proposed, which would allow arrest
even for very minor crimes. Would speeding, Justice Souter asked,
qualify as a sufficient "danger to others on the road"? 4  Why, as a
constitutional matter, should only reckless driving qualify, as Ms.
Atwater's counsel had suggested at oral argument? Moreover, Justice
Souter argued, "is it not fair to expect that the chronic speeder will
speed again despite a citation in his pocket, and should that not
qualify as showing that the 'offense would.., continue'... ?,141
As noted in the previous section, there is certainly a need to give
the police a workable set of decision rules that will apply to all but the
most exceptional circumstances. But in the case of the decision to
arrest for a minor traffic offense, such rules already exist, and pose
137. Brief of Petitioners at 46, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
138. See ACLU Amicus Brief at 26-29, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (all fine-only
offenses); Brief Amici Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers and the Association of Federal Defenders in Support of the Petitioners at 21-
22, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (all fine-only misdemeanors); Institute Amicus Brief at 27-
30, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (same); Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement, Inc., in Support of Neither Party at 4-13, Atwater (No. 99-1408)
("minor" offenses); Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of the
CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2-5, Atwater (No. 99-
1408) ("minor" offenses not involving a breach of the peace); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association in Support of Petitioners ("Texas
Defense Lawyers Amicus Brief") at 28-29, Atwater (99-1408) (all fine-only offenses).
For further discussion of these rules, see infra Part V.
139. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348.




none of the problems Justice Souter suggested. Laws in a number of
states place strict limits on such arrests, with no apparent problems for
either the police or the courts. These state rules are further discussed
in Part V. Here again, however, the manner in which the Atwater case
was briefed and argued may have led the Court to think that these
issues were more difficult than they are-the briefs suggested at least
seven sets of decision rules, which differed in crimes covered and/or
exceptions allowed, and many variations on these rules can be found
in the state laws and model rules cited to the Court. Did this rich
menu of options, many of which went beyond the specific facts of Ms.
Atwater's case, and none of which were tied closely to prior court
rulings or well-established constitutional principles, make the Court
think that setting minor-crime arrest limits is a task for legislatures or
criminal rules-drafters, not federal constitutional adjudication?142
In any case, the rule-drafting problems cited by Justice Souter are
not serious enough to justify the unnecessary arrests and potential for
abuse created by his pro-police rule. It is certainly true that an
arresting officer will sometimes not know facts that make the offender
eligible for a jail penalty. This problem did not concern the Court in
Welsh v. Wisconsin,143 however, where the Court held that police may
not make a warrantless entry on exigent circumstances for a non-
jailable offense. One of the most common bases for enhanced
punishment is the offender's prior conviction record. But in traffic
cases, the arresting officer can usually determine the offender's
driving record by radio or computer. If the officer lacks this
information, he should assume that there are no prior violations that
would invoke a jail term (which will usually be the case for minor
traffic offenders; the fact that officers almost always issue citations for
minor violations like Ms. Atwater's strongly suggests that such
aggravating factors are rarely present).
On the other hand, if the officer reasonably believes (or, under
Justice O'Connor's standard, if the officer has articulable suspicion)
that the offender's prior violations make him eligible for a jail
sentence, then the Petitioner's proposed rule would permit a custodial
arrest. Similar exceptions take care of Justice Souter's other two
uncertain-charge examples. In terms of drug amounts, which will
rarely be an issue in traffic cases,144 the officer only needs reasonable
142. At oral argument, Justice Kennedy objected to Petitioner's proposed rule, and
pointed out that her supporting amici had also proposed "four or five different
tests.., and they're all different." Supreme Court Oral Argument at 21, Atwater (No.
99-1408); see also Respondents' Brief at 22-23, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (arguing that
differences between proposed standards "reveal the futility" of devising a
constitutional rule); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National League of Cities, et al.,
Supporting Respondents at 25, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (noting "inability of petitioners
and their amici to agree on a single, workable rule").
143. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
144. But see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 152.027(3) (2001) (prohibiting more than 1.4 grams
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belief (or articulable suspicion) to believe the offender's drug amount
is enough to permit a jail term.145 As for the possibility that the
prosecutor might later decide to charge a different, jailable offense,
the traditional standard of probable cause seems appropriate-if the
officer has probable cause to believe a jailable offense has been
committed, he can arrest for that charge. Again, these circumstances
will rarely arise in traffic cases.
In critiquing Petitioner's willingness to permit custodial arrest for
some non-jailable traffic violations, Justice Souter questioned why
arrest should generally be prohibited for speeding, even by a "chronic
speeder," but permitted for reckless driving. In most states, the
simple answer is that the legislature has determined that reckless
driving is a more serious offense. 146 Moreover, the police may charge
that offense and execute a custodial arrest if they have probable cause
to believe that recklessness has been shown. Similarly, a "chronic"
speeder can be charged with a jailable offense-if the legislature has
authorized such a charge 147 and has given police officers ready access
to traffic-conviction records. If such a law and/or the supporting
traffic records are not available, speeders normally will-and should-
be issued citations; officers should not be given carte blanche to
speculate about whether a particular offender will "speed again
despite a citation in his pocket. 1 4' The reality is that a case-specific
need for custodial arrest is rarely present in minor traffic cases, and
such need can easily be assessed on a case-by-case basis, as is already
done under many existing state laws.149
Of course, none of these decisions is free of fact-specific line-
drawing issues. But that is true of many everyday police decisions
involving standards such as "probable cause" and "voluntary"
of marijuana).
145. Courts tend to uphold arrests unless it should have been very clear to the
police that the offender's drug amount was insufficient to support a higher charge.
Compare State v. Hanson, 488 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding arrest
valid because officer could not reasonably know drug amount too small to permit
arrest), with State v. Evans, 373 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding arrest
invalid based on single marijuana cigarette).
146. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.13 (2001) (categorizing reckless or careless
driving as a misdemeanor); id. § 169.14 (describing speed limit regulations); id. §
169.89(1) (stating that speeding is ordinarily a petty misdemeanor); id. § 609.02(3)
(punishing misdemeanor with up to 90 days in jail and/or a maximum fine of $1,000);
id., § 609.02(4a) (punishing petty misdemeanor by fine of up to $300); see also Nat'l
Comm. on Unif. Traffic Laws and Ordinances, Uniform Vehicle Code and Model
Traffic Ordinance §§ 11-801, 11-901, 17-101 (1998) [hereinafter Uniform Vehicle
Code] (drawing similar distinction between speeding and reckless driving penalties).
147. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.89(1) (stating that third petty misdemeanor
within one year is punishable as a non-petty (jailable) misdemeanor); see also
Uniform Vehicle Code, supra note 146, § 17-101(b) (stating that third violation within
one year is jailable).
148. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 349 (2001).
149. See infra Part V.
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consent.15 The minimal additional requirements for arrest proposed
by the dissent and in this article- articulable suspicion to believe that
custody is necessary-are designed to prohibit arrest only when, as in
Atwater, the officer can point to no plausible need for custody. And
this rule would only apply to non-jailable traffic crimes, where the
need for custody rarely arises. As with any legal limitation, there will
be borderline cases and some uncertainty. But that is also true under
Justice Souter's ruling, which characterized the manner of Ms.
Atwater's arrest as "normal," and purported to distinguish such
arrests from "extraordinary" intrusions that require greater
scrutiny.151
Justice Souter's critique of Petitioner's proposed arrest rule is
unconvincing, and thus provides weak support for the rule Justice
Souter eventually adopted. Part of the problem with Justice Souter's
critique is that he did not confine himself to the traffic law context
raised by the facts of this case, and by Petitioner's proposed rule. He
seemed to believe (without saying why) that the Court ought to craft a
rule extending to all non-jailable violations. This topic is examined
further in Part IV, which discusses the pros and cons of "minimalist"
decisions focusing on the facts of the case at hand. Perhaps another
reason for Justice Souter's unsatisfactory critique is that Petitioner's
proposal was vague on several key points. These issues are further
discussed in Part V, which seeks to combine elements of the rules
proposed by Petitioner, Justice O'Connor's dissent, and Petitioner's
supporting amici into a workable, relatively bright-line arrest rule for
minor traffic cases.
3. Broad Arrest Authority Is Needed to Avoid Problems of Excluded
Evidence, Civil Liability, Increased Litigation, and a Systematic
Disincentive to Arrest
Justice Souter conceded that police routinely make the kinds of
distinctions proposed by Petitioner regarding the need for custody in a
particular case. Nevertheless, he hesitated to subject determinations
of such need to constitutional scrutiny for fear that this would result in
excluded evidence, personal liability of officers, increased litigation,
and a systematic disincentive to make custodial arrests even when
they were needed-all arising out of decisions that a police officer
must make "on a moment's notice."' 52  He also rejected a simple
presumption- "if in doubt, do not arrest"- arguing that such a rule
150. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that probable cause
is not a "model of precision"); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 211, 221-35 (2001-2002). Another highly fact-specific determination is
whether the defendant had a constitutionally-protected "reasonable expectation of
privacy" under case law following Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
151. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354; see infra Part II.B.5.
152. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350.
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would be akin to a "least-restrictive-alternative" standard that he
believed the Court had previously rejected.
Once again, none of these problems is as serious as Justice Souter
claims, although one of them raises issues that the Court may need to
address. The risk of lost evidence, if the officer wrongly decides to
arrest, is the least important problem here. The evidence in question
will usually be items seized in a search incident to arrest or while
inventorying the car's contents. Absent consent to search (which the
police may request whether or not they are entitled to arrest), such
evidence could not be legally obtained if a citation were issued, so we
are not talking about excluding evidence that the police might have
lawfully obtained but for confusingly complex arrest rules. Nor, given
the minimal "articulable facts" standard for arrest proposed by the
dissent and in this article, will there be very many illegal arrests to
sanction with exclusion. Finally, there have been no problems of
unfair exclusion, increased litigation, or arrest disincentive in
Minnesota, which adopted strict limitations on minor-crime arrests in
1975, and has enforced these limitations with exclusionary remedies
since 1977.153 Despite these strict rules and the exclusionary rule
remedy, there have been very few reported cases applying these rules.
This is probably because the need for custodial arrest rarely arises in
cases subject to these rules.
The risk of civil liability is a greater concern, because it may impose
unfair burdens on arresting officers and/or disincentives to arrest, but
such problems can be handled by properly-defined qualified immunity
rules. Justice Souter worried that,
[E]ven where personal liability does not ultimately materialize, the
mere "specter of liability" may inhibit public officials in the
discharge of their duties for even those officers with airtight
qualified immunity defenses are forced to incur "the expenses of
litigation" and to endure the "diversion of [their] official energy
from pressing public issues."' 154
However, in Saucier v. Katz,' decided six weeks after Atwater, the
Court solved many of these problems by broadening the criteria
establishing qualified immunity and encouraging trial courts to rule on
immunity claims at an early stage of litigation. The Court confirmed
that qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial that
requires trial courts to address two questions early in the proceedings:
(1) Would a constitutional right have been violated, if the facts alleged
by the plaintiff are true? and (2) Was such a right-in its application
to the particular official conduct alleged to violate it-already clearly
153. Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.01; State v. Martin, 253 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1977); Institute
Amicus Brief at 28-29, Atwater (No. 99-1.408); see infra Part V.
154. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351 n.22 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814
(1982)) (citations omitted).
155. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
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grounds.16 Of course, Petitioner's counsel in the Supreme Court was
not free to argue that the lower court was wrong and that qualified
immunity is and should be frequently available.'61 In any case, the
Court's subsequent decision in Saucier should take care of many of
these problems. If not, the remedy is to give further attention to
qualified immunity standards and procedures, rather than grant
unnecessarily broad arrest powers to the police.
With reasonable qualified immunity standards, combined with a
minimal requirement of "articulable facts" justifying arrest in lieu of
citation, there should be little disincentive to arrest. But even if there
were some disincentive, that would be entirely appropriate in such
minor cases. We are not talking about disincentives to charge and to
prosecute such violators-only to custodially arrest them. When an
offense cannot result in incarceration after conviction, and when case-
specific needs for custody prior to conviction are very rare, elemental
notions of reasonableness and proportionality call for rules that
strongly discourage pretrial custody.162 Moreover, any "systematic
disincentive" to arrest in minor traffic cases would provide a valuable
counterweight to the strong police incentives to make unnecessary
arrests in these cases. Such incentives include the desire to search the
suspect and his car for evidence and contraband, or to use a minor-
crime arrest as a pretext to investigate more serious crimes; the
tendency to engage in formal or informal racial profiling; and (as
appears to have been the case in Atwater) the temptation to impose a
little "street justice," contrary to legislative judgments about
appropriate levels of punishment.
Justice Souter also objected to Petitioner's proposed rule because
he viewed it as "something akin to a least-restrictive-alternative
limitation."'63 However, that is not a fair characterization: Petitioner
was simply arguing that, when enforcing non-jailable traffic offenses,
the police should have some reason for thinking that custodial arrest is
needed."6 In any event, the cases cited by Justice Souter, rejecting
160. See, e.g., Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1369-71 (8th Cir. 1985). In
Patzner, officers lacked qualified immunity in making warrantless entry to arrest for a
jailable drunk driving violation. The court seemed to assume that loss of blood
alcohol evidence may constitute exigent circumstances (or that the officers could
reasonably so believe), but relied on Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), refusing
to permit warrantless entry on these grounds. Welsh, however, involved a non-
jailable drunk driving violation, and the entry in Patzner took place before Welsh was
decided.
161. Cf. Supreme Court Oral Argument at 18, Atwater (99-1408). In oral
argument, Justice Ginsburg suggested it was "almost certain" that Officer Turek
would have qualified immunity. Petitioner's counsel responded that the Fifth
Circuit's en banc decision did not address the issue, that it was a "tough hurdle to
overcome," but that a defendant without immunity (the city) was still in the lawsuit.
162. For further discussion of proportionality, see infra Part III.B.
163. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 350.
164. Cf Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1997) (ruling that police
[Vol. 71
ATWATER AND UNREASONABLENESS
established, so that the officer was on notice that his conduct would be
clearly unlawful? If the answer to either question is no, trial is
unnecessary and the claim should be dismissed.
As applied to the facts of Atwater, it appears that Petitioner's claim
against Officer Turek should have been dismissed under either the
first or the second prong of the Saucier standard. Although the Fifth
Circuit panel decision in Atwater held that the individual defendants
lacked qualified immunity, it conceded that no prior case had held
that such arrests are unconstitutional. 5 ' Moreover, even if the
holdings and dicta in a number of prior cases had suggested that arrest
for a minor crime might raise constitutional problems, these cases
hardly seem sufficient support for a "clearly established right." The
panel, in rejecting qualified immunity, appears to have made the same
two mistakes as the lower court in Saucier. First, the panel decision
identified the applicable "clearly established" rights at too high a level
of generality. The decision focused on the rights to be free from
"unreasonable seizures," and from seizures "conducted in an
extraordinary manner" or constituting "an extreme practice,"'57 rather
than examining established law applicable to Officer Turek's
particular conduct. Second, the panel viewed the "objective
reasonableness" of the officer's conduct as an element of the qualified
immunity standard.'58 Saucier emphasizes that an officer's conduct,
even if later deemed unreasonable by a court, would not subject the
officer to a civil damages trial unless a reasonably well-trained officer
would have known that his conduct violated clearly established
rights. 59
One wonders whether Justice Souter and the other justices in the
Atwater majority were influenced by the lower court's rejection of
qualified immunity. Even if they knew or suspected that the
immunity ruling was incorrect, perhaps they thought that it reflected a
widespread tendency for lower courts to give officers insufficient
protection from civil suits. Indeed, it is not difficult to find cases in
which qualified immunity has been rejected on questionable
156. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 1999); see also
Atwater, 532 U.S. at 362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that the United States
Supreme Court had never precisely considered the issue in this case).
157. Atwater, 165 F.3d. at 384, 387.
158. Id. at 385-86.
159. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204-05. It might be argued that the arresting officer in
Atwater was acting in bad faith, intending to punish or harass Petitioner, rather than
for any legitimate law enforcement purpose. Such actions would arguably be a
violation of "clearly established" constitutional rights. But this reasoning does not
appear in the Fifth Circuit panel decision. It also seems inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's preference for objective standards, avoiding scrutiny of the hidden
motives of police officers. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990); Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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such a limitation, all involved highly routinized procedures with
limited potential for disparity,165 not the totally discretionary arrest
power conferred by the Court in Atwater. And although the Court
has also rejected the least restrictive alternative concept in several
stop-and-frisk cases, 16 the police actions in those cases were
considerably less intrusive than Ms. Atwater's custodial arrest.
4. Arrests Such as Ms. Atwater's Are Not a Widespread Problem
The administrative problems discussed above led Justice Souter to
conclude that the costs of enforcing a constitutional limitation on
unnecessary minor-offense arrests would outweigh the benefits,
particularly since, in Justice Souter's view, such arrests are not very
common. 67  Justice Souter noted that suspects arrested without a
warrant are entitled to a judicial review of probable cause within
forty-eight hours, and he further assumed that, as in Ms. Atwater's
case, most suspects will have a "prompt opportunity to request
release."' 6 s  Justice Souter further noted that laws in some states
already limit minor-offense arrests, and he asserted that regulation by
statute is preferable because it can reflect "any sort of practical
consideration without having to subsume it under a broader
principle," or develop "a new and distinct body of constitutional
law."' 69 He also argued that it is in the interest of police departments
and other local authorities to limit these kinds of arrests.70 He
concluded that these limitations, as well as "the good sense (and,
failing that, the political accountability) of most local lawmakers and
executing search warrant need reasonable and articulable suspicion that knocking and
announcing their presence would be dangerous or futile); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.
325, 334 (1990) (holding that police who have arrested a suspect in his home need
articulable suspicion that another dangerous suspect may be present in order to justify
a security "sweep" of the entire house).
165. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Other cases rejecting a least-restrictive-alternative standard, and also involving highly
routinized procedures, include Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), and Colorado
v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
166. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.
675, 687 (1985). Earlier cases had seemingly adopted a least-intrusive-means test or
factor in Terry cases. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
167. Justice Souter implied a variety of standards for assessing when a police abuse
would be frequent enough to merit intervention by the Court. He first stated that
there is "a dearth of horribles demanding redress." Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353. Later he
concluded that "surely the country is not confronting anything like an epidemic of
unnecessary minor-offense arrests." Id. Finally, he stated that "there simply is no
evidence of widespread abuse of minor-offense arrest authority." Id. at 325 n.25.
168. Id. at 352.
169. Id. at 352-54.
170. Id. at 352.
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law-enforcement officials" will minimize abuse of broad arrest
powers.
Petitioner and her supporting amici were completely blind-sided by
this argument. The Court has never before required a citizen to show
that any one else's rights have been similarly violated, let alone that
the challenged government practice is "widespread" or of "epidemic"
proportions. When Justice Souter raised this point at the oral
argument, Petitioner's counsel did his best to provide anecdotal
evidence of similar minor-offense arrests, 7 ' and the petition for
rehearing presented statistics suggesting that large numbers of such
arrests do occur. 172  Such arrests seldom appear in reported cases
because there is rarely any evidence to suppress in minor traffic stops,
and where evidence is found, the case will not be charged and
reported as a "traffic" offense. 73  Nor do many arrested traffic
offenders have the time, resources, and stamina to pursue a civil
damages action. But some reported cases can nevertheless be
found, 74 and other evidence (in particular, data in recent studies of
police-citizen contacts)1 75 strongly suggests that arrests like Ms.
Atwater's have occurred with some frequency in recent years.
171. See id. at 353 ("[Cjounsel... could offer only one [such case].").
172. Petition for Rehearing at 1, 3-4, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (estimating over
250,000 annual arrests nationwide for "minor traffic" violations, based on data from
California and Oregon).
173. Petition for Rehearing at 5, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
174. See ACLU Amicus Brief at 7-8, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (citing five pre-Atwater
cases); see also Logan, supra note 64, at nn.80, 104, 106, 110, 125 & 129-32 (citing
dozens of cases involving arrests for very minor violations). Minor-offense arrest
cases reported after the Atwater decision (but involving arrests that took place
before) include the following cases: Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001)
(discussing an arrest for speeding; defendant's claim rejected, citing Atwater); Lee v.
Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1196 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that "[u]nder both Atwater and
Florida law.., a full custodial arrest is allowed when a misdemeanor has been
committed"); Williams v. Jaglowski, 269 F.3d 778, 784 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Atwater
in support of an arrest of a police officer for violating a municipal code that
prohibited members of the police department from failing to "perform any duty
required of him by... the rules and regulations of the department"); Price v. Roark,
256 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing an arrest for lack of vehicle license tags; §
1983 claim dismissed, citing Atwater); Irvine v. City of San Francisco, No. C-00-01293
EDL, 2001 WL 967524 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2001) (discussing an arrest on outstanding
traffic warrant, resulting in overnight jail detention; § 1983 claim dismissed, citing
Atwater); Davenport v. Rodriguez, 147 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (discussing a
non-in-presence arrest for alleged shoplifting resulting in strip search at police station;
§ 1983 claim dismissed, citing Atwater); People v. McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 63-64 (Cal. 2002)
(citing Atwater to support arrest for Defendant who was stopped by deputy sheriff for
riding a bicycle the wrong way down a residential street); Nicholson v. Texas, No. 05-
00-01401-CR, 2001 WL 515919 (Tex. App. May 16, 2001) (discussing an arrest for lack
of valid registration sticker; defendant's motion to suppress denied, citing Atwater).
175. See, e.g., Erica L. Schmitt et al., Characteristics of Drivers Stopped By Police,
1999 1, 12-13 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 2002) (estimating that traffic stops in 1999
involved an estimated 19.3 million drivers; 1.3 million drivers had their person and/or
vehicle searched, and 578,000 were arrested; no criminal evidence had been found on
over four-fifths of arrested drivers). In addition, recent pretext cases and racial
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Of course, the more important question is not how common these
arrests have been in the past, but how common they will be in the
future. 7 6 Prior to Atwater, the police had some reason to fear that
arrests for very minor crimes, with no plausible need for custody,
might be held invalid. But now that the Court has explicitly granted
the police almost unlimited discretion in choosing between arrest and
citation, there is every reason to believe that unnecessary, minor-
offense arrests will become more common and that "search incident
to citation" will become much more common.' 7 Unless police
supervisors strongly discourage such practices,'78 why wouldn't
officers employ them? As noted in the previous section, there are
many personal and professional incentives to make unnecessary
arrests and searches.
Because the Court in Atwater had no reliable statistical or
qualitative evidence on the frequency of such arrests even in the past,
let alone the probable frequency in the future, the Court should have
issued a narrow ruling focused on the compelling facts of Ms.
Atwater's case, rather than seeking to craft a broader arrest rule with
a correspondingly greater potential for unintended consequences."'
At the very least, these problems of unknown and unknowable
frequency of abuse should have entered into Justice Souter's broad
conception of "balancing" along with the value of bright-line rules.
Finally, even if Justice Souter was correct in assuming that minor-
crime arrests are rare, this means that the "cost" to law enforcement
and the courts of regulating such arrests is likewise not very high. Yet
for those unlucky citizens who are arrested, the intrusion will be great,
and the perceived unfairness even greater.
None of Justice Souter's specific reasons for assuming that arrests
like Ms. Atwater's have been or will be rare holds up under close
scrutiny. The right to obtain prompt review of probable cause after a
warrantless arrest will not benefit many suspects-such a review does
profiling studies show that some officers are quite willing in minor-violation cases to
use broad police powers for reasons other than those which justify the power. See,
e.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996); see supra note 13.
176. Supreme Court Oral Argument at 46, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (arguing for
Petitioner that "perhaps more on point, if the conduct in this case is condoned, it will
be much more likely to be a recurring problem").
177. See supra note 19.
178. Actually, some law enforcement officials seem to want to actively encourage
such arrests, at least in the context of anti-terrorism efforts. In a speech given on
February 2, 2002, a U.S. Justice Department official stated that persons suspected of
terrorist involvement should be arrested for even the most minor crimes (for example,
spitting on the sidewalk). Anne Gearan, U.S. Terror Tactics Detailed, Associated
Press, Feb. 1, 2002 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
179. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 4-6, 46-48, 262. Sunstein argues that lack of
information about a topic, and the risk of unintended consequences, are some of the
strongest arguments for a narrow, "minimalist" decision. See infra Part IV for further
discussion of Sunstein's theory.
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not prevent arrest, nor address the prior or continuing need for
custody; moreover, since almost everyone violates some traffic rule,
probable cause is virtually assured. And although arrested persons
are often promptly brought before a magistrate, where they may
request release, many are not; indeed, in most jurisdictions, indigent
defendants remain in custody long after their first court appearance,
without even seeing an attorney."" Some jurisdictions limit minor-
offense arrests by statute or criminal rules, but many others do not. It
is true that statutory regulation can go further than the federal
constitution and need not be tied to any existing or proposed
constitutional principle, but the minimal, articulable-need standard
proposed by the dissent and in this article is easily justified by
application of the Court's reasonableness balancing cases and draws
on a suspicion standard that is well established not only in the stop
and frisk cases, but also in several other contexts where it has been
applied."8 ' Finally, the Court's reliance on "good sense" and political
accountability proves too much. If police self-regulation were an
adequate safeguard, much of the protections recognized under the
Fourth Amendment would not be necessary, nor would problems such
as overcrowded jails and congested court dockets ever arise.8 2
In the end, the police respondents and their supporting amici in
Atwater were saying: "Trust us; we'll use our broad arrest powers
wisely and very selectively." This is not very reassuring to citizens
who fear they or their friends and family will be subjected to racial
profiling, or who simply happen to be among the unlucky few who get
arrested. Indeed, the exceptional nature of these custody decisions,
and the likelihood that they will most often involve young, poor, non-
white suspects, virtually ensures lack of any effective political or
administrative check.8 3
As a further safeguard, Justice Souter argued that, under his rule,
arrests "conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful" to
the citizen's privacy or physical interests, will remain subject to case-
specific, constitutional scrutiny.8 4  However, this novel distinction
among arrests raises new line-drawing problems, which are discussed
in the next section.
180. See Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to
Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. I11. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1998) ("In a majority of
localities, the incarcerated indigent defendant will not see an attorney for days, weeks,
or months following the bail decision.").
181. For further discussion, see infra note 400 and accompanying text.
182. Cf Institute Amicus Brief at 3-17, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (describing jail
crowding and other problems caused by unnecessary minor-offense arrests).
183. See infra Part IV.
184. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352-53 (2001) (quoting Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)).
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5. Balancing Is Generally Inapplicable When the Police Act with
Probable Cause
In light of the arguments discussed above, Justice Souter adopted
the following rule, applicable to all in-public arrests, for any offense,
regardless of the circumstances:
[W]e confirm today what our prior cases have intimated: the
standard of probable cause "applie[s] to all arrests, without the need
to 'balance' the interests and circumstances involved in particular
situations ... [Officers acting with probable cause are]
authorized ... to make a custodial arrest without balancing costs
and benefits or determining whether or not [the] arrest was in some
sense necessary.'
185
He added, however, that such case-specific reasonableness
balancing is required where an arrest is made "in an extraordinary
manner, unusually harmful to [the citizen's] privacy or... physical
interests." '86 Turning to the Atwater facts, Justice Souter concluded
that the Petitioner's arrest, although "surely 'humiliating'... was no
more 'harmful to... privacy or ... physical interests' than the normal
custodial arrest."'187 It was therefore not sufficiently "extraordinary"
when compared to the intrusions that the Court had previously found
sufficient to justify case-specific reasonableness balancing, such as
surgery to remove a bullet for evidence, police use of deadly force,
and warrantless or no-knock entry into the home.'88
Justice Souter relied on two prior cases to support his proposed
limitation on balancing analysis. Both cases, however, are easily
distinguishable from the facts and issues in Atwater. Moreover, the
sweeping language that Justice Souter quoted from these two cases
went far beyond the facts and issues presented in those cases.
In the first case, Dunaway v. New York, 89 the Court was actually
engaging in balancing when it rejected the government's argument
that reasonable suspicion (the Terry standard) should suffice to justify
185. Id. at 354 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)).
186. Id. at 352-53 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 818). Justice Souter also cited
Whren with approval earlier in his opinion. Id. at 347 n.16. The Fifth Circuit en banc
decision relied heavily on this language from Whren. See supra notes 29-30 and
accompanying text.
187. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
188. Justice Souter referred to Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)
(unannounced entry into the home); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (police
use of deadly force to arrest); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (surgery under
general anesthetic to remove a bullet for use as evidence); and Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740 (1984) (warrantless home entry in exigent circumstances). These were
the same four cases cited by Justice Scalia in Whren and quoted by the Fifth Circuit
en banc decision below. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818; see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195
F.3d 242, 244-45, 253-54 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
189. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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transportation to the police station for questioning.19" All the Court
needed to say in Dunaway-and what it did say after the passage
quoted by Justice Souter-is that the reasonable suspicion standard
approved in the stop and frisk cases is a narrowly-tailored exception
justified by the minimal intrusions involved, whereas the police
actions in Dunaway were far more intrusive-functionally equivalent,
in the Court's view, to an arrest. 9 ' The Court thus had no need to
broadly limit the scope of balancing analysis in order to reject the
prosecution's argument in Dunaway. Indeed, the Court was applying
balancing when it concluded that the police action at issue was too
intrusive to be justified on less than probable cause.
The second case relied on by Justice Souter was Whren v. United
States.'92 As in Dunaway, the Court was presented with a rather weak
reasonableness balancing argument (this time proposed by the
defense)-that a pretextual investigative stop for a minor traffic
violation, conducted by plain-clothed officers in unmarked cars,
involves "a possibly unsettling show of authority" and "substantial
anxiety," yet only minimally advances public safety.'93 In Whren, the
balancing analysis did not favor the citizen nearly as much as it did in
Atwater, where the nature of the intrusion was far greater than a
traffic stop, and the police lacked any legitimate law enforcement
reason for the intrusion. As Justice O'Connor noted in her Atwater
dissent, Whren did not even consider, let alone uphold, custodial
arrests for fine-only offenses, and the court's language should not be
taken beyond the context there. 94  Moreover, the defendants in
Whren were proposing a rule that would invalidate the initial stop,
and hence the entire enforcement effort, based on actual or presumed
pretextual motives. Ms. Atwater was not attacking decisions to
enforce minor traffic laws, only the use of arrest in lieu of charging by
citation, and her proposed rule was based on objective facts, not
hidden police motives.
Another problem with Justice Souter's reliance on the broad
language of Whren lies in the proposed distinction between a "normal
custodial arrest" and one that is made "in an extraordinary manner,
unusually harmful" to privacy or physical interests 95 These new,
undefined boundaries undercut Justice Souter's search for a simple,
"readily administrable" arrest rule.' 96 How intrusive must an arrest be
in order to be deemed extraordinary? What if Ms. Atwater had been
subjected to a much more thorough search at the scene and/or at the
190. Id. at211-12.
191. Id. at 212.
192. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
193. Id. at 817 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979)).
194. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 363 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
195. Id. at 354.
196. Id. at 347.
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station? Or if she was held in detention for much longer, or held in a
crowded, dirty, and dangerous jail cell? Or suffered some
combination of these additional hardships? A further problem lies in
the Court's authority for this rule-it seems very doubtful that either
the text of the Fourth Amendment or Founding-era history justifies
the "extraordinary arrest" criterion. Indeed, no such textual or
historical support was offered in either Whren or Atwater.
Furthermore, it is quite plausible to argue that Ms. Atwater's
custodial arrest was, in a number of respects, an "extraordinary"
intrusion. 97 It was highly disproportionate to the offense, and lacking
in any law enforcement justification. It was also very unusual, as such
offenders are almost always ticketed and released. Moreover, the
Court's recognition of this broad arrest power and its correlated
search powers, combined with the potential to apply these powers to
virtually any driver on the road for pretextual or racially
discriminatory reasons, creates an "extraordinary" potential for abuse.
Justice Souter and the other Justices in the majority might reply
that Ms. Atwater's arrest, even with its various intrusive "incidents"
and potential for abuse, was less "extraordinary" and "unusually
harmful" than the intrusions at issue in the four prior cases, cited in
Whren and Atwater, in which the Court permitted case-specific
balancing despite the presence of probable cause.198 Her arrest was
clearly less onerous than the physical intrusions in these prior cases,
which involved general-anesthetic surgery to remove a bullet, and
deadly force to arrest. 99 And given the Court's long tradition of
granting maximum Fourth Amendment protection to the home, a
"normal" custodial arrest is arguably less "harmful" than a
warrantless or no-knock home entry.""'
But the Court's prior applications of balancing analysis despite the
existence of probable cause are not limited to the four cases cited in
Whren. In a number of cases, the Court has used balancing to expand
the powers of the police when they are acting on probable cause.2 '
Even more to the point, the Court's prior limitations of police powers,
despite the presence of probable cause, have not always involved
extraordinarily harmful physical or residential intrusions. In Knowles
197. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 165 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating
that in all prior reported cases of custodial arrests for violation of Texas seat belt law,
some additional conduct or factor justified arrest); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195
F.3d 242, 251 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Wiener, J., dissenting) (finding that
custodial arrest of Petitioner met dictionary definition of "extraordinary," which
includes "going beyond what is usual, regular, or customary").
198. See supra note 188.
199. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force);.Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753 (1985) (bullet removal).
200. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (no-knock entry); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (warrantless entry).
201. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
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v. Iowa,"2 the Court unanimously refused to extend the "search-
incident" doctrine to cases where the officer issued a citation in lieu of
arrest, even though the officer in that case had probable cause, and
was authorized under state law to make a custodial arrest. The Court
was implicitly engaging in balancing analysis when it concluded that
neither of the government interests supporting the search-incident
doctrine, which included protecting officers from hidden weapons and
seizing destructible evidence, provided a sufficient basis to justify the
additional intrusion involved in such searches.2 3
Another example of the use of balancing analysis to limit police
powers, despite probable cause, is Graham v. Connor,20 4 a case not
mentioned in Whren and only briefly noted in Atwater, but which was
cited with approval in a post-Atwater case.2" 5 In Graham, the Court
held that claims of excessive police force in the course of an arrest,
investigative stop, or other seizure of a person2" 6 should be analyzed
under the totality of the circumstances, "balancing... 'the nature and
quality of the intrusion' ... against the countervailing governmental
interests at stake."2"7 Three factors were relevant to an assessment of
such claims: "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight. 1120
Graham is important not only because it shows a more flexible
approach to the limits of balancing than the Court suggested in either
Whren or Atwater, but also because, in a very real sense, Ms. Atwater
was making an "excessive force" claim. Moreover, the three Graham
factors, summarized above, all weighed heavily in her favor-the
"force" involved in her custodial arrest, search, and jailing was
excessive and unreasonable in light of the very low severity of her
crime and the total lack of any evidence that she posed an immediate
safety threat or was likely to attempt to flee.
202. 525 U.S. 113 (1998); see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
203. 525 U.S. at 117. The Court also engaged in balancing, despite an initial police
determination of probable cause to arrest, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44, 52, 54-55 (1991) (holding that judicial review of probable cause must
normally occur within 48 hours of warrantless arrest). For a further discussion of the
Court's presumptive 48-hour rule, see infra notes 214, 372-73 and accompanying text.
204. 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(upholding warrantless seizure of defendant's blood but seeming to require not only
probable cause and exigent circumstances, but also proper, medically-supervised
taking of the sample); Salken, supra note 34, at 260-6 1.
205. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001).
206. Although the Court in Graham stated that the standard it announced would
apply to all excessive-force claims, deadly or non-deadly, the more specific standards
laid down in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 11-12 (1985), presumably still also
apply in deadly force cases. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95.




In neither Atwater nor Whren did the Court explain why it was
necessary to strictly limit the application of reasonableness balancing
analysis when the police act with probable cause. Such a general
limitation finds very little support in the text of the Fourth
Amendment.29 In a warrantless arrest case like Atwater, the police
action, even though supported by probable cause, is not justified by
the Warrant Clause; such action is justified, if at all, by the
Reasonableness Clause.
Nor is such an arbitrary limitation on the scope of balancing
analysis necessary in order to provide the police and lower courts with
a "readily-administrable" arrest rule. As several of the cases cited in
Whren and Atwater illustrate, balancing can be used by the Court to
decide that further limits are needed on certain intrusive police
measures, but the Court can then provide simpler, "rule-like"
standards to govern the use of such measures. Thus, in Tennessee v.
Garner, the Court held that police may not use deadly force to arrest,
unless "the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses
a significant threat of death or serious physical injury" if not promptly
arrested.2"" In Wilson v. Arkansas and Richards v. Wisconsin, the
Court held that police may not make "no knock" entries of premises
unless there is reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing
their presence would be dangerous or futile, or would result in
destruction of evidence. 211 And in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court held
that police may not make warrantless entries on exigent
circumstances, such as the risk of losing crucial evidence, to arrest for
a non-jailable offense.212  Similarly, some of the Court's most
prominent applications of the reasonableness balancing approach to
expand police powers in the absence of probable cause resulted in
relatively simple, easily-applied procedures or standards: for example,
the area "warrant procedure" upheld in Camara v. Municipal Court of
San Francisco,2 11 and the "articulable suspicion" standard adopted in
Terry v. Ohio.214  As these cases demonstrate, the use of
209. See U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
210. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.
211. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S.
385, 394 (1997).
212. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984).
213. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
214. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Other examples of cases using balancing analysis to justify
additional police powers, but specifying fairly "rule-like" criteria for the exercise of
those powers, include Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (allowing police to
order passengers to exit stopped vehicle); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)
(allowing police to detain persons at scene without showing particular need for
detention while search warrant is executed); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977) (allowing police power to routinely order driver of stopped car to exit the
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reasonableness balancing to identify a police activity that merits
further limitation or expansion does not mean that police and lower
courts must be left with no guidance, or forced to perform complex
interest-balancing in every case they confront. In Atwater, the Court
could have used reasonableness balancing to invalidate the arrest, but
then could-and should-have proposed a set of simpler rules to
govern arrest decisions in minor traffic cases. These rules are
discussed more fully in Part V.
Despite all of these criticisms, however, one cannot solely blame
Justice Souter and the other Justices in the majority for their poorly-
considered reliance on the Whren opinion and its proposed limits on
further applications of reasonableness balancing. This was, after all,
the principal basis for the Fifth Circuit en banc opinion below, yet
Petitioner and her supporting amici devoted relatively little attention
to these arguments.2"5 This failure is all the more surprising given the
signs, evident in numerous other recent opinions, that the Court was
seeking to limit the further expansion of reasonableness balancing
analysis. These broader trends are discussed in Part III.A.
C. Summary
Justice Souter's reasons for refusing to place any constitutional
limitations other than probable cause on in-public arrests are
unconvincing. To some extent, this is because Petitioner and her
supporting amici failed to address many of these issues adequately,
and gave too much emphasis to inconclusive historical arguments.
But the Court is surely familiar with the limitations of the briefs and
arguments presented in its cases, and such limitations therefore seem
an insufficient explanation for the majority's ruling.
So, what else were the Justices in the majority thinking? As
discussed more fully in the next section, it appears that several of the
Justices may have had other, broader concerns about the approach the
Court should take in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. In
particular, these Justices were concerned that further applications of
the reasonableness balancing approach would, even if combined with
vehicle). See also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (adopting
presumptive rule that warrantless probable cause to arrest must be judicially reviewed
within forty-eight hours).
215. See Brief of Petitioners at 36-40, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318
(2001) (No. 99-1408); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et
al. at 13-14; Brief Amici Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al. at 22; Brief of Amicus Curiae Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers
Association at 2-3, 5-6; Supreme Court Oral Argument at 47 (final comments of
Petitioner's counsel). The briefs on the other side gave more emphasis to the Whren
dictum. See Brief of Respondents at 8-11; Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 21-22; Brief Amici Curiae of State of Texas et al. at 5-9; Brief Amicus
Curiae of the National League of Cities et al. at 8-9, 14-16; Supreme Court Oral
Argument at 37, 44-45 (argument of counsel for State of Texas et al.).
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adoption of relatively simple rules and standards to guide everyday
police decisions, lead the Court and lower courts down a doctrinal
"slippery slope," threatening instability and undesirable change in
well-settled areas of Fourth Amendment law.
III. UNDERSTANDING ATWATER IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER
RECENT FOURTH AMENDMENT DECISIONS
The Atwater decision is not the only recent case in which the Court
has rejected a persuasive argument based on reasonableness
balancing. In several other cases the Court seems to have been
looking for bright-line rules for itself (not just for the police) that
would clearly limit further expansion of the balancing approach and
maintain traditional citizens' rights and police powers. Indeed, this
tendency has been evident in the Court's decisions since at least 1978.
The Court has stated many times that "reasonableness in all the
circumstances" is the "touchstone" of Fourth Amendment analysis.216
But if that is true, then reasonableness balancing becomes a possibility
in every search and seizure case. The Court does not want to allow
this broad principle, both for practical reasons and as a matter of
substantive policy. The practical problems go beyond the desire to
give the police rules that are easy to apply. As was pointed out above,
simple decision rules and standards can be devised even if the Court
has used balancing to decide that additional limitations (or
expansions) of police power are appropriate in a given context.2 7
Beyond the need for workable police-decision rules, the Court wants
to maintain defensible doctrinal boundaries that tell lower courts, and
the Supreme Court itself, which categories of cases are eligible for
balancing analysis. From a substantive policy perspective, the Court
wants to protect innocent citizens from further erosion of their rights,
while also making sure that traditional police powers are not placed in
doubt.
In other words, the Court has been concerned that further
extensions of the balancing approach were leading it down a doctrinal
slippery slope. Some hints of this concern may be found in Justice
Souter's opinion in Atwater. Justice Souter characterized the
Petitioner's argument as requiring the "development of a new and
distinct body of constitutional law." ' 8 He also alluded to broader
doctrinal problems when he expressed his preference for non-
constitutional solutions to the issues in Atwater: "It is of course easier
216. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); United States v.
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997); Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991);
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, (1977) (per curiam); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
217. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
218. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353-54 (2001).
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to devise a minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one
through the Constitution, simply because the statute can let the arrest
power turn on any sort of practical consideration without having to
subsume it under a broader principle." '219
Thus, the majority in Atwater may have feared that a ruling in the
Petitioner's favor would encourage future defendants to challenge
other very intrusive, unnecessary, and/or disproportionate searches
and seizures where the police act on probable cause, for example, very
thorough and/or destructive searches of cars, boats, and other vehicles
(especially those with substantial living quarters);2 0 exigent
circumstances entries and searches to enforce offenses more serious
than the fine-only violation at issue in Welsh v. Wisconsin;221 public
arrests for more serious crimes than were at issue in Atwater; and
perhaps even some warrant-based arrests and searches in minor-crime
cases.
222
Section A below traces the Court's efforts over the past twenty-five
years to avoid such slippery slope problems by adhering to traditional
Fourth Amendment rules and limiting the application of
reasonableness balancing. Section B then argues that this concern,
even if valid, did not require the majority's ruling in Atwater.
A. The Court's Search for "Bright-Line" Limits on Reasonableness
Balancing
Besides Atwater, two other cases decided in the October 2000 term
rejected application of case-specific reasonableness balancing analysis
and reached results that, like those in Atwater, were contrary to the
outcome suggested by such balancing. In both cases, it appears that
the Court was at least as concerned with avoiding a doctrinal slippery
slope as it was with giving the police clear decision rules; indeed, the
latter consideration was not mentioned in either case.223
219. Id. at 352.
220. Cf. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 n.3 (1985) (permitting warrantless
search of motor home found in a public parking lot, but leaving open the possibility
that a warrant might be required if such a vehicle were "situated in a way or place that
objectively indicates that it is being used as a residence."). See infra notes 330-31 and
accompanying text.
221. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
222. See also William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive
Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 869-76 (2001) (arguing that
reasonableness balancing based on crime seriousness might provide a basis to
invalidate racially-discriminatory traffic stops and racially-disparate drug law
enforcement policies).
223. As was suggested above, the absence of discussion in these two cases of the
need for bright-line decision rules might be explained by the Court's unstated (and
unfounded) assumption that such rules are only appropriate when they grant over-
broad police powers. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. An equally valid
explanation, however, would be that the police activity at issue in these two cases
(drug-interdiction roadblocks and drug-testing of pregnant women) was part of a
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In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,224 decided one week before the
oral arguments in Atwater, the Court struck down a suspicionless
drug interdiction roadblock program, even though application of
balancing analysis seemed to favor the state at least as strongly as it
had in earlier balancing cases. The Court's 1990 ruling in Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 2 5 upholding drunk-driver roadblocks,
seemed particularly apposite: in Sitz, the "hit-rate" (arrests per stop)
was less than two percent,226 whereas it was nine percent in
Edmond.227 Moreover, drug trafficking would seem to be a more
serious crime than drunk driving, at least if judged by the authorized
penalties.22 s Indeed, Justice O'Connor expressed "no doubt that
traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first magnitude,"
but she concluded that "[t]he same could be said of various other
illegal activities, if only to a lesser degree.... [T]he gravity of the
threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means
law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose. '"229
The majority in Edmond, which included two of the "swing" Justices
in the Atwater majority, Justices Souter and Kennedy,23 ° distinguished
the roadblocks and other measures upheld in prior cases on the
grounds that these measures were based on "special needs" other than
criminal law enforcement (e.g., immediate public safety, in the case of
drunk driver roadblocks),"' whereas the "primary purpose" of the
drug-interdiction roadblock in Edmond was "to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing. ' 23 2 As discussed more fully below, this
carefully-planned program, designed and supervised by high-level law enforcement
officials. These cases did not involve "quick, ad hoc judgments" by low-level officers
in the field. Cf United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,220-23 (1973).
224. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
225. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
226. Id. at 454-55 (resulting in two arrests out of 126 stops).
227. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
228. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 152.021(3a) (2001) (listing maximum prison term
for first offense of first degree controlled substance crimes as thirty years); id. § 169A.
24(2) (listing maximum term for first degree drunk driving (fourth alcohol-related
driving incident within ten years) as seven years); id. § 169.27(2) (punishing third-
degree drunk driving as a misdemeanor); id. § 609.02(3) (listing maximum sentence
for a misdemeanor as ninety days).
229. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
230. Besides Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the other justices in the
majority were Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
dissented.
231. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37-38. Besides Sitz, other prior "special needs" cases
discussed and distinguished by the Court in Edmond included, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); New York v. Burger,
482 U.S. 691 (1987); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499 (1978); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); and Camara v.
Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
232. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38. The Court used a variety of other verbal
formulations of the category of "primary" goals which do not permit balancing
analysis, including the "general interest in crime control," "general crime control"
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distinction may be somewhat arbitrary, but it does limit further
erosion of citizens' rights and uncertainty about when the Court will
engage in reasonableness balancing. As Justice O'Connor explained,
"[w]ithout drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve
the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would
do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of
American life. 233
Later in the 2000-2001 term, and one month before Atwater was
decided, the Court handed down another case in which it refused to
apply a reasonableness balancing approach. In Ferguson v. City of
Charleston,3 the Court, citing Edmond, struck down the non-
consensual, suspicionless drug testing of pregnant women by a public
hospital.235 As in Edmond, the Court held that balancing could not be
used because the "primary purpose" of the testing program was to
obtain and turn over to the police evidence of criminal conduct.236
The lineup of justices in Ferguson was almost identical to that in
Edmond,237 and once again reasonableness balancing seemed to favor
purposes, and the "ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes." Id. at 40, 41, 43-44,
47.
233. Id. at 42. Similarly, Justice O'Connor rejected the government's argument
that drug-interdiction roadblocks, like the drunk-driver roadblocks upheld in Sitz,
promote highway safety:
The detection and punishment of almost any criminal offense serves broadly
the safety of the community, and our streets would no doubt be safer but for
the scourge of illegal drugs. Only with respect to a smaller class of offenses,
however, is society confronted with the type of immediate, vehicle-bound
threat to life and limb that the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz was designed to
eliminate.
Id. at 43. Justice O'Connor also rejected the government's argument that these drug
interdiction roadblocks could be upheld based on the secondary purposes of detecting
impaired drivers and checking licenses and registration, since the latter goals
constitute recognized "special needs." Id. at 37. Justice O'Connor feared that
acceptance of this argument would permit the police "to establish checkpoints for
virtually any purpose so long as they also included a license or sobriety check." Id. at
46; see also Laurence A. Benner et al., Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of United States Supreme Court Criminal and Habeas Corpus Decisions
(October 2, 2000 - September 30, 2001), 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 87, 95 (2001) (stating that
the Court in Edmond (and in Ferguson, discussed infra notes 238-45 and
accompanying text) "was confronted with the logical consequences of its own prior
decisions that had departed from the individualized suspicion standard." Police had
sought to maximize their powers under these decisions, and "the Court attempted to
halt the hemorrhaging" of Fourth Amendment rights).
234. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
235. Although the testing program was said to be designed for patients "suspected
of drug abuse," the criteria for selection were broad and the Court assumed that
probable cause, and even reasonable suspicion of drug use, were lacking. Id. at 71, 76.
236. Id. at 84.
237. Justice Souter was in the majority, and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion,
while not accepting all of the majority's reasoning, agreed that the fatal defect was the
"substantial law enforcement involvement in the [drug testing] policy from its
inception." Id. at 88.
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the government.2 8 The harm to the fetus caused by the maternal use
of cocaine, as well as the substantial public and private costs of
treating such harm, would seem to be very important government
interests, 23 9 and the intrusion on privacy, although greater than in
previous drug testing programs upheld by the Court,240 was not
substantial. The testing in Ferguson was based on urine samples taken
from hospital patients24 who presumably were accustomed to having
such samples taken and analyzed.
Nevertheless, the Court refused to engage in balancing, citing the
narrow definition of the "special needs" doctrine adopted in
Edmond.242 Once again, the Court appeared to be concerned with
avoiding a doctrinal slippery slope. The government had argued that
its ultimate purposes were to get the women into treatment and off
drugs, and thus to protect the health of the mother and child.243 But
the Court rejected this characterization of the program, focusing
instead on the immediate objective of obtaining evidence for law
enforcement purposes:
Because law enforcement involvement always serves some broader
social purpose or objective, under respondents' view, virtually any
nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the
special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its
ultimate, rather than immediate purpose ... [T]his case simply does
not fit within the closely guarded category of "special needs." 2 4
The doctrinal-bright-line, slippery-slope-avoiding nature of the
Court's ruling in Ferguson was underscored by the minimal degree to
which arrest and prosecution were actually used in the program
invalidated by the Court-of the 253 women who tested positive for
drug use, only 30 were arrested, and only two were prosecuted.245
Thus, Edmond and Ferguson rejected balancing in support of
expanded police power, while Atwater and Whren rejected balancing
238. This was the basis for the lower court's ruling, upholding the testing program.
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 479 (4th Cir. 1999).
239. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, agreed that drug abuse is "a serious
problem." Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86. On the other hand, he also argued that such
testing programs are counterproductive because they discourage drug users from
seeking prenatal care. Id. at 84 n.23.
240. Under the program at issue in Ferguson, the test results were disseminated to
third parties (the police). In prior drug testing cases, the test results were designed to
be used primarily or exclusively for internal (school or employer) purposes. Id. at 78.
241. Id. at 70.
242. Id. at 81 n.15.
243. Id. at 82-83.
244. Id. at 84. In contrast, the student drug-testing program subsequently upheld in
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002), involved a classic "special needs"
situation (allowing the search of students by school authorities for school purposes
only).
245. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 103 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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in support of reduced police power and expanded rights of suspects.246
In all of these cases, the Court seemed intent on ruling out further
application of balancing analysis-even in cases like Atwater,
Edmond, and arguably Ferguson, where the balance seemed to clearly
favor one side over the other. The Court sought to draw a line in the
sand-this far with balancing, and no farther. The slippery slope
problem was explicitly recognized in Edmond and Ferguson,24 and
was implicit in the Court's rejection of balancing in Whren and
Atwater. This broader doctrinal concern makes more sense than the
other reasons cited by the Court in Atwater,2 4' and helps to explain the
otherwise puzzling distinction, in Edmond and Ferguson, between
criminal law enforcement and other government purposes. Why
should the police have less power to investigate serious crimes than to
enforce administrative regulations?2 49
246. Based on Atwater, Edmond, Ferguson, and Kyllo v. United States (discussed
infra), Professor Craig Bradley has proposed the following theory to explain the
Court's Fourth Amendment decisions since Justice Breyer's appointment in 1994: the
Court rules in favor of the police when they have probable cause, while resisting
interferences with "(legally) innocent civilians." Craig M. Bradley, The Court's New
Approach to the Fourth Amendment, Trial, Feb. 2002, at 82. The theory I am
proposing is consistent with Bradley's, but goes further. My theory identifies the
rejection of reasonableness balancing as a common theme in the cases Bradley
discusses, and also in cases decided as early as 1978 (discussed infra). I also point out
language in the Court's opinions, suggesting its slippery slope concerns. My theory
helps to explain the pattern of case outcomes identified by Bradley. If balancing
cannot be invoked, then courts must fall back on traditional doctrinal categories: no
individualized suspicion means no search or seizure (absent "special needs," narrowly
defined); probable cause means that the police retain substantial, unregulated search
and seizure powers.
247. See supra notes 233, 244-45 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part II.
249. Although the "non-criminal-law purpose" rationale was foreshadowed in prior
cases it was not consistently applied and was never even clearly stated prior to
Edmond. In the original balancing case, Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387
U.S. 523 (1967), the Court indicated that one of the factors supporting the
reasonableness of housing code inspections is the fact that they are not "aimed at the
discovery of evidence of crime." Id. at 537; supra text accompanying note 80. One
year later, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court extended the application of
balancing analysis to government actions that were aimed more at prevention than
evidence-gathering. However, the activity sought to be prevented by the stop and
frisk in Terry ("casing" a store for an armed robbery) seemingly involved "ordinary
criminal wrongdoing," City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000), and
there was also very "substantial" (indeed, exclusive) "law enforcement involvement"
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 99-102 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Several subsequent cases also
upheld the application of balancing analysis despite heavy involvement of law
enforcement personnel acting with a major, if not primary, goal of obtaining evidence
for criminal prosecution. In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the Court
upheld the warrantless search of an automobile junkyard by plainclothes police
officers whose sole apparent motive at the time of the search was to uncover evidence
of criminal acts. Id. at 724-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Michigan Dep't of Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), the drunk-driving roadblocks at issue involved substantial
"criminal law" goals and attributes-they were set up and operated by the police and
were expected to result in arrest and criminal prosecution. Moreover, the Court in
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Two other cases decided in the October 2000 term also reflected the
Court's desire to reinforce traditional doctrinal boundaries and limit
the application of reasonableness balancing analysis. In Arkansas v.
Sullivan,250 the Court reaffirmed and extended its decision in Whren
(and thus, Whren's rejection of reasonableness balancing) by
upholding a custodial arrest and a search of the defendant's car
incident to that arrest, arising out of speeding and minor equipment
violations. The state court in Sullivan specifically found that the
arrest was pretextual (based on suspicion of narcotics dealing).
According to the Supreme Court's short, unsigned opinion, "[t]hat
Whren involved a traffic stop, rather than a custodial arrest, is of no
particular moment. '25 2 Nor did it seem to matter that the pretextual
police motives in Whren were only assumed, not proven.253 The Court
seemed to be saying that probable cause is all that matters and that it
will consider neither the degree of the intrusion nor the blatantness of
the pretext, because such a fine-grained approach would give neither
the police nor the courts any clear and defensible boundaries for
police powers or the application of reasonableness balancing.
Later the same term, in Kyllo v. United States,254 the Court
invalidated the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device used to
detect degrees of heat escaping from different rooms in an apartment.
This case involved the question of whether any "search" had occurred,
rather than the reasonableness of the search, but the Court was likely
implicitly rejecting balancing as a way of upholding the search.
Although the latter issue was not addressed, it would not make much
sense for the Court to invalidate the use of thermal imaging in Kyllo
and then, in a later case, hold that the very same warrantless intrusion
could be upheld under a balancing approach.255
In any case, the Court's actual holding in Kyllo, that a "search" did
occur, resembles the Atwater decision. In both cases, the Court
refused to take into account the triviality of the case-specific interests
at stake. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Kyllo (which
included Justice Souter, but not Justice Kennedy), argued that the
Fourth Amendment "draws 'a firm line at the entrance of the
Sitz specifically rejected Respondents' argument that the reasonableness balancing
approach is limited to contexts presenting a "special need" beyond criminal law
enforcement. See id. at 450.
250. 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam).
251. Id. at 770.
252. Id. at 772.
253. The defendants in Whren argued not that the officers' motivations were
actually pretextual, but that they probably were. They claimed that a "reasonable
officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons
given." 517 U.S. 806,814 (1996).
254. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
255. Such a balancing rationale would also seem to be precluded by the Court's
decisions in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), and Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366 (1993), discussed infra notes 277-78, 282-84 and accompanying text.
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house,'... [which] must be not only firm but also bright. '256
Accordingly, the Court held that the warrant requirement applies to
any sense-enhancing surveillance technology not in general public use
that reveals any information-even non-intimate information like the
heat escaping from Mr. Kyllo's apartment-regarding the interior of a
home that police could not otherwise obtain without entering the
home. 7 As in Atwater, the Court acknowledged that the actual facts
in Kyllo might call for a different result: "[I]t is certainly possible to
conclude.., in this case that no 'significant' compromise of the
homeowner's privacy has occurred. 2 5  But the majority concluded
that in the home, "all details are intimate details 2 59 and that any
standard requiring assessment of degrees of intimacy would be
impractical in application by failing to provide police with a clear and
workable decision rule, and requiring the Court to "develop a
jurisprudence specifying which home activities are 'intimate' and
which are not. '2611 Moreover, a ruling in favor of the government
would
[P]ermit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment... [and] would leave the homeowner at the
mercy of advancing technology-including imaging technology that
could discern all human activity in the home. While the technology
used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must
take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or
in development. 261
Thus, the Court was trying to provide a bright line not only for the
police but also for the courts, governing both current and future
technologies, and without the need to define the exact point at which
information about conditions or activities inside the home raises
sufficient privacy concerns to require Fourth Amendment
protection.262
The Court's five decisions in the 2000-2001 term, curtailing
reasonableness balancing and reaffirming traditional doctrinal
boundaries, were actually a continuation of a tendency which began
many years before. In some of these earlier cases the Court expressly
stated its concern to avoid a doctrinal slippery slope; in other cases,
this concern was strongly implied. The first category (expressing
256. 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
257. Id. at 35.
258. Id. at 40.
259. Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
260. Id. at 38-39.
261. Id. at 34, 36.
262. See also Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (adopting, like Kyllo, a
bright-line, "a search is a search" rule, notwithstanding the very minor nature of the
intrusion, which involved a law enforcement officer who had physically manipulated
the soft-sided bag that the defendant carried onto a cross-country bus and placed in
the luggage rack above his seat).
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concern) includes Florida v. J.L.,263 decided one year before Atwater;
Richards v. Wisconsin, a 1997 case;26 and Mincey v. Arizona,265
decided in 1978.
In Florida v. J.L, the Court held that the special danger of gun
violence did not permit a stop and frisk based on an anonymous tip
that failed to meet normal suspicion standards. The case involved a
tip that a "young black male standing at a particular bus stop and
wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. '266  The police found a
person of that description at that location, frisked him, and found a
gun.267 The Court acknowledged the "serious threat that armed
criminals pose to public safety, '266 but feared that it would be difficult
to limit such a rule to firearms, given the strong public interest in
stopping and searching other suspects: for example, those carrying
large amounts of drugs (many of whom are also carrying guns). 269 The
Court pointed to its decision in Richards v. Wisconsin,27' declining to
approve a state court rule permitting "no-knock" entries in all felony
drug cases: "[T]he reasons for creating an exception in one category
[of Fourth Amendment cases] can, relatively easily, be applied to
others.'27 1 Although the Court in J. L. did not rule out the possibility
of allowing stops and frisks based on minimal tips in cases of
imminent public danger (e.g., a report that a person is carrying a
bomb) and/or in contexts where privacy expectations are diminished
(e.g., in airports or schools),272 the Court was clearly unwilling to give
broad approval to such a balancing approach in Terry cases.
The Court expressed similar slippery slope concerns in Mincey v.
Arizona,273 in which it declined to approve a "murder scene"
exception to the warrant requirement. The Court acknowledged the
very serious nature of this offense, but noted that
[Tihe public interest in the investigation of other serious crimes is
comparable. If the warrantless search of a homicide scene is
reasonable, why not the warrantless search of the scene of a rape, a
263. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
264. 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
265. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
266. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
267. Id. at 272. The Court distinguished Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990),
which permitted a stop based on an anonymous tip that accurately predicted the
suspect's future movements, and noted that the Court regarded even that case as
"borderline" and "close." J.L., 529 U.S. at 270-71.
268. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
269. Id. at 273.
270. 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
271. J.L., 529 U.S. at 273. Besides the doctrinal slippery slope problem, the Court
in J.L. was also concerned that any "automatic firearm exception to our established
reliability analysis... would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in
motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by
placing an anonymous call." Id. at 272.
272. Id. at 273-74.
273. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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robbery, or a burglary? "No consideration relevant to the Fourth
Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation" of such a
doctrine.
274
The Court therefore "decline[d] to hold that the seriousness of the
offense under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances"
justifying a warrantless search.275
In all three of these cases, the Court expressed slippery slope
concerns, and also implicitly rejected the application of the
reasonableness balancing approach by refusing to accord great weight
to the seriousness of the crime and/or inherent exigencies of
enforcement. In none of these cases did the Court base its decision on
the need to provide the police with clear decision rules; indeed, in two
of these cases, Richards and Mincey, the Court rejected proposed
bright-line rules that would have made police decisions much simpler
in the category of cases covered by the rule . 6 The uncertainties that
concerned the Court in these three cases related to the implications of
any such rule for other types of cases not yet before the Court. These
uncertainties would be a problem for the courts, as well as the police.
If the Court recognized expanded police power based on crime
seriousness or inherent exigencies, consideration of these factors
would present difficult line-drawing problems in future cases, and
would threaten steady erosion of citizens' rights.
Other cases in recent decades have also reflected slippery slope
concerns, albeit implicitly. In two cases decided in 1987 and 1993, the
Court refused to permit minor intrusions for evidence-gathering
purposes, based on reasonable suspicion, even though such police
measures could easily have been justified by the logic of the
reasonableness balancing test applied in Camara and Terry-
measures that are much less intrusive than ordinary searches and
seizures require a lower degree of suspicion.
In Arizona v. Hicks, the police lawfully entered the defendant's
apartment, observed an expensive stereo turntable that seemed out of
place in the "ill-appointed" four-room flat, and turned it over to
record the serial number and see if it had been reported stolen. 77 The
Court held that this relatively minor intrusion was not permitted
unless the police already had probable cause to believe the turntable
was stolen. As Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, put it,
274. Id. at 393.
275. Id. at 394. Mincey was re-affirmed in Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17(1984) and again in Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999).
276. In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 395 (1997), the Court rejected a lower
court ruling that a no-knock entry is per se reasonable in all felony drug cases. In
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395, the Court declined to approve a "murder scene exception"
under which exigent circumstances, permitting warrantless entry and re-entry of
homicide premises, would be presumed to exist.
277. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987).
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[A] search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable.... We are unwilling to send police and
judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a
creature of uncertain description that is neither a "plain-view"
inspection nor yet a "full-blown" search. Nothing in the prior
opinions of this Court supports such a distinction. 78
As noted above, however, Terry v. Ohio supported precisely this
distinction." 9 Moreover, in another line of cases, the Court upheld
temporary detentions of mail or luggage, on reasonable suspicion, to
permit further investigation and/or application for a search warrant.280
In the latter cases, as in Terry, the courts justified expanded police
powers under a reasonableness balancing analysis-a minor intrusion
can be justified by a degree of suspicion less than probable cause.
Thus, it seems that in Hicks the Court was concerned that further
extension of the scope of reasonableness balancing would cause
uncertainty and litigation. The Court therefore drew a questionable
distinction between minimal detentions (in all of the prior cases
mentioned above) and the minimal search in Hicks, with a further
distinction between searches for weapons (Terry) and searches for
evidence (Hicks)."'
278. Id. at 325, 328-29.
279. See supra, notes 84-86 and accompanying text. Subsequent cases, expanding
the application and scope of police powers under Terry, were based on a similar
"minor intrusion" rationale. See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985)
(involving a stop to investigate completed felony offense); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983) (involving a weapons "frisk" of vehicle after suspect gets out); Michigan
v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (involving a suspicionless detention of persons
during search warrant execution); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)
(involving a suspicionless order to exit stopped vehicle); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (involving a stop to investigate non-violent immigration
violations).
280. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-10 (1983) (stating in dicta that
detention of luggage to permit further investigation would be permissible in some
cases; actual detention was invalidated because unreasonably conducted); United
States v. van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (upholding detention while police
gathered enough evidence to obtain a search warrant).
281. However, the Court's decision in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), is
more difficult to reconcile with Hicks. In Class, the Court upheld a brief entry and
search of defendant's car in order to uncover the vehicle identification number
("VIN") which had been covered by papers lying on the dashboard. Thus Class, like
Hicks, involved a limited search for evidence, not a detention or a search for weapons.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority viewed the VIN as "a significant thread
in the web of regulation of the automobile," and argued that "[a] motorist must surely
expect that such regulation will on occasion require the State to determine the
VIN ... [T]he individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby
diminished." Id. at 111, 113. The Court did not, however, hold that no "search" had
occurred; instead, it held that the search was reasonable. Therefore, the inconsistency
between Class and Hicks remains. Perhaps the ruling in Class could have been
justified by the theory that the defendant was legally obligated to keep the VIN
uncovered, and that by obscuring the VIN the defendant forfeited any objection to
the officer's actions (or gave implied consent to them).
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Six years later, in Minnesota v. Dickerson,2"2 the Court again refused
to broaden the scope of reasonableness balancing and held that frisks
under Terry v. Ohio are strictly limited to finding weapons and cannot
be extended to a general search for evidence or drugs based solely on
reasonable suspicion. The frisking officer in that case felt a small, hard
object that he knew was not a weapon, but that he thought might be
(and was) crack cocaine." The Court held that further squeezing and
prodding of the object to ascertain its nature was a full "search"
requiring probable cause.28 4
Although most of these earlier cases involved attempts to expand
police powers based on balancing analysis, several cases implicitly
rejected balancing arguments designed to limit police powers. In the
1978 case of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,2"5 the Court upheld the search
of the offices of a student newspaper for evidence of the identity of
persons who took part in a violent protest that the paper had
reported. The paper and its employees were not suspected of any
wrongdoing, but the Court rejected the argument that First
Amendment concerns and/or the greater rights of innocent third
parties justified special limits on such searches beyond normal
probable cause and warrant requirements.286 As in Richards and
Mincey, the Court did not seem concerned that the consideration of
such case-specific factors would make the law too uncertain for the
police to follow; indeed, the Court in Zurcher actually rejected a
relatively "bright-line" rule that the lower court had adopted.28 7
Another case in which the Court refused to adopt special rules based
on First Amendment concerns was New York v. P.J. Video,"' where
the Court held that a warrant to seize allegedly pornographic
videotapes was supported by probable cause. The Court noted that
the First Amendment imposes certain limits on content-based
seizures,2 9 but declined to hold that the Fourth Amendment requires
a higher-than-normal standard of probable cause in this context.29
In all of these cases, the Court seemed to fear that the application
of the reasonableness balancing approach would inevitably lead to
requests for balancing in a host of other cases, thus threatening the
rights of citizens or traditional police powers, while also raising
282. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
283. Id. at 377.
284. Id. at 378.
285. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
286. Id. at 553-54.
287. Id. at 552 (rejecting lower court's holding that a warrant to search premises of
a non-suspect required probable cause to believe that the materials could not be
obtained by subpoena, and also rejecting that court's holding that search of a
newspaper required a clear showing that important materials would be destroyed or
moved unless seized with a warrant).
288. 475 U.S. 868 (1986).
289. Id. at 873-74 (citing cases).
290. Id. at 874-75.
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difficult line-drawing problems for the courts. Examples of pro-
citizen rulings of this type, invalidating searches of persons or
property that might have easily been upheld on a balancing approach,
include Edmond, Ferguson, J.L., Richards, Mincey, Hicks, and
Dickerson. Examples of pro-police rulings upholding law
enforcement actions that would or might be invalidated under a
balancing approach include Atwater, Sullivan, Whren, Zurcher, and
P.J. Video. Although these decisions reflect shifting majorities and
changes in the court's personnel, Justices Souter and Kennedy have
been quite consistent. Justice Souter was in the majority on all of the
cases decided after he joined the Court; Justice Kennedy was in the
majority (or strongly concurred with the majority) in all of the cases
he sat on except Kyllo. Neither Justice was on the Court when it
decided Zurcher, Mincey, P.J. Video, and Hicks.
In many of these cases, the Court explicitly stated its concerns
about slippery slope problems; in other cases, such concerns seem
implicit in the Court's decision. Atwater falls into the latter category.
As was suggested at the outset of this section, the Court may have
feared that a ruling in Petitioner's favor would make it difficult to rule
against similar claims in related Fourth Amendment areas, including
some warrantless vehicle and exigent circumstances searches, arrests
for more serious crimes, and perhaps even some warrant-based arrests
and searches in minor-crime cases.
However, as discussed more fully in the next section, the Court
could have ruled in Ms. Atwater's favor by making a very limited
extension of the applicability of balancing, or perhaps none at all.
Moreover, there were very good reasons to apply balancing in
Atwater, reasons that do not apply to the other police powers listed
above.
B. Atwater Required Little if Any Extension of the Application of
Reasonableness Balancing
Even if the Court's concerns about slippery slope problems were
understandable, the decision in Atwater was unnecessary and unwise.
Ruling in Ms. Atwater's favor would not have led the Court onto, or
farther down, a doctrinal slippery slope requiring balancing in every
Fourth Amendment case.
To begin with, it must be recognized that the Court has not been
very consistent in its rejection of balancing. Balancing analysis has
been used to justify expanded or contracted search and seizure powers
in at least five contexts: 1) to uphold measures based on
administrative or regulatory "special needs" unrelated to criminal law
enforcement;291 2) to invalidate various "extraordinary" bodily or
291. See supra notes 224-49 and accompanying text.
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domicile intrusions;292 3) to uphold measures with very substantial
police involvement and criminal law enforcement goals, such as stop
and frisk;293 4) to grant the police additional powers when they
execute a search warrant or carry out certain other searches and
seizures based on probable cause;29 4 and 5) to assess claims that
excessive force was used in making an arrest.29 Clearly, the Court
makes exceptions and extends the application of reasonableness
balancing when it feels it has a good reason to do so.
In Atwater, there were very good reasons to apply reasonableness
balancing. The balance of private and public interests tilted very
strongly in Ms. Atwater's favor-her custodial arrest, with its
associated searches, processing, and detention, was a major intrusion
with serious implications for liberty, personal safety, privacy,
reputation, and property. Yet the governmental interests supporting
this intrusion were minimal or non-existent, given the legislative
classification of the offense as non-jailable and the absence of any
need to take Ms. Atwater into custody. Furthermore, the Court's
refusal to apply balancing to invalidate arrests such as Ms. Atwater's
has created a serious potential for abuse, particularly in light of prior
decisions recognizing overbroad police powers (e.g., in connection
with inventories and searches incident to arrest), adopting purely
objective standards (e.g., the plain view and pretext cases), and
making it difficult to successfully raise claims of discriminatory
enforcement.2 96  In deciding whether to apply reasonableness
292. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1 (1985); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740
(1984); see supra notes 177, 185-86 and accompanying text.
293. Terry. v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Other examples of the use of balancing
despite the substantial involvement of police personnel seeking to enforce criminal
penalties include New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), Michigan Dep't of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), United
States v. van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), and United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112
(2001).
294. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (granting police power to prevent
resident from re-entering his home unaccompanied, pending arrival of search
warrant); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (extending scope of Carroll
vehicle searches to purse belonging to non-suspect); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408
(1997) (extending Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), to passengers);
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (permitting limited "protective sweep" of
premises where an arrest has been made to look for other persons who may pose a
danger to officers); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (permitting detention
of occupants of premises, while search warrant is executed); Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(allowing routine ordering of driver to exit stopped vehicle). Although the police in
both Mimms and Wilson had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had
occurred, the added police power recognized in these cases also apparently applies
when a vehicle is stopped based on articulable suspicion. See Dressier, supra note 21,
§ 18.04[C][2]; LaFave, supra note 21, § 3.8(e).
295. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see supra notes 204-08 and
accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
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balancing to a new area of police activity, the Court should carefully
consider the cumulative impact of its prior decisions governing related
police powers, and not casually pile new overbroad pro-police rules on
top of old ones.2
9 7
Moreover, Ms. Atwater's case could have been decided in her favor
with little or no further extension of the reasonableness balancing
approach. As was argued in Part 11,298 Ms. Atwater's arrest was
"extraordinary" in a number of respects, including the
disproportionality to her offense, the absence of government need, the
highly unusual police response, and the high potential for abuse.
Thus, her arrest fit within the exception recognized by the Court in
Whren and permitted balancing despite the presence of probable
cause. Indeed, in Graham v. Connor,299 a case not cited by the Court
in Whren and only briefly mentioned in Atwater, the Court applied
reasonableness balancing to a broad category of cases involving claims
of excessive police force in the course of an arrest, investigatory
detention, or other seizure of the person, many of which involved
intrusions no more "extraordinary" or "unusually harmful" than
custodial arrest and its accompanying searches, jailing, and other
detrimental effects. Finally, there were two additional grounds for
relief in Atwater-proportionality and equality-that the Court could
have relied on in lieu of or in combination with reasonableness
balancing.
1. Fourth Amendment Proportionality
Given the extremely minor nature of Ms. Atwater's offense-a
nonjailable traffic violation-basic principles of proportionality
dictate a finding of unreasonableness. Justice O'Connor, at several
points in her dissenting opinion, lamented the disproportionality of
Ms. Atwater's arrest relative to the very minor nature of her traffic
violations.3"0 Although a Fourth Amendment proportionality
297. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
299. 490 U.S. 386 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes 206-08, 295.
300. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 364, 372 (2001). Justice
O'Connor also complained that the lack of any good reason to take Ms. Atwater into
custody likewise made her arrest disproportionate. Id. at 371. This alternative
meaning of "proportionality"-focusing not on the seriousness of the offense, but
rather on the government's specific needs and the availability of equally effective, less
intrusive measures-is more akin to reasonableness balancing analysis than to
proportionality per se. See infra note 304 and accompanying text. Such weighing of
government needs and available measures finds counterparts in many areas of
American law, including the requirements of narrowly-tailored regulation of speech,
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564-
66 (1980), "strict scrutiny" of certain classifications under the Equal Protection
clauses, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280, 283-84 (1986), evaluation
of state regulations burdening interstate commerce, Kassel v. Consol. Freightways
Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662, 670-71 (1981), evaluation of federal legislation
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principle has never been explicitly recognized by the Court, this
principle has been articulated by a number of scholars,3"1 and is
reflected in common-law arrest rules and in several of the Court's
search and seizure decisions. The principle also finds support in
Eighth Amendment and due process case law," 2 and in well-
established principles of sentencing jurisprudence and substantive
criminal law." 3
Since it has roots in the common law, the proportionality principle
pre-dates the reasonableness balancing approach. Thus, for justices
who are strongly committed to "originalism," it provides an
enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 520 (1997) ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."), assessments
of government "takings" of private property, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980) (zoning law "effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests" or "denies an owner economically viable use of his
land"), and in applying the Eighth Amendment Bail Clause, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S.
1, 5 (1952) (bail set higher than "reasonably calculated" to assure appearance at trial
is "excessive" within the meaning of the Amendment).
301. See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
"Reasonableness," 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1642, 1724-25 (1998); Christopher Slobogin,
Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 St.
John's L. Rev. 1053 (1998) [hereinafter Slobogin, Proportionality Principle];
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1,
51-55 (1991). Other articles that make similar Fourth Amendment arguments without
specifically using the "proportionality" concept are Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 785 (1994); Amsterdam, supra
note 93, at 436-37; Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause,
Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 693, 719-24 (1998); William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of
the Offense into Fourth Amendment Equations - Warrantless Entries into Premises:
The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 439, 530 (1990); Stuntz, supra
note 222, at 869-76.
302. Substantive "proportional-to-the-offense" limitations are imposed on various
measures governed by the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
Excessive Fines, and Excessive Bail clauses. See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321 (1998) (in personam forfeiture under Excessive Fines Clause); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape of adult victim); Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1 (1952) (bail). Under the Due Process clauses, proportionality standards
limit the size of punitive damages awards. See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996). Proportionality concepts are also reflected in "petty
offense" limitations to constitutional criminal procedure rights. See, e.g., Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (right-to-counsel); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66
(1970) (jury trial). Limits on statutory and rule-based criminal procedural rights also
reflect proportionality considerations (what might be termed "making the procedure
fit the crime"). See, e.g., Minn. R. Crim. P., 5.02, 9, 23, 26.01 (counsel, defense
discovery, petty misdemeanor procedures, and jury trial rights). Administrative
procedures are subject to a due process balancing test that considers the importance
of the private and public interests at stake, and the risk of errors under the state's
chosen procedure. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
303. See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law § 6.01-.05 (3d ed. 2001)
(stating that proportionality principle limits all justification defenses including self
defense, and defense of property, and is important in sentencing under both
retributive and utilitarian philosophies).
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independent historical basis for finding a search or seizure
unreasonable. Proportionality analysis is similar but not identical to
reasonableness balancing. Both approaches examine the nature and
degree of the intrusion on liberty and privacy, but the two concepts
differ on the "government need" side of the ledger. Whereas
balancing examines a wide range of factors--seriousness and
immediacy of the harm sought to be prevented; degree of
individualized or target-group suspicion; presence of a warrant,
warrant substitute, or other limits on police discretion; importance of
the evidence or other expected fruits of the intrusion; availability of
other means 34-the proportionality principle focuses primarily on the
seriousness of the crime suspected or charged. Given this narrower
focus, the proportionality principle is easier to apply than
reasonableness balancing, and lends itself to simpler rules. In extreme
cases, the principle bars the use of intrusive measures even when the
police have probable cause, and even if police inability to use such
measures is very likely to prevent prosecution and conviction of the
offender.
At common law, misdemeanor arrests were prohibited unless the
offense was committed in the officer's presence."" Although Justice
Souter's opinion in Atwater cast doubt on the common-law "breach-
of-the-peace" requirement for misdemeanor arrests, °6 the common-
law in-presence rule is well documented, and continues to be
recognized in some form by most states.3"7 The Supreme Court has
never decided whether any aspect of the common-law in-presence rule
is enforceable under the Fourth Amendment.3"8 But even if it is not,
this common-law limitation embodies an underlying proportionality
concept that was well established in the Founding era, and helps to
define what the founders viewed as "reasonable" police measures.
Indeed, the custodial arrest in Ms. Atwater's case was even more
disproportionate than the misdemeanor arrests prohibited at common
law, because many of the latter involved much more serious, jailable
offenses.3"9 The survival of the in-presence rule under state laws and
the Court's modern decisions incorporating proportionality concepts
attest to the continuing importance of proportionality in Fourth
304. See generally Dressier, supra note 21, §§ 18.01-19.02.
305. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925) (citing Halsbury's
Laws of England, vol. 9, part II, at 612).
306. See supra Part I.B.
307. See Dressler, supra note 21, § 10.02; Schroeder, supra note 65, at 777; see also
Davies, supra note 4, at 322-26 (discussing other common-law distinctions between
felony and misdemeanor arrest powers).
308. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 340 n.ll (2001) (declining to
decide or speculate on constitutional status of in-presence rule).
309. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 440 n.9 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (commenting that many serious modern felonies, including assault,
forgery, bribery, and kidnapping, were classified as misdemeanors at common law).
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Amendment analysis. These cases, together with the common-law
and state law in-presence rules, stand for a single proposition-that
intrusive police measures cannot be used to enforce minor crimes.
In Welsh v. Wisconsin,"" the Court held that the police could not
make a warrantless entry of a person's house to effect an arrest for a
non-jailable drunk driving offense, even though the officers had
probable cause to arrest, and also had a very plausible claim that
delaying the arrest until a warrant was obtained would have resulted
in the loss of crucial evidence of intoxication. The Court noted that
many lower courts have viewed the seriousness of the offense as an
important factor in assessing the reasonableness of a warrantless entry
on exigent circumstances.3"' The Court also cited Justice Jackson's
view that warrantless entry to arrest for a minor offense would display
"a shocking lack of all sense of proportion.""3 2  Although drunk
driving poses major risks to persons and property, the Court
considered the Wisconsin legislature's decision classifying first-time
violations as non-jailable, civil offenses, to be the best indication of
the state's interest in making an arrest and enforcing this law.3t3
Ms. Atwater's arrest presented just as strong a case as Welsh for
applying the Fourth Amendment proportionality principle. Although
the Court has granted the greatest degree of protection to the home,
custodial arrest and its accompanying measures and effects are also
highly intrusive; moreover, Ms. Atwater's seat belt violation carried
less risk of public harm than the drunk driving charge in Welsh. And
unlike the home entry invalidated in Welsh, a rule prohibiting Ms.
Atwater's arrest, and the arrest of traffic violators like her, would
rarely result in the loss of crucial evidence.3"4
In Tennessee v. Garner,"5 the Court held that police may not
employ deadly force to arrest a fleeing, unarmed suspect who is not
reasonably believed to pose a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others. Recognizing that such a rule
might permit some suspects to escape and perhaps even permanently
evade capture and prosecution, the Court nevertheless concluded that
the use of deadly force to arrest a suspect not believed to be
310. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
311. Id. at 751-52 (citing Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir.
1970)).
312. Id. at 751 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
313. Id. at 754; cf Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 335-36 (2001) (distinguishing
Welsh and rejecting a proportionality argument). The offense in McArthur was
punishable with up to 30 days in jail, and the police intrusion, which included barring
the suspect from entering his home unsupervised for two hours until a search warrant
was obtained, was less serious than the warrantless home entry in Welsh. Id.
314. Cf Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) (stating that once defendant was
stopped for speeding, officer already had all the evidence needed to convict; no
further evidence was likely to be found on the defendant's person or in his vehicle).
315. 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
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dangerous or to have committed a serious violent crime would
constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.3"6
Thus, as in Welsh, the Court implicitly recognized that the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard incorporates a requirement of
proportionality between the intrusiveness of the arrest and the
seriousness of the offense or offender.
Admittedly, Ms. Atwater's full-custody arrest was much less
intrusive than the use of deadly force in Garner. Contrary to the
situation in Garner, however, limiting police power to make full-
custody arrests for non-jailable traffic violations would have little
adverse effect on the enforcement of such crimes: almost all traffic
offenders can be fully identified from driver's licenses and/or vehicle
records, and thus are unlikely to permanently evade justice.
Several other decisions of the Court have also recognized the
principle that police powers are more limited in minor cases. In
Graham v. Connor,317 the Court held that the severity of the crime is
one of three factors to be considered in assessing a claim that
excessive force was used to make an arrest or other seizure. And in
United States v. Hensley,318 the Court suggested (but did not decide)
that completed crimes less serious than the felony at issue in that case
might not permit the use of Terry stop and frisk powers.319 Finally,
numerous lower court decisions, in a variety of contexts, have
considered the seriousness of the offense to be an important factor in
determining issues of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, particularly
with regard to the use of intrusive police powers.32°
Taken together, the decisions summarized above demonstrate an
important principle: even where the police have probable cause, a
search or seizure may be found unreasonable when it involves
intrusive police measures that are disproportionate to the seriousness
316. Id.
317. 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
318. 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
319. Some lower courts have applied this dictum to invalidate certain stops. See,
e.g., Blaisdell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985),
affid on other grounds, 381 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1986) (finding Hensley inapplicable to
misdemeanor committed two months earlier); cf. State v. Stich, 399 N.W.2d 198, 199
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding stop to investigate misdemeanor committed
"moments" before).
320. For example, many courts have invalidated suspicionless strip searches of jail
inmates charged with traffic or other minor crimes. See, e.g., Chapman v. Nichols, 989
F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.
1983); Wilson v. Shelby County, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1262-63 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (noting
that eight federal circuits have condemned blanket strip search policies applied to
minor-offense detainees). Similarly, long before the Supreme Court's decision in
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), most lower courts had considered the
seriousness of the offense an important factor in assessing whether exigent
circumstances permit warrantless entry of a home. See Dorman v. United States, 435
F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Offense severity has also been cited in numerous other
Fourth Amendment cases. See Schroeder, supra note 301, at 444 n.26.
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of the offense. When, as in Atwater, the state has declared that an
offense is not punishable with incarceration, the use of custodial
measures prior to trial is clearly disproportionate to the state's
determination of the seriousness of the offense. In very minor cases,
the proportionality principle can operate as a trump, as it did in Welsh
v. Wisconsin.2 In such cases, intrusive measures such as custodial
arrest are banned, and the police and courts have no need to examine
other case-specific reasonableness factors. At the extremes of offense
seriousness (Welsh) or intrusiveness (Garner), the proportionality
principle generates simple, bright-line decision rules applicable to a
limited group of cases.
Of course, the Court may have been reluctant to recognize the
proportionality principle for fear of entering onto yet another
doctrinal slippery slope, as proportionality arguments could
potentially be raised in a wide variety of Fourth Amendment
contexts.322 But except in extreme cases such as those noted above,
recognition of a principle like proportionality does not commit the
Court to any particular application or result; such a broad principle,
like those applied in other areas of constitutional law (i.e., "equal
protection"; "freedom of speech"), can be interpreted in many
different ways, and does not tightly constrain future decisions.323
Moreover, even if the Court was unwilling to base a ruling in Ms.
Atwater's favor entirely on this principle, the strong proportionality
considerations in her case would have justified a modest extension or
redefinition of the scope of reasonableness balancing in probable
cause cases. The combination of strong balancing and proportionality
arguments distinguishes Atwater from cases that present only one of
these factors, thus providing a small, secure ledge above the doctrinal
slippery slopes that the Court sought to avoid.
2. Equal Justice
Fundamental principles of equal justice, and the need to avoid gross
disparities in the administration of criminal justice, also supported a
modest expansion of reasonableness balancing to cover cases like
Atwater. Although the Court has not been sympathetic to these
principles in its recent cases rejecting limits on pretext stops and
321. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
322. Such slippery slope concerns help to explain the Court's extremely limited
recognition of proportionality limits on the length of prison sentences. See, e.g.,
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding sentence of life without parole
for a major cocaine possession crime by a first offender). Yet the Court has shown a
greater willingness to apply proportionality limits to fines, civil forfeitures, and
punitive damages. See supra note 302.
323. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 11-13, 260-61. This and other aspects of Sunstein's
theory of constitutional adjudication are further discussed in Part IV.
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arrests,3 24 the Court's special-needs cases have often recognized the
importance of limiting the "unbridled discretion" of the police and
other low-level officials. 2 ' Even if the Court is unwilling, for the
reasons discussed in Part III.A, to broadly recognize equality concerns
when the police act with probable cause, limited recognition of these
concerns is essential under the extreme circumstances presented in
Atwater, where a highly intrusive measure like custodial arrest is
virtually certain to be applied in a highly discriminatory manner.
Gross disparity in the use of arrest and search powers in such cases is
guaranteed by the simple facts that 1) almost everyone violates minor
traffic laws;3 26 and 2) there is rarely any actual need for arrest or
search in such cases.327
3. Other Fourth Amendment Contexts
None of the other Fourth Amendment contexts, identified
previously as possible candidates for future pro-defendant
reasonableness balancing arguments, is likely to raise anything close
to the compelling proportionality and equal justice arguments present
in Ms. Atwater's case. In all of these other contexts-warrantless
searches of vehicles; exigent circumstances searches of private
premises; warrantless arrests for more serious offenses; warranted
arrests and searches-the factual and legal conditions for the
intrusions occur less frequently than the conditions that permit a
minor traffic stop. As a result, those other police activities carry much
less potential for police abuse of overbroad powers, and thus present a
less compelling need for limitations supported by balancing analysis.
Two of these other police activities are further distinguishable from
the minor traffic offense context of Atwater. Arrests for more serious
offenses can be distinguished by the simple criterion of the authorized
punishment. Where the legislature has provided for jail or prison
penalties, custodial arrest raises much weaker proportionality
concerns. 32  Moreover, serious offenses are more likely to actually
require custodial arrest and search, which tends to promote more
uniform arrest practices. As for warranted searches and seizures, they
324. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806 (1996).
325. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
711-12 (1987); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1979); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
383-84 (1976).
326. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 385-86 and
accompanying text.
328. As for Justice Souter's concern that the police cannot always tell if the
suspect's offense will permit a jail term, see supra notes 143-45 and accompanying
text.
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are supported by much stronger textual justification, based on the
warrant clause.329
In the other two areas mentioned above, vehicle and exigent
circumstances searches, the Court has already expressed a willingness
to consider balancing in some cases. Thus, although the warrantless
search of a recreational vehicle was upheld on the facts of California
v. Carney,33 the Court explicitly left open the possibility that searches
of some less mobile and/or more "home-like" vehicles would still
require a warrant.331 As for exigent circumstances evaluations, the
Court already approved the use of balancing in minor cases in Welsh
v. Wisconsin, and most lower courts have used balancing even in cases
involving serious offenses.332
Thus, the Court has already entered onto the slippery slopes of
balancing and proportionality in assessing vehicle and exigent
circumstances searches. And despite the available distinctions and
doctrinal boundary lines that could be drawn, perhaps the Court
should also consider further applications of balancing in the other two
areas discussed above (other arrests, warranted intrusions). The
Court could have ruled narrowly in Ms. Atwater's favor, and waited
329. Petitioner's counsel in Atwater conceded that his client's arrest would have
been valid, if supported by a warrant. Supreme Court Oral Argument at 5, Atwater
(No. 99-1408). In previous cases, the Court has been reluctant to read additional
requirements into the Warrant Clause that are not based on Founding-era law and
practice. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); New York v. P.J.
Video, 475 U.S. 868 (1986) (refusing to add specific additional requirements for
searches involving premises of non-suspects and persons asserting First Amendment
claims; such considerations are left to discretion of warrant-issuing magistrates); cf.
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (holding that common-law "knock and
announce" rule is part of Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry for warranted as
well as warrantless entries). But see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that
court-authorized surgery to remove a bullet for use as evidence violated Fourth
Amendment).
330. 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (permitting warrantless search of a fully mobile motor
home found in a city parking lot).
331. Id. at 394 n.3 (suggesting warrant might be required if motor home were
"situated in a way or place that objectively indicates that it is being used as a
residence"; factors which "might be relevant in determining whether a warrant would
be required [include the vehicle's] location, whether the vehicle is readily mobile or
instead, for instance, elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is
connected to utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public road"). Lower
courts have invalidated the warrantless search of a vehicle being used as a residence
and not readily mobile. See State v. Kypreos, 39 P.3d 371, 378-79 (Wash. Ct. App.
2002) (invalidating search of trailer not connected to any motor vehicle); United
States v. Adams, 845 F. Supp. 1531, 1535-37 (1994) (invalidating search of motor
home parked in woods, with "no convenient or easy access to public road").
332. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(armed robbery). The seven factors announced in Dorman have been widely
adopted. See LaFave, supra note 21, § 3.6(a). Although some of these factors relate
to particular types of exigency such as armed suspects or flight risks, others seem to
reflect elements of reasonableness balancing, including whether the violation at issue
is a "grave offense," whether the police have strong probable cause as to suspect's
guilt and/or location in the place, or whether the entry is made peaceably.
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until later cases to decide whether and when to use balancing and
proportionality arguments to further limit arrests and other police
actions based on probable cause.
Instead, the Court ruled in favor of the police, and refused to apply
balancing and proportionality analyses. The Court ruled broadly not
only in its rejection of such analyses, but also in choosing the scope of
its ruling. As previously noted,333 the Court rejected the Petitioner's
request to issue a ruling limiting arrests for non-jailable traffic
violations; instead, the court looked at all non-jailable offenses, and
decided that no workable rule could accommodate all of them.
Moreover, the Court's grant of broad arrest power, limited only by
probable cause and the uncertain boundary between "normal" and
"extraordinary" arrests, seems to validate practically all arrests,
including some more onerous and abusive than Ms. Atwater's, such as
those involving lengthier jailing or arrests based on apparent racial
profiling.
Was such a broad ruling-implicitly deciding cases and factual
contexts that have not yet been presented to the Court-an
appropriate mode of adjudication? Recent scholarship on
constitutional decision-making, discussed in the next section, suggests
that it was not.
IV. WHAT A TWA TER CAN DRAW FROM, AND ADD TO, THEORIES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Resolving the policy issues in Atwater can both benefit from and
contribute to contemporary theories of constitutional decision-
making. For the reasons discussed in Part II.A, the Court's heavy
reliance on uncertain historical sources, with little concern for the
present day legal and social context of its decision, shows the severe
limitations and dangers of "originalism" as a primary basis for
interpreting the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, a case like Atwater
reveals the limitations of "textualism." Whatever the Court decided
in that case, its decision could not be based directly on the text of the
Fourth Amendment. Although the Reasonableness Clause of the
Amendment does specify that suspects have "the right.., to be secure
in their persons," it provides no particular guidance as to when a
seizure of the person is reasonable. The Warrant Clause provides
even less help, because the Court has held that warrants are not
required for in-public arrests.334
333. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
334. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (requiring no warrant for
in-public felony arrests, even if the police had grounds and plenty of time to seek a
warrant). Contrary to the implications and effect of Watson, however, the text of the
Reasonableness Clause implies that the people's "right to be secure" is equally
important in "their persons, houses, papers and effects."
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The facts and decision in Atwater also shed light on both the value
and the limitations of the theory of adjudication recently proposed by
Professor Cass Sunstein.335 Under Sunstein's model, decisions have
two fundamental dimensions. In terms of the scope of the ruling, a
decision can be "narrow" (limited to the case facts; highly
contextualized) or "wide" (purporting to govern factual circumstances
and policy issues not presented by the case at hand).336 In terms of the
Court's reasoning, the justification for a decision can be "shallow" or
"deep. ' 337 Shallow rulings avoid abstract theories or principles, except
for those broadly-shared ideals (e.g., equal protection; freedom of
speech) that can be interpreted in many different ways, thus yielding
"incompletely theorized agreement" among the justices voting in
favor of a particular outcome. 33' Deep rulings involve "ambitious
theoretical justifications" or overarching interpretative models,
including originalism, textualism, deference to majority rule,
"democracy-reinforcement," and independent judicial
interpretation. 339 Both of Sunstein's dimensions are matters of degree;
decision X can be "narrow" (and/or "shallow") when compared to
decision Y, but "wide" (and/or "deep") when compared to decision
Z.
3 4 0
Using this model, Sunstein makes both descriptive and prescriptive
claims; he asserts that the current Court usually prefers to rule
narrowly and shallowly, and that this "minimalist" approach is
generally preferable, reflecting the style and wisdom of our common-
law tradition.341 Narrow and shallow rulings focus on the concrete
facts of the current case, lessen the risk of unintended consequences,
and preserve flexibility, for the Court and the other branches of
government, to rule differently in future cases presenting different
facts. 342 Minimalism is especially valuable, Sunstein argues, when the
Court is dealing with a constitutional issue of high complexity and lack
of consensus, and when judges lack information about the topic they
are addressing, or the probable consequences of their decision. On
the other hand, "maximalist" (wide and/or deep) rulings are
appropriate, he argues, if one or more of the following criteria are
met:
(1) when judges have considerable confidence in the merits of that
[wide and/or deep] solution,
335. Sunstein, supra note 59.
336. Id. at 10-11.
337. Id. at 11-14.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 6-10.
340. Id. at 10-11, 16.
341. Id. at xi-xiv, 5-6, 49.
342. Id. at 3-6, 9, 46-54, 259.
343. Id. at ix, 4-6, 46-48, 59-60, 262.
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(2) when [such a] solution can reduce costly uncertainty for future
courts and litigants,
(3) when advance planning is important [e.g., in a commercial
context], and
(4) when a maximalist approach will promote democratic goals [by
giving elected officials good incentives, to which they are likely to be
responsive, to address the subject matter in question]. 344
Although not stressed by Sunstein, another value of wide and deep
rulings is that they reduce judicial discretion and promote uniformity
in the law, albeit at the risk of failing to recognize important case-
specific differences, and, in the case of wide rulings granting
overbroad government powers, at the further risk of leaving officials
with too much unregulated discretion. 141
Sunstein does not discuss very many of the Court's constitutional
criminal procedure cases, and it is not clear how he intends his theory
to apply in that context. In any case, his descriptive claim is
contradicted by the large number of wide, "bright-line-rule" decisions
handed down, by both liberal- and conservative-leaning majorities,
over the past half century.346
Sunstein's prescriptive claim is also problematic in the criminal
justice context. Professor Donald Dripps has argued that "width is a
virtue rather than a vice in constitutional criminal procedure," due to
the high volume of criminal cases raising constitutional issues, "the
need to supply police and lower courts with reliable guidance," and
"the demonstrable failure of legislatures to deal constructively with
criminal procedure problems. '347  However, Dripps seems to agree
with Sunstein that "deep" justifications are generally undesirable,
since they tend to be more controversial and unstable over time.
Shallower justifications "would command normative respect from
various ideological perspectives, which would reduce both collective
decision problems in future cases and the risk of hostile political
reaction. ",348
344. Id. at 57; see also id. at 54-56, 59, 71, 263.
345. See id. at 71, 262 (mentioning uniformity goals).
346. Examples of wide, pro-defendant rulings include Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Examples of wide
pro-police rules include Robinson and Belton, and Opperman and Lafayette.
347. Dripps, Constitutional Theory, supra note 71, at 4, 40.
348. Id. at 4. Dripps views the Court's recent decision in Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S 428 (2000), reaffirming the constitutional basis for the Miranda rules,
as a narrow and shallow ruling. Miranda itself was a wide (but shallow) ruling.
Sunstein, supra note 59, at 262. Miranda imposed bright-line rules which went far
beyond the facts and demonstrated constitutional violations in the cases presented,
with a questionable doctrinal basis in the Fifth Amendment privilege. Dickerson is
narrow in that it reaffirms Miranda but refuses to explicitly repudiate post-Miranda
cases which were seemingly premised on the assumption that Miranda rights are not
constitutionally-based. To the extent that the latter cases have not been implicitly
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Justice Souter's opinion in Atwater does not fully support either
Sunstein's general theory or Dripps' proposed alternative. Instead,
the opinion contradicts Sunstein's descriptive and prescriptive claims
and partially contradicts Dripps' wide-shallow preference in that it
appears to be both "wide" and "deep." According to Sunstein, Justice
Souter is usually a "minimalist" justice,349 but in Atwater he
disregarded the compelling facts of Ms. Atwater's case,35 which he
admitted would support a decision in her favor, and adopted a
relatively "wide" rule applicable to all arrests, including non-traffic
cases, and permitting arrest and detention on probable cause under
almost any circumstances."' Thus, except for the uncertain category
of "extraordinary" and "unusually harmful" arrests, the Court has not
given itself much flexibility to rule differently in future cases
presenting different facts. At the same time, the opinion's reasoning
is "deep" in several respects: in its heavy reliance on the theory of
originalism; in its statement of a general preference for "bright-line"
rules; and in its adoption of the Whren court's a priori limits on case-
specific reasonableness balancing (seemingly due to broader,
"slippery slope" concerns about the continued expansion of balancing
analysis) .352
Sunstein and Dripps both caution that the optimum choices as to
narrow versus wide scope and shallow versus deep rationale are highly
context-specific. 3 Thus, one case does not necessarily prove either of
their theories wrong. 4 But at least on first inspection, it appears that
overruled, Dickerson's reasoning is shallow-it fails to provide any underlying theory
that reconciles these cases with Miranda and Dickerson.
349. Sunstein, supra note 59, at xiii. Most of the other Justices' votes in Atwater are
consistent with Sunstein's classification: Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer
dissented, favoring a narrow, case-specific ruling, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Justice Souter's "maximalist" ruling,
preferring an ambitious, "clear, bright-line rule[], producing stability and clarity in the
law." Id. at xii-xiii (identifying Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas as "maximalists"); id. at 58, 101 (discussing maximalist decisions joined by
Justice Kennedy). But see id. at 9 (Justice Kennedy is a minimalist). See also, Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), where Justices Ginsburg and Breyer ruled widely,
"endeavor[ing] to craft an all-encompassing rule for the future." Id. at 51 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined the
dissent, and thus preferred to rule narrowly.
350. Justice Souter similarly disregarded the strong case facts (in favor of the
government) in Edmond, Ferguson, and Kyllo. See supra notes 224-45, 254-62 and
accompanying text.
351. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Justice Souter
declined the Petitioner's request for an arrest-limiting rule applicable only to non-
jailable traffic violations. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
352. See supra Part III.A.
353. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 262; Dripps, Constitutional Theory, supra note 71,
at 4, 76.
354. Dripps believes Atwater is a bad decision. A few days after the decision was
announced, he walked into my office and remarked that "the Fourth Amendment was
born in Lexington, and died in Lago Vista." Sunstein's views on Atwater are
unknown, but he presumably believes that the Court's decision demonstrates the
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Sunstein's theory not only fails to predict the outcome in Atwater, but
also provides limited guidance as to how that case should have been
decided.
Sunstein's criteria for choosing between a minimalist and
maximalist approach generate conflicting results in Atwater. On the
one hand, several features of this case argue strongly for a narrow,
case-specific ruling. Although the Court assumed that abusive arrests
like Ms. Atwater's are rare, it lacked any reliable evidence to support
this conclusion,355 thus failing the first of Sunstein's four criteria for a
wide rule. Moreover, the Court's grant of almost unlimited police
discretion to arrest minor offenders, coupled with the reality that
virtually anyone who drives is chargeable with some violation, carries
serious potential for adverse, unintended consequences.356 On the
other hand, the Atwater context-high-volume decisions by low-level
officers, on the street-is one which, according to Sunstein's second
criterion, calls for relatively simple, bright-line, over-broad rules,
applicable to all minor offenses (not just traffic violations), in order to
"reduce costly uncertainty for future courts and litigants." '357
Moreover, the Court's decision in Atwater might be seen as promoting
democratic goals (Sunstein's fourth criterion) by leaving almost all
arrest-limiting decisions to the legislative or executive branches. The
"wider" the decision in favor of police power, the better. Minimal
constitutional limits on such powers leave maximum scope for
democratic policy-making, albeit with little incentive-via the threat
of constitutional regulation-for democratic processes to actually
address such policy issues.
One solution to the indeterminancy and high context-specificity of
Sunstein's theory might be to weight or prioritize his four prudential
factors. In fact, Sunstein seems to give greatest emphasis to the fourth
factor, democracy-promotion.358 As noted above, this factor seems to
favor the Court's decision in Atwater (and perhaps all of the Court's
over-broad, bright-line police-powers decisions in recent decades).
Thus, if a given jurisdiction's citizens want more limitations on the
danger of wide and broad rulings.
355. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
356. Sunstein, supra note 59, at ix, 47.
357. Id. at 57. As argued in Parts II and V, however, the need for overbroad police
power is less compelling in the Atwater context than in many others, and a simple,
workable rule limiting arrests for non-jailable traffic violations can easily be devised.
Moreover, what the Court's wide, pro-police rule gains in reduction of legal
uncertainty it loses by promoting unfettered police discretion and inconsistency in
decisions about which offenders will actually be arrested and searched (or vice versa).
358. Id. at xiv, 24-45, 259-60. Sunstein distinguishes between rulings that are
"democracy-promoting" (triggering democratic deliberative processes, or improving
them, e.g., through greater accountability or a requirement of reasoned decisions);
"democracy-foreclosing" (placing some practices or issues "off limits to politics"); or
"democracy-permitting" (validating the results of democratic processes). See id. at 26-
28.
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arrest power, let them ask their legislators or police officials. The
Court's pro-police decision in Atwater merely represents, in Sunstein's
words, a "'remand' to the public." '359 Indeed, his strongly-emphasized
democracy-promotion factor might even be cited in support of a
general preference in favor of wide, pro-government decisions, in all
criminal procedure and civil rights cases.
Such a government-preferring principle would be unwise. As
Dripps and others have noted, legislatures and other officials have
traditionally failed to deal constructively with most criminal
procedure issues, and have rarely granted additional rights to criminal
suspects.36 Nevertheless, it might be argued that legislatures or police
administrators will be much more responsive to abuses in the traffic
enforcement context, since so many "ordinary" citizens are affected
by these laws. Indeed, this may be precisely what Justice Souter was
assuming when he relied so heavily upon "the good sense (and, failing
that, the political accountability) of most local lawmakers and law-
enforcement officials,"36' to prevent abuse of broad arrest powers.
But if one is to judge by studies of racial profiling and policing in
general,362 the greater likelihood is that "ordinary" citizens like Ms.
359. Id. at 135.
360. See Dripps, Constitutional Theory, supra note 71, at 45-46. See generally
Amsterdam, supra note 93, at 379 ("[T]here will remain more than enough crime and
fear of it in American society to keep our legislatures from the politically suicidal
undertaking of police control."); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn
About the Rights of the Accused? 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079 (1993); Logan, supra note
64, at 364 ("[T]he inevitable majoritarian impulse of legislatures, with their
characteristic modern crime-control orientation, potentially undercuts the tenability
of reliable legislative intervention [to limit minor-crime arrests]."). Indeed, even with
a sympathetic figure like Ms. Atwater, civil rights proponents were not able to enact
legislation in Texas limiting police powers in such cases. See infra note 414 and
accompanying text.
361. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001); see also Supreme
Court Oral Argument at 41, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (Scalia, J.) (suggesting that the
political process protects misdemeanants better than felons). Justice Souter also
apparently assumed that police administrators will strongly discourage unnecessary
arrests, because "it is in the interest of the police to limit petty-offense arrests, which
carry costs that are simply too great to incur without good reason." Atwater, 532 U.S.
at 352. But neither Justice Souter nor the Atwater respondents and their supporting
amici cited any examples of such police regulations or policies. One reason for the
absence of self-regulation is that arrest also permits various searches; moreover, as
was noted previously, no actual arrest may be made if the "search incident" and
vehicle-inventory search produce no evidence or contraband. See supra note 19.
362. See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment on the Streets, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1258 (1990); Tracey Maclin, Terry v.
Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 St. John's L.
Rev. 1271, 1278 (1998); see also supra note 13. The high degree of attention that has
been given to racial profiling issues in recent years would seem to contradict the
pessimistic assessments above, see supra note 360 and accompanying text, about the
prospects for addressing the Atwater problem through democratic processes. It
remains to be seen, however, whether this increased attention will produce real
change in racially discriminatory police practices. Additionally, without sustained
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Atwater will rarely be affected by overbroad arrest powers in traffic
cases, just as they are rarely affected by broad "stop and frisk" rules
that apply to everyone in theory, but not in practice.
Dripps' insight into the inherent race and class politics of criminal
justice shows that this context requires important modifications to
Sunstein's general interpretive theory. Because the typical victim of
police abuse is likely to be poor and non-white-and thus uninvolved
in, and unprotected by, democratic processes - Sunstein's
"democracy-promotion" criterion cannot be considered as a general,
"pro-police" factor. If anything, courts should adopt the opposite
principle: "if in doubt, rule in favor of the citizen." '363 Such an a priori
preference is consistent with several bedrock principles of modern
criminal justice: the presumption of innocence, the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, the privileging of the rights of the
defendant over those of the victim, and the rule of lenity in statutory
construction. Moreover, this principle is consistent with the
"democracy-reinforcement" theory noted favorably by both Sunstein
and Dripps-that constitutional rules have an important role to play
in "protecting groups that are at special risk because the democratic
process is not democratic enough."3"
It is important to note that any such "pro-suspect" preference
would not systematically favor either a wide or a narrow rule-scope.
In some situations, Sunstein's criteria would justify a wide, pro-
suspect ruling, and I agree with Sunstein and Dripps that Miranda
falls into this category."' In Miranda, the Court had extensive
experience with interrogation issues and the application of the case-
specific (voluntariness) approach, no narrower bright-line rule seemed
to be workable, and the Court's wide-but-shallow rule366 still left open
the option for the legislative or executive branches to devise suitable
alternative safeguards meeting the Court's criteria for
constitutionally-adequate interrogation procedures.367
In other criminal justice contexts, however, a pro-suspect
data collection, analysis, and advocacy, concerns about racial profiling may not lead
state legislatures, rule drafters, or police chiefs to cut back on arrest discretion. Most
profiling studies focus on disparity in traffic and other investigatory stops, not arrests.
State and local policymakers will have to be convinced not only that there is racial
disparity in stopping and searching of traffic offenders, but that part of the solution to
these problems is to cut back on overbroad arrest powers that legally justify the
searches.
363. Judge Posner has proposed an analogous, pro-government preference, to be
applied in the military context. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 168.
364. Id. at 7; see also Dripps, Constitutional Theory, supra note 71, at 45-46.
365. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 55, 262; Dripps, Constitutional Theory, supra note
71, at 4, 42-46.
366. See supra note 348.
367. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (stating that Miranda standards
apply "unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it").
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preference, in combination with Sunstein's criteria, would call for a
narrow decision. As noted previously, such a ruling is particularly
appropriate when the court faces a high degree of "factual or moral
uncertainty" (Sunstein's first factor), thus posing a substantial risk of
adverse unexpected consequences. This was the case in Atwater.
Accordingly, the Court should have issued a narrow ruling in Ms.
Atwater's favor, along the lines suggested in Part V-that is, a ruling
limited to non-jailable traffic offenses of the type charged in Atwater.
Because the Court did not know precisely what it was doing, it should
have ruled narrowly. And that narrow ruling should have been in the
citizen's favor-the democratic process cannot be relied on to prevent
unnecessary and abusive traffic arrests, because the typical victim of
such arrests will not be a suburban "soccer mom" like Ms. Atwater.
Apart from democracy-promotion goals and the politics of criminal
justice, does a preference for minimalist decisions tend to favor a
ruling for one side or the other? In particular, could the Court have
issued a narrow-shallow ruling in favor of the government in Atwater?
Although such a question does not appear to have been directly
addressed by Sunstein, the logic of his model clearly dictates that a
narrow-shallow ruling for either party is not always possible. In a case
where the facts and case-specific policy arguments strongly favor one
party-as even Justice Souter admitted that they did in Atwater-any
decision against that party would have to be based on an abstract,
"deep" rationale. Moreover, such a decision would, in effect, be a
"wide" decision-even if the court were to explicitly state that its
decision is limited to the current case facts and context. In Atwater,
with its strong case facts and arguments supporting Ms. Atwater's
claim, any decision upholding her arrest means that practically any
arrest, for any offense under any circumstances, is also valid. Thus, if
a minimalist decision is generally preferable, a case with strong facts
and case-specific policy arguments for one side should generally be
decided in that party's favor. Accordingly, the Court should have held
that Ms. Atwater's arrest was unreasonable, while expressing only
limited views on the validity of arrests under other circumstances.
Consistent with the general preference expressed by both Sunstein
and Dripps, a narrow ruling in Ms. Atwater's favor could also have
been based on a shallow, "incompletely theorized36 rationale,
derived from principles of reasonableness balancing, proportionality,
and equal justice that can attract broad support with limited
agreement on particulars other than the result required on the facts
presented. At the same time, the narrowness of the ruling, and its
shallow reasoning, minimize the risk of moving the Court onto, or
further down, any doctrinal "slippery slope. '3 69
368. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 11.
369. See supra Part 1I.
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On the other hand, a relatively narrow and shallow ruling does not
mean that the police and lower courts must be left with no guidance or
"bright-lines." Such bright-lines are highly desirable in the criminal
procedure context, and should be employed whenever possible.370 As
discussed in Part V, a narrow ruling in Ms. Atwater's favor could
include a simple set of decision rules for the police. The category of
cases governed by the rule (non-jailable traffic) could be clearly
defined, and the appropriate exceptions to the general rule, barring
arrest in such cases, are few and easily stated.
A workable decision rule need not consist entirely of bright-line
elements. Indeed, some aspects of the rule may need to incorporate
more flexible standards, factors, or principles.37 In Atwater, the
general rule suggested in Part V that no custodial arrest should be
permitted for non-jailable traffic violations, necessitates case-specific
assessments of the need for custody in exceptional cases. But such
assessments will interfere only slightly with the goal of providing
police and courts with a relatively simple, bright-line rule. The
proposal creates a strong, rule-like presumption (no arrest), and
exceptions to that general rule will rarely arise in the narrowly-
defined category of cases governed by the rule. The Court adopted a
similar rule-and-exceptions approach in County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin.372 The court ruled that warrantless probable cause to
arrest must "as a general matter" be judicially reviewed within forty-
eight hours; the government has the burden of demonstrating that
"extraordinary circumstances" justify a longer delay, and the
defendant has the burden of showing that a delay of forty-eight hours
or less was unreasonable.373
Admittedly, a narrow-shallow ruling, limited to non-jailable traffic
violations and based on "incompletely theorized" '374 principles, leaves
the police and lower courts uncertain about the validity of arrests for
other minor offenses (jailable traffic violations and all non-traffic
crimes, both jailable and non-jailable). Such uncertainty is, of course,
the price of minimalism. But such a ruling would not leave the police
and lower courts in any worse position than they were in before the
Atwater case arose, because the Court had never clearly spoken on
370. Dripps, Constitutional Theory, supra note 71, at 4, 40; see also supra notes 100-
01, 347 and accompanying text.
371. Cf Sunstein, supra note 59, at 19 (stating that decisions can be minimalist in
some ways or along some dimensions, and maximalist in other respects). As others
have noted, some criminal procedure standards, such as probable cause and
reasonable suspicion, are largely and unavoidably dependent on flexible, case-specific
assessments. Slobogin, supra note 301, at 72; Dripps, Constitutional Theory, supra
note 71, at 44.
372. 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991).
373. Id. at 56, 70.
374. Sunstein, supra note 59, at 11-14.
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any of these issues.375 Invalidating Ms. Atwater's arrest would
inevitably cast some doubt on the legality of arrests for other minor
crimes, but so did the dicta and holdings in a number of the Court's
prior decisions.376 Moreover, the Court could stress the particularly
strong facts of Ms. Atwater's case, as well as the special (citation-
promoting) circumstances of the traffic law context, and could make it
very clear that its decision invalidating her arrest does not necessarily
cast doubt on the validity of arrests for other kinds of minor offenses.
Finally, as Sunstein points out, the limits of a minimal decision are
also its strength. Such a decision allows the Court to take a wait-and-
see approach to broader policy issues, addressing them only when
presented by concrete case facts, and in light of experience gained
from application of the Court's earlier, narrow rulings. And although
a holding that Ms. Atwater's arrest was unconstitutional would
remove that narrow class of cases from the scope of democratic
policy-making, such a ruling could actually encourage legislators,
police administrators, and other officials to become more actively
involved in drafting and enforcing appropriate limitations on minor-
crime arrests, thus achieving Sunstein's all-important "democracy-
promoting" goal. Legislative and executive branch officials would
want to address these issues not only to reduce uncertainty about the
legality of arrests not governed by the Court's narrow ruling, but also
to demonstrate to the courts that further constitutional limitations are
unnecessary.
In sum, it appears that the optimum resolution of the issues
presented in Atwater is both informed by, and has important
implications for, the theories of constitutional adjudication proposed
by Professors Sunstein and Dripps. Application of Sunstein's model to
the Atwater problem shows the need to prioritize his criteria for
choosing between minimalist and maximalist rulings and to further
elaborate their application in the criminal procedure context. Both
authors give strong emphasis to the goals of democracy-promotion
and democracy-reinforcement, but these important goals do not
systematically favor either a narrow ruling (Sunstein) or a wide ruling
(Dripps). Instead, that choice is dependent on the application of
Sunstein's other factors. Nor, for the reasons suggested by Dripps,
does Sunstein's democracy-promotion goal justify a general
preference for criminal justice rulings in the government's favor.
Finally, "minimalism" does not necessarily leave officials without
guidance, nor does such guidance require exclusively "bright-line"
375. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Also, Justice Souter's ruling is not
free of uncertainty either. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
376. Note, in particular, the concurring opinions of Justice Stewart, in Gustafson,
and Justice Powell, in Robinson, and the implications of Welsh. See supra notes 117,
310-14 and accompanying text.
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decision rules. Any ruling, whether narrow or wide, can incorporate
both bright-line and case-specific elements.
Looking at Atwater in light of the Sunstein-Dripps model, as further
elaborated in this article, suggests that the Court was right to look for
simple, relatively bright-line rules, and to avoid the need for police
officers and lower courts to engage in complex, fact-specific
"reasonableness balancing" in every traffic case. But the Court was
wrong to assume that such practical concerns call for a wide, pro-
police ruling. For the reasons persuasively argued in Sunstein's work,
the Court should have ruled narrowly, on a shallow rationale. But for
the equally persuasive reasons advanced by Dripps, the Court should
have chosen to err on the side of citizen's rights. The reality is that, in
many jurisdictions, the political process will not-at least without
some goading from the Court-produce appropriate limits on the
arrest power in minor cases. Moreover, given the very strong case
facts and policy arguments against Ms. Atwater's arrest, any truly
"minimalist" decision would have to be in her favor.
The precise nature of a suitable "minimalist" ruling in Atwater is
further explored in the next section.
V. BETTER BRIGHT LINES: PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AND
NONCONSTITUTIONAL ARREST RULES
Whether it based its decision on reasonableness balancing alone, or
balancing in combination with proportionality and equality principles,
the Supreme Court should have concluded Ms. Atwater's arrest to be
an unreasonable seizure. Surely this police action was unreasonable
in any ordinary sense of the word, and Justice Souter admitted as
much.377 His stated reasons for disregarding the facts of Ms. Atwater's
case (as well as common sense and common language) are
understandable but ultimately unpersuasive.37s Even accounting for
Justice Souter's desire to give police and lower courts a "readily
administrable" rule, the Court's broad ruling-that probable cause
alone justifies a "normal custodial arrest" for any violation under any
circumstances-is not the only workable rule option. Nor is the
Court's decision justified by broader concerns about entering onto a
doctrinal slippery slope, with endless requests for more "balancing." '379
The Court could, and should, have issued a "narrow-shallow" ruling
of the type it has often preferred in recent years, which would have
had few implications for other factual or legal contexts.8 Given the
strong facts in Ms. Atwater's case, such a narrow, "minimalist"
approach would clearly require a ruling in her favor.
377. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
378. See supra Part II.
379. See supra Part III.
380. See supra Part IV.
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Although Ms. Atwater's arrest was clearly unreasonable, Justice
Souter was correct in concluding that police and trial courts cannot be
expected to engage in complex balancing or proportionality and equal
justice assessments in every case-particularly in the context of minor,
high-volume traffic violations. Thus, rather than simply striking down
Ms. Atwater's arrest based on the particular facts of her case, the
Court needed to provide some guidance for future cases. When
would arrest be constitutional? What relatively simple, bright-line
rules are possible for these kinds of cases? In her dissent, Justice
O'Connor proposed barring arrest for any non-jailable offense,
"unless the officer is 'able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion' of a full custodial
arrest." '' Elsewhere in her opinion Justice O'Connor indicated that
warrantless arrest would be permissible, even for a non-jailable
violation, "to abate criminal conduct[,] .... to verify the offender's
identity and, if the offender poses a flight risk, to ensure her
appearance at trial." '382 She also stated that arrest would be proper
when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect "might be a
danger to the community if released." '383
Justice O'Connor's opinion provides a simple statement of the
arrest power, but her proposed rule is not truly "minimalist" because
it appears to govern non-traffic as well as traffic cases. Several of the
Petitioner's supporting amici (including the author, mea culpa) also
proposed arrest-limiting rules applicable to a broader class of minor
crimes.384 There were very good reasons, however, for the Court to
limit its ruling to non-jailable traffic violations of the type charged
against Ms. Atwater. Such a limitation avoids deciding issues not
presented by the facts of the case, thus preserving the advantages of
minimalism articulated by Professor Sunstein-in particular, the risk
of poorly-informed decision-making and unintended consequences.'
381. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 366 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). A similar rule was
proposed by Judge Wiener, dissenting from the en banc decision. Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 249-50 (5th Cir. 1999).
382. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 365 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 367 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
384. See supra note 138.
385. Of course, any rule limiting arrest powers for non-jailable offenses risks the
unintended consequence that legislatures might be tempted to add jail penalties
simply to evade the new constitutional limitations. This danger seems relatively
small, however, in the context of minor traffic violations. Ordinary citizens would feel
threatened by, and question the need for, any such increase in penalties. Moreover,
limiting the maximum penalty to a fine allows these high-volume offenses to be
processed quickly and cheaply, with a minimum of procedural formality. See, e.g.,
Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.02(2), 23.01 (stating that there is no right to appointed counsel or
jury trial for nonjailable misdemeanors); id. 23.03(1) (granting authority for local
courts to establish violations bureaus for payment of fines); id. 23.03(2)(1) (stating
that state judges shall adopt uniform schedule of fines payable at violations bureaus
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Moreover, minor traffic offenses present by far the strongest case for
placing strict limits on the arrest power. The universality and low
visibility of such minor violations raise the greatest potential for
discriminatory arrest decisions, and there is rarely any actual need to
arrest in such cases. Most traffic offenders are easily identified by
means of driver's license and/or vehicle records and their prior driving
records are readily accessible to officers in the field. They are unlikely
to flee to avoid the minor penalties authorized in these cases, and if
they do fail to appear for trial they can be subjected to license
suspension and other expedited administrative remedies.386 For these
reasons, the advantages of a narrow, context-specific ruling outweigh
the disadvantages of failing to definitively resolve the limits of the
arrest power for minor violations outside of the traffic-law context.
The Petitioner properly limited her proposed arrest rule to non-
jailable traffic violations. But her rule was too minimalist in some
respects-it failed to fully specify the kinds of factors that would
justify arrest in such cases, and did not indicate whether articulable
suspicion or some other evidentiary standard would be applied to
these factors. The principal statement of Petitioner's rule simply
provided that arrest is permitted "when... necessary for enforcement
of the traffic laws or when the offense would otherwise continue and
pose a danger to others on the road." '387 Later, Petitioner added that
arrest would be proper "when the officer cannot ascertain the driver's
identity." '388 This specific example (along with "danger to others") is
helpful, but the police, legislators, criminal rule drafters, and lower
courts need even more detailed guidance. The Court could have
offered such guidance by incorporating provisions that are well-
established in existing state laws and model codes.389 At the same
for all statutory non-jailable offenses and any other statutory misdemeanors they may
select).
386. In Minnesota, when a cited traffic violator fails to appear for trial, the alleged
violation is treated as a conviction for driver's license administration purposes (but
this is not a basis for imposing a fine). Minn. Stat. Ann. § 171.01(13); State v. Haney,
600 N.W.2d 469 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). Under the Uniform Vehicle Code, the court
shall report any violation of a written promise to appear to the state department of
motor vehicles; department may suspend license of driver who violates promise to
appear in a citation given to an officer in that or any other state. Uniform Vehicle
Code, supra note 146, §§ 6-205(b), 6-211(a)(6).
387. Brief of Petitioners at 46, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
388. Id. at 46-47.
389. An alternative approach, similar to one suggested by Professor LaFave to deal
with the pretext problem, would be for the Court to require states to develop
legislative or administrative regulations specifying when arrest is permissible for non-
jailable traffic violations. LaFave, Search & Seizure, supra note 104, §§ 1.4(e), 5. 2 (g).
The Court would then review those regulations, with a substantial degree of
deference. The Court appears to have used this approach to regulate inventory
searches. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (invalidating search because state had
no regulations on opening of closed containers); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367
(1987) (upholding inventory search where regulations were adequate). Some have
argued, however, that this experience shows that such police regulations do not
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time, such guidance need not remove all discretion; as was noted in
Part IV, it is possible, and sometimes necessary, to craft decision
criteria that are "rule-like" in some respects, while also incorporating
standards and principles that allow some room for case-specific
assessments.
What particular grounds for arrest should the Court have
recognized as exceptions to the general rule barring arrest for a non-
jailable traffic violation? First, there seems to be widespread
agreement that a citation will not suffice when there are doubts that
the suspect's identity has been reliably established.39" There is also
considerable support in existing laws and model codes for the
proposition that, even where the suspect's identity is well-known,
arrest is permissible if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
violator will not appear in court or pay the fine39'-for example,
where the suspect refuses to sign the citation, or the officer knows that
the offender has previously failed to appear in court, or the offender is
not a state resident, and in each of these cases, where the offender
provides no credit or bond card guaranteeing payment of the fine.392
Other common justifications for arrest found in state laws and
model codes include the officer's belief that the offender: 1) presents
a serious risk of causing imminent bodily harm,3 93 or 2) will persist in
sufficiently constrain police discretion. See Salken, supra note 34, at 248-49. It could
also be argued that custodial arrest and its various incidents and potentials for abuse
is too important an area to be delegated to administrative or legislative rule-makers.
Furthermore, the well-developed standards for citation release, found in state rules
and model codes, suggest that the Court has a firm basis to impose minimum
constitutional requirements to govern the narrow category of nonjailable traffic
violations.
390. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter ABA Standards] 10-2.2(c)(i); Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n, National
Prosecution Standards 10.2(B) (1977); Nat'l Ass'n of Pretrial Servs. Agencies,
Performance Standards And Goals For Pretrial Release And Diversion: Pretrial
Release [hereinafter NAPSA Standards] II.A(1) (1978); see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525
U.S. 113, 118 (1998) (rejecting argument that search-incident to citation could be
justified by risk that suspect will destroy evidence of his identity because "if a police
officer is not satisfied with the identification furnished by the driver, this may be a
basis for arresting him"); Brief of Petitioners at 46-47, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (arguing
that officers could arrest when they cannot ascertain driver's identity); ACLU Amicus
Brief, at 22-23, Atwater (No. 99-1408) (detailing state statutes that recognize lack of
proof of identity as a basis to arrest for minor crimes).
391. See, e.g., ABA Standards, supra note 390, 10-2.2(c)(ii, iv, v); Nat'l Conference
of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure 211(c)(iii)
(1974) [hereinafter Uniform Rules]; NAPSA Standards, supra note 390, II.A(4), (5).
392. Arguably, the problem of out-of-state violators has been solved by adoption of
the Nonresident Violator Compact of 1977, under which state A helps to enforce state
B's traffic laws by suspending the driver's license of a state A resident who fails to pay
or appear in State B. Salken, supra note 34, at 267-68; see Supreme Court Oral
Argument at 8, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
393. See, e.g., ABA Standards, supra note 390, 10-2.2(c)(iii); Uniform Rules, supra
note 391, 21 1(c)(i).
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committing the same violation for which he has just been charged,394
or 3) is in need of medical care or other protection.395 However, the
third justification would seem to be rarely sufficient to justify
custodial arrest for a non-jailable traffic violation; if the driver needs
immediate medical care or protection, the officer can seize his keys
and, if necessary, escort him home or to a hospital. The first two of
these justifications are more substantial, and are probably covered by
the first prong of Petitioner's proposed standard, because the arrest is
"necessary for enforcement of the traffic laws." The Court simply
needed to make these grounds for arrest more specific, and, for all of
the proposed grounds, specify an officer-belief standard such as
reasonable suspicion. It is worth mentioning, however, that these two
additional grounds, while acceptable as a matter of setting federal
constitutional minimum standards, are overbroad and problematic in
the context of minor traffic violations. They should not automatically
be adopted as a matter of state constitutional law, or in statutory or
criminal-rule arrest provisions.
If the Court were unwilling to "legislate" all of these exceptions in
Atwater, it could have taken a slightly more minimalist approach,
validating the most compelling arrest grounds, for example, no
identification, or out-of-state driver without a valid credit or bond
card, while expressing doubts (or reserving judgment) about whether
other exceptional cases might also justify arrest for a non-jailable
traffic offense. A similar rule was proposed in one of the amicus
briefs in Atwater-citation release should be mandatory for all non-
jailable traffic offenses unless the defendant cannot be identified.396
This strict rule produces the most proportional and uniform results,
and provides the simplest decision rule. On the other hand, it is
arguably too "overbroad" in the opposite (pro-suspect) direction,
preventing some justifiable arrests (or at least casting doubt on their
validity). Nevertheless, such a rule finds support in several of the
Court's prior cases. The Court's rulings in Tennessee v. Garner and
Welsh v. Wisconsin, discussed in Part III.B, prohibited certain
intrusive police measures (the use of deadly force to arrest and
warrantless entry of a home on exigent circumstances, respectively)
even though the inability to use such measures would, in some cases,
totally preclude effective prosecution of the suspect.39
394. Uniform Rules, supra note 391, 211(c)(ii).
395. Id. 211(c)(iv).
396. Texas Defense Lawyers Amicus Brief, supra note 138, at 27 (proposing a
second alternative rule). But see id. at 28-29 (arguing that "no reason" justifies not
applying such a rule to non-jailable violations outside of the traffic law context).
397. See supra notes 310-16 and accompanying text. Neither of those cases,
however, adopted a rule that would leave the police unable to prevent an immediate
threat to public safety. In Tennessee v. Garner the Court approved the use of deadly
force to deal with such a threat. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). In Welsh v. Wisconsin, the drunk
driver the police were trying to arrest and subject to blood testing was in his home,
2002]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
What evidentiary standard should apply to the circumstances
justifying arrest? Should the Court have gone even further than the
dissent's reasonable suspicion standard, and held that the police must
have probable cause to believe that arrest is needed to protect one of
the legitimate law enforcement interests noted above? Although the
text and history of the Fourth Amendment provide no basis for this
approach, some support for "reading in" a further probable cause
requirement governing "custody need" can be found in the rule that
police must have probable cause to believe "exigent circumstances"
are present to permit a warrantless search or seizure.39 If a probable
cause standard were applied to need-for-custody assessments, it might
also be appropriate to permit "standardized procedures" -regulations
mandating arrest-to be applied in cases of serious crime, since the
arrest power is often justified and widely invoked in such cases.399
Even with this qualification, however, use of the probable cause
standard is problematic in that it places stricter limits on police
discretion. This higher standard would therefore be less likely to gain
the support of a majority of the justices on the U.S. Supreme Court, or
on state supreme courts, and it may be undesirable on policy grounds.
Use of Justice O'Connor's articulable suspicion standard seems like a
suitable compromise. Nor would this be a novel application of that
standard. In several cases arising outside of the Terry stop and frisk
context, the Court has granted additional police powers, but limited
their use to cases meeting an articulable suspicion standard.""'
Of course, state courts and rule-drafters have more freedom to craft
arrest-limiting rules than does the Supreme Court. Courts may
interpret state constitutional provisions more favorably than the
Supreme Court has interpreted similar, or even identical, language in
the federal constitution. 41 After Atwater was decided, lower courts in
and was not expected to go out and resume driving. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
398. See Dressier, supra note 21, § 12.04; Whitebread & Slobogin, supra note 21, §
9.04.
399. Such a mandatory arrest policy would be consistent with several of Professor
LaFave's criteria for adopting an overbroad, "bright-line" rule. See supra note 100
and accompanying text.
400. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (search of probationer's
home); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (need for "no-knock" home
entry); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) ("sweep" of arrest premises for other
dangerous persons); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (search of government
employee's office); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985)
(strip search at international border); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(search of high school student's purse).
401. LaFave, supra note 21. State and federal courts may also adopt rules under a
"supervisory powers" theory, which provides more flexibility in the formulation of the
rule and in its implementation, amendment, or repeal. The status of this power in
federal courts is uncertain. See id. § 1.5(i). It has been frequently used, however, by
some state supreme courts. See, e.g., State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994)
(requiring electronic recording of custodial interrogations); State v. Lefthand, 488
N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 1992) (barring custodial interrogation of represented suspect
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Montana and Ohio ruled that such an arrest violates the state
constitution.4 2 Even before Atwater, several states had adopted
statutes or criminal rules limiting custodial arrests in minor cases, and
experience has shown that such limitations are workable. In
Minnesota, for example, the Rules of Criminal Procedure have, since
their inception in 1975, required the police to issue citations in all
misdemeanor cases with a maximum penalty of 90 days in jail
(including non-traffic cases), "unless it reasonably appears to the
officer that arrest or detention is necessary to prevent bodily harm to
the accused or another or further criminal conduct, or that there is a
substantial likelihood that the accused will fail to respond to a
citation."4 3 As for non-jailable violations (petty misdemeanors), the
Rule's text, commentary, and interpretive case law indicate that arrest
is very rarely permitted.4' 4 Since 1977, these limits on the arrest power
have been enforced through exclusionary rules.40 5 For more serious
offenses, however, the rules are different. Recognizing the
fundamental proportionality principle discussed in Part III.B, as well
as the more frequent need for arrest in serious cases, the Minnesota
rules give police full discretion to arrest, or, in some cases, require
arrest, if the most serious charged offense is a gross misdemeanor
(punishable with up to one year in jail), or a felony.40 6
without presence of or notice to counsel).
402. State v. Bauer, 36 P.3d 892 (Mont. 2001) (finding that arrest for being a minor
in possession of an alcoholic substance, a non-jailable offense, is prohibited except in
special circumstances); State v. Brown, 2001 WL 1657828 (Ohio App. 2d Dec. 28,
2001) (unpublished opinion) (finding that arrest of jaywalker violated Ohio statute
R.C. 2935.26 and Ohio Constitution, and as a result, the cocaine seized in search
incident must be suppressed). The prior Ohio Supreme Court decision in State v.
Jones, 727 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 2000), based on the same statute as well as the United
States and Ohio constitutions, is still controlling notwithstanding Atwater. See also
United States v. Swanson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000 (C.D. II. 2001) (declining to
extend Atwater to permit detention at police station beyond time reasonably
necessary to write citation for traffic violations and apply court-ordered bail
schedule).
403. Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.01(1).
404. State v. Martin, 253 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1977) (holding that arrest violated
Rule 6.01); State v. Richmond, 602 N.W.2d 647 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (same); State v.
Evans, 373 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.01(1), cmt.
("[W]here possible, a person should not be taken into custody for an offense for
which the person could not be incarcerated even if found guilty."); Minn. R. Crim. P.
3.01 (stating that upon filing of a complaint charging an offense punishable by fine
only, a summons shall be issued in lieu of a warrant). Since Rule 6 went into effect in
1975, no reported case has ever upheld custodial arrest for a non-jailable
misdemeanor. Cf State v. Brown, 345 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1984) (finding that arrest
for jailable misdemeanor was proper where suspect was known to have previously
failed to appear after receiving citations).
405. See Martin, 253 N.W.2d 404 (excluding evidence obtained after arrest for a
non-jailable misdemeanor); State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998)
(excluding evidence taken during arrest for jailable misdemeanor).
406. Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.01(2); State v. Bauman, 586 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998) (upholding admissibility of evidence seized following custodial arrest on gross
misdemeanor charge carrying maximum penalty of one year in jail).
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Other states also significantly limit arrest powers in minor cases.41 17
Indeed, some of these states require issuance of a citation for most
misdemeanor traffic violations,4 " and a few even require citations for
certain non-traffic offenses. 4119 Such rules still permit arrest when the
offender cannot be identified, or when the suspect appears unlikely to
respond to the citation,4"' and a strong argument can be made that
these are the only valid reasons to make a warrantless arrest for a
non-jailable traffic offense. 411 Dangerous drivers-in particular, those
who are drunk or chemically impaired-can usually be charged with
and arrested for more serious offenses.412 Short of that, officer
predictions of "imminent harm" or "continuation" of the violation are
arguably too subjective, unreliable, and inconsistent. Perhaps the
most compelling additional basis for arrest beyond identification or
non-appearance problems would be that the offender has already
resumed the violation for which he has just been charged-for
example, if Ms. Atwater had been cited and then drove off without
407. One national survey found a large number of states with statutes requiring or
strongly encouraging the use of citations for traffic and other minor offenses. See
Salken, supra note 34, at 251 n.189. Additional limits are found in rules of criminal
procedure (e.g., the Minnesota Rules). See also Davies, supra note 4, at 368 (noting
that Justice Souter's own summary of current state laws indicated that at least fifteen
states would not permit warrantless arrest in a case like Atwater).
408. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 9-30-2-5 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-684 (1998);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-123(A) (1978); S.D. Codified Laws § 32-33-2 (2002).
409. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.25.180(b) (2000) (violations); Vt. R. Crim. P. 3(c)
(misdemeanors).
410. Salken, supra note 34, at 266-67; see also id. at 251, n.189 (stating that, in the
twenty-two states with statutes limiting discretion to arrest in traffic cases, by far the
most common exceptions (i.e., permitting arrest) were for lack of satisfactory
identification or risk of non-appearance in court).
411. See Uniform Vehicle Code, supra note 146, §§ 16-203, -204, -206 (stating that,
for minor traffic violations, officers have discretion to arrest only where offender fails
to furnish satisfactory proof of identity or where officer has reasonable and probable
grounds to believe offender will disregard written promise to appear; offender who
refuses to sign promise to appear must be promptly taken to court).
412. If a particular jurisdiction has removed jail penalties for certain potentially
dangerous traffic violations (for example, the first-offense drunk driving offense at
issue in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)), such a violation could justify arrest
for reasons of public safety. See LaFave, Search & Seizure Supplement, supra note 4,
at 23. Arrest may also be needed to obtain scientific evidence of intoxication. If the
legislature has authorized the gathering of such evidence, and if the law would be very
difficult to enforce without such testing, then there is at least an implicit legislative
intent to authorize (and indeed, to encourage) custodial arrest. Such offenses are, to
that limited extent, "jailable." Of course, it would be better if such laws were
amended to explicitly provide that custodial arrest for chemical testing is permitted.
See also Salken, supra note 34, at 274 (arguing that citation should be required for all
adequately-identified violators in traffic cases, except for intoxicated drivers). Other
than cases like Welsh, 466 U.S. 740, the need to arrest in order to conduct further
investigation will be extremely rare in minor traffic cases. LaFave, Search & Seizure
Supplement, supra note 4, at 24; Salken, supra note 34, at 269. The police will usually
have witnessed the offense, already have all the evidence they need to convict, and
expect to find no further evidence in the possession of the suspect. See also Knowles
v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113,118 (1998).
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buckling herself or her children. Of course, the officer can pursue the
offender and issue another ticket. If such cases are deemed to be a
problem, the legislature could specifically authorize arrest for a repeat
violation on the same day, or could provide that such a repeat
violation constitutes a jailable offense.4"3 But unless and until the
arrest rules or traffic laws are changed in this manner, the officer
should assume that the legislature intends no more than a fine, even
for repeated violations. Under such circumstances, the officer's sole
duty and authority should be to ensure that the suspect has been
identified and is likely to appear in court and pay the fine authorized
by the legislature.
The experience of Minnesota and other states shows that strict
limitations on police powers to arrest for minor offenses are workable
in practice and pose no threat to law enforcement and public safety.
Such limits should be enacted by legislatures in all states. But the
political process in some states will not permit the adoption of even
minimal limits on the arrest power. For example, in Texas, following
the Atwater decision, a bill limiting arrests in minor cases passed the
legislature despite great police opposition, but was then vetoed by the
Governor in response to further police pressure.414 If legislative
solutions are not forthcoming, courts can and should impose arrest
limits under the state constitution, supervisory powers, or state rules
of criminal procedure, as proposed above.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Atwater makes little sense based
on the facts of the Petitioner's case, creates serious potential for abuse
of the arrest power, and is not supported by the reasons stated in
Justice Souter's majority opinion. The Court's apparent desire to
limit further growth in the application of reasonableness balancing
analysis may help to explain the result in Atwater, but does not justify
it. The Court could easily have ruled in Ms. Atwater's favor without
creating either unmanageably complex rules for the police and lower
courts or a doctrinal slippery slope. A narrow ruling in her favor
would have done justice in her case and prevented many similarly
unjustified arrests in minor traffic cases. Such a "minimalist" ruling
would also have been more consistent with the Court's usual approach
to deciding novel constitutional issues, and is supported by the strong
policy considerations articulated by Cass Sunstein. As Donald Dripps
has shown, a wider, "maximalist" ruling is often appropriate in
413. Cf. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.89(1) (2001) (stating that third non-jailable traffic
violation within one year, excluding parking violations, is a jailable misdemeanor);
Uniform Vehicle Code, supra note 146, § 17-101(b) (stating that third violation within
one year is jailable).
414. Michele Deitch, Veto Risks Texans' Civil Rights, Dallas Morning News, July 1,
2001, at 5J, available at http://www.dallasnews.com.
2002]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
criminal procedure cases, but Atwater was not such a case. The
Atwater Court lacked sufficient information and experience with
minor-violation arrest standards to issue a wide rule, and thus risked
reaching the wrong result, with serious, unintended consequences.
Although the unfortunate results of Atwater will probably have to
be remedied by statutes, rules, or state constitutional rulings, it is
possible that the Supreme Court will be persuaded in the near future
to revisit this issue and reverse itself, or at least define
"extraordinary" intrusions broadly enough to include many custodial
arrests.4" 5 In recent decades, there have been several instances in
which the Court has overruled a prior decision, sometimes one it had
issued only a few years earlier.416 Alternatively, the Court might seek
to limit Atwater's potential for abuse by cutting back on other over-
broad, pro-police rules, in particular those defining the invocation and
scope of search incident to arrest.417
Several events could force the Court to revisit related Fourth
Amendment doctrines, or Atwater itself. First, the Court may be
presented with a custodial arrest involving even more troubling, but
not clearly "extraordinary" or unusual facts, for instance: a non-white
driver, arrested on much weaker probable cause (or based on a
pretext, and/or racial profiling) for an even more trivial offense such
as a parking or littering offense, searched more frequently or more
thoroughly, and held for longer in a crowded, unsanitary, and
dangerous jail.4is  Alternately (or in addition), the Court might
conclude, based on new empirical data showing the significant or
growing frequency of unnecessary custodial arrests in minor cases
and/or searches "incident" to citation,4 9 that abuses of the unfettered
415. Reinterpretation of the "normal" versus "extraordinary" arrest distinction
would be an example of a subsequent court taking a "minimalist" approach to a prior
decision; for example, by characterizing much of the prior decision as dicta, even
though the authors of that decision intended it to be "maximalist." See Sunstein, supra
note 59, at 19-21; see also Dripps, Constitutional Theory, supra note 71, at 63-72
(arguing that all justices should accept both the holding and the reasoning of prior
decisions, even those with which they strongly disagree, but that the Court should also
feel free to reconsider and openly overrule prior holdings, when appropriate).
416. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), partially overruling Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (regarding victim-impact statements in death penalty
hearings); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), overruling Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (involving search of closed container found in a car);
W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville
School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (requiring flag salute in public schools
in violation of child's religious beliefs).
417. For a list of authorities criticizing this doctrine, see supra note 114.
418. See, e.g., Davenport v. Rodriguez, 147 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Tex. 2001)
(involving non-in-presence arrest for alleged shoplifting). In Davenport, police
officers strip-searched defendant at police station and while in public view, and forced
her to change clothes. Id. at 634. Defendant was then placed in a cell for three hours
before being released. Id. at 637. The trial court dismissed her § 1983 suit, citing
Atwater. Id.
419. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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arrest power granted in Atwater are more common than Justice Souter
had assumed.4 2' The collection of such data will be difficult, 421 but
such research is clearly a high priority.
Finally, the Court may be forced, in light of further developments in
Fourth Amendment law and practice, to reconsider its limits on the
application of reasonableness balancing and the proportionality
principle. It seems inevitable that the Court will be presented with
one or more cases in which the police request additional investigative
authority to deal with terrorism or other threats of catastrophic
harm.422 Indeed, the Court has already suggested in dicta that such
additional authority will be granted.4 23 But if the Supreme Court does
grant such authority, it will face increased pressure to impose
additional limitations on police powers in very minor cases.
Reasonableness balancing and proportionality cannot be allowed to
become a "one way street, to be used only to water down" Fourth
Amendment rights.424
The Atwater decision was puzzling and disappointing, but it also
provides some important lessons about the processes that shape the
development of Fourth Amendment doctrine. With hindsight,
scholars and civil rights litigators can better understand how the Court
went astray in Atwater, and, in the future, avoid some of the problems
that contributed to the Court's unfortunate decision.
Atwater illustrates the variety of ways in which Fourth Amendment
law depends on the accidents of Supreme Court litigation-which
cases come to the Court, with what facts, which arguments, and in
what procedural posture. At the oral argument, Justice O'Connor
told Petitioner's counsel: "[y]ou've got the perfect case. '425 But in
420. Cf. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 773 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(hoping that Justice Souter's assumed "dearth of horribles" was an accurate
perception and prediction, "[blut ... if experience demonstrates 'anything like an
epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests' . .. I hope the Court will reconsider
[Atwater]").
421. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
422. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137
(2002) (arguing that it is both natural and good that additional police powers be
granted in the wake of the September 11th attacks, but that there should be
compensating changes that increase regulation of certain police powers).
423. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up
to thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely
to flee by way of a particular route."); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273 (2000) (noting
that "a report of a person carrying a bomb" might permit a Terry stop, where a similar
report of a man with a gun would not). Some lower courts have already adopted what
amounts to a "terrorism" exception to normal Fourth Amendment requirements. See,
e.g., People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (Cal. 1972).
424. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 465 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that nighttime searches are much more intrusive and should require
additional justification, beyond normal probable cause and warrant requirements,
under the Court's reasonableness balancing approach).
425. Supreme Court Oral argument at 14, Atwater (No. 99-1408).
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fact, Atwater was a deceptively difficult case, due to the Court's
broader concerns about bright-line rules and doctrinal slippery slopes.
Moreover, even the facts were not as strongly in Ms. Atwater's favor
as one might think. Her arrest, handling, and detention were actually
fairly "mild," and carried no hint of racial profiling or pretext. As
suggested above, much worse minor-offense arrest scenarios can and
will arise.
The procedural posture of Ms. Atwater's case-a civil suit,
dismissed on summary judgment-was also problematic. At first
blush, she would seem to benefit, in two ways: unlike most Fourth
Amendment claimants, she was not trying to exclude evidence clearly
establishing her guilt; moreover, the trial court's summary judgment
decision required it and subsequent reviewing courts to assume as true
the relevant facts alleged in her complaint. But did all of the judges
and justices strictly apply this assumption, or did some of them assume
that the facts were probably less strong than she alleged, and that
there may have actually been legitimate reasons for her arrest?
Officer Turek later told a reporter that he arrested Ms. Atwater to
protect her children,426 and this was also the view of the lawyer for the
city of Lago Vista.427 Moreover, Justice Souter stated in a footnote
that "allowing a small child to stand unrestrained in the front seat of a
moving vehicle at least arguably constitutes [felony] child
endangerment. '428 Although judges are believed to be capable of
playing the legalistic mind game of assuming and then ruling upon
hypothetical facts, one wonders if the Atwater majority would have
approved of such outrageous police behavior, or would have been so
willing to assume that such police abuses are rare, if the assumed facts
had actually been proven at trial. Moreover, since the arresting
officer never got a chance to give his reasons for taking Ms. Atwater
into custody, the trial and reviewing courts had no concrete examples
of such reasons, legitimate or illegitimate. Thus any approval or
disapproval of such reasons would have been dicta.429
Furthermore, although Ms. Atwater was not trying to suppress
evidence, she was trying to obtain compensatory and punitive
damages from the arresting officer, as well as from the police chief
and the city of Lago Vista. Justice Souter was very concerned about
the unfairness of subjecting officers to future civil suits, and the
426. Patty Mullins, Turek tells his side of arrest, North Lake Travis Log, May 16,
2001, at http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=1823054&BRD=1553&PAG
=46 1&dept-id=181 (last accessed May 17, 2001).
427. Charles Lane, Police Win Latitude on Minor Cases, Washington Post, Apr. 25,
2001, at Al (stating that attorney Bill Krueger said Ms. Atwater was "endangering the
life of [her] child").
428. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 349 n.20 (2001).
429. Of course, when the Court issues a "wide" ruling, going beyond the specific




deterrent effect that even the threat of liability would have on arrest
decisions-problems that seemed quite real, given the lower court's
rejection of qualified immunity. As was suggested in Part II, qualified
immunity would seem to be appropriate in most such cases, including
this one. But of course, counsel representing Ms. Atwater in her civil
suit was not free to argue for a generous doctrine of qualified
immunity. Finally, Ms. Atwater was clearly guilty of the violation that
led to her arrest; a truly perfect case would have to be brought by a
citizen who was innocent of any violation (and not found, when
searched incident to the arrest, to be carrying anything incriminating).
Supreme Court decisions are also strongly influenced by the
arguments that the parties choose to make and emphasize. As has
been noted at several points in this article, "20/20 hindsight" suggests
that Ms. Atwater and her supporting amici made a number of
mistakes in deciding how to frame and argue the issues in this case. In
particular, they gave too much attention and priority to historical
arguments, and failed to anticipate the issues which most concerned
Justice Souter, namely, the value of simple, readily-administered rules
(the Robinson/Belton argument); the threat of civil liability, despite
qualified immunity protections; the frequency of arrests like Ms.
Atwater's; and the Court's desire, expressed in Whren and earlier
cases, to limit further applications of the reasonableness balancing
analysis. It may also be the case that Petitioner and her supporting
amici, by citing the many model and state rules limiting arrests in
minor cases, gave the Court too many options; this diversity of
possible rules might have made the Court's task seem more complex
than it was, or may have made these issues seem too "legislative.""43 It
probably would have been wiser, both as a matter of litigation strategy
and in terms of general principles of constitutional adjudication (as
articulated by Professor Sunstein), for Petitioner and her amici to give
the Court only one constitutionally required rule, limited to the facts
of the current case (i.e., non-jailable traffic offenses).
Counsel for Ms. Atwater and her supporting amici are not entirely
to blame for their unsuccessful tactics; they didn't get much help from
Fourth Amendment scholars, who have devoted very limited attention
to the specific and broader doctrinal issues in Atwater. This is rather
surprising-a case like Atwater has been expected since 1973, when
the Court decided Robinson and Gustafson. Justices Stewart and
Powell, concurring in those cases, both suggested that some offenses
are too minor to justify custodial arrest.43' Moreover, the holdings of
those cases-permitting routine, suspicionless searches incident to
arrest-clearly put a premium on the underlying question of when
such arrests are constitutionally allowed. That premium grew in value
430. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
431. See supra note 117.
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as the Court: 1) added additional routine search powers to arrests and
to related car-impound and jail-booking procedures; 32 2) refused to
limit pretextual traffic stops; 433 and 3) made it virtually impossible for
most suspects to successfully challenge racially biased police
decisions. 34 The Atwater premium went platinum in 1998 when the
Court held, in Knowles v. Iowa, 35 that a routine "search incident" is
not authorized if the officer has already decided to release the suspect
on citation. Knowles sent a clear message to the police: if you want to
search, be sure to arrest first (or at least, say you're going to) rather
than ticket the offender. That same year, the Court heard arguments
but then dismissed the writ in a case challenging custodial arrest for a
non-jailable business-licensing violation.436
Thus it was inevitable that the Court would eventually have to
decide whether there are any constitutional limits beyond probable
cause on in-public arrests for very minor offenses. Similarly, the
Court's recent preference for overbroad, pro-police bright-line rules is
well known, as was the steadily expanding application of
reasonableness balancing. Sooner or later, the Court would have to
decide whether certain categories of search and seizure are excluded,
a priori, from balancing analysis, and are governed instead by cruder
categories tied to the degree of suspicion (no police power, if no
individualized suspicion; very limited power, with reasonable
suspicion; largely unfettered power, if the police act with probable
cause).
Scholars were well aware of these developments, but did not link
most of them to the looming question posed by Atwater. Some
scholars disapproved of reasonableness balancing, apparently thinking
that it would only be used to expand police powers.4 7 Very few
writers emphasized the importance of offense severity in
reasonableness balancing analysis, and even fewer explicitly
recognized the important concept of Fourth Amendment
proportionality.438
432. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing Belton, Bertine, and
Lafayette).
433. See supra notes 11, 192-94, 250-53 and accompanying text (discussing Whren).
434. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
435. 525 U.S. 113 (1998); see supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
437. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
438. See supra note 301. Scholars who have recognized the proportionality concept
have not always emphasized or even discussed offense severity. See, e.g., Rory K.
Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role,
68 Fordham L. Rev. 723, 727 (1.999) (arguing that prosecutors should balance public
and private costs of intrusive investigative measures against factors such as offense
gravity, the likely benefit of the measure, and the availability of less intrusive means);
Slobogin, Proportionality Principle, supra note 301, at 1053 (proposing that increasing
degrees of suspicion-from reasonable suspicion, to probable cause, to clear and
convincing evidence-justify increasing degrees of governmental intrusion).
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Could counsel for Ms. Atwater and her supporting amici, or
scholars writing on contemporary Fourth Amendment issues, have
done better? Could they have changed the result in Atwater?
Perhaps not. But the Court's disastrous decision at least suggests the
need for a more strategic view of Supreme Court advocacy and policy-
oriented scholarship. Advocates must do a better job of anticipating
the issues that will concern the Court, or certain Justices, even if those
concerns are not clearly reflected in the other side's briefs. Scholars
must do a better job of identifying critical "open" questions of the sort
presented in Atwater, and analyzing how the Court is likely to address
those questions in light of its recent decisions, interpretative theories,
and competing policies.
Notes & Observations
